*NEWS ANALYSIS – The humanitarian disaster that occurs in Nagorno-Karabakh, a region of the Caucasus that seems far from Italy and Europe, but with which our country has intense commercial relations (the pipeline network will start from Azerbaijan, which will reach up to Puglia with Tap), is the rekindling of a conflict that has been going on for 30 years. In these few weeks of fighting there have already been more than 70,000 displaced people, at least 70 civilians have been killed on both sides, Covid-19 is hitting violently and with exponential figures in Armenia and Azerbaijan, a winter is approaching in where the risk will be the scarce food supplies. The escalation of autumn is the latest flare-up of what is regarded as a “frozen conflict”, but now more than ever we understand how wrong that definition is.
The context shows such a situation: the Azeris lost the war with the Armenians 30 years ago, and the control of seven regions (most populated by Azerbaijanis) around Nagorno (land under the Azerbaijan government, but for the 85% Armenian); the premier of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, has begun to adopt a more aggressive and nationalist rhetoric; both, Azeris and Armenians, consider Nagorno-Karabakh a sacred land and want control, while the OSCE Minsk group (Russia, France, USA) has completely failed and failed to force either of them to make concessions . Now, Azerbaijan launches a war to regain lost territories, encouraged by an unprecedented positioning of Turkey, which supports it and has never taken part as directly as today: there are confirmed reports that the Azeris are using drones provided by Erdogan, to their some Syrian mercenaries are also fighting alongside.
But let’s say one thing right away: these mercenaries are not jihadists. Religion has nothing to do with this conflict. Let’s go back to broadening the field to the external protagonists. There is Ankara, which was the “game changer”. And there is Russia, which was surprised by Erdogan’s acceleration and was slow to act, even though many think that Putin has the power to decide when and how to eventually stop the escalation. Moscow and Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, have a military cooperation pact linked to membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the joint air defense system of the Commonwealth of Independent States, born after the dissolution of the USSR .
The question, then, is: why is Russia not doing anything for its strategic ally-partner? Meanwhile, relations have changed since 2018, when Pashinyan came to power, who immediately positioned himself as a democratic leader and came one step away from calling for integration with the EU, all moves that certainly Putin does not like. Russia also has perfect relations with the Azeris, is an active part in the country’s arms race, to which it has provided 31% of the supply: in short, Azerbaijan is anything but an enemy of Moscow. For this, Russia has always tried to ensure a balance, maintain the status quo and not wanting to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh status conflict. I do not exclude that Putin does not advance the Azeris, pushing them to take back 5 of the regions, and then become the peacekeeper. It is equally unlikely, however, that Moscow will accept the Turkish military presence on the ground, but on the other hand it will not fuel any kind of confrontation with Erdogan: the two leaders, Putin and Erdogan, have always capitalized on their respective interests, even when these they are conflicting, so in Libya, so in Syria. They work on divisions: important energy relations exist between the two countries. In short, Russia has an interest in keeping the conflict alive, but it also has the power to enforce the ceasefire.
So the priority now is to stop the war. The EU cannot remain silent. The Azeris are very much encouraged, even on social networks, not to give anything up and appeal to international law, while the Armenians for historical reasons. The role of the EU? Bring the parties to respect the Madrid principles of 2007 by developing a guarantee and security mechanism for the people of Nagorno Karabakh. At that point, the course could be of this type: that Armenia slowly withdraws from the surrounding regions, and that then in the long term we will arrive at the definition of a status for the torn and disputed Nagorno-Karabakh.
* Head of the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Program Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)
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