Ge Hongliang, Associate Dean, Guangxi University for Nationalities
Editor’s note: For many people, the news that Myanmar’s Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint and other dignitaries were detained by the military on the morning of February 1 came very suddenly. But in the eyes of people who have been observing the situation in Myanmar for a long time, all this has been foreshadowed. “I don’t think anyone can say exactly what will happen in the next three days, but it is clear that Myanmar is moving towards the worst constitutional crisis since the abolition of the old military government in 2010.” The former UN Secretary-General U Thant, the famous Myanmar Historian Dan Minwu said on social media at the end of January. In general, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi has been cautiously maintaining cooperative relations with the military since taking office. However, since the NLD’s overwhelming victory in the general election in November last year, the military and its allies have continuously accused of “election fraud.” The political atmosphere in Myanmar has continued to intensify, as the new parliament convenes on February 1st. , The military’s attitude has become increasingly tough. The general election may be just a fuse. The reasons for the military’s actions are multiple, including changes in Myanmar’s power structure, concerns about the weakening of its political status, and differences with the Democratic League on many issues.
1. Some “important clues” from last year’s election
It was still dark on February 1, and the Burmese military launched a clear and critical operation, including detention, propaganda control, social control, and power transfer.
First, detain the leaders of the Democratic League and related parties, as well as some minority political parties and student leaders. Related news showed that in addition to Aung San Suu Kyi and Wen Min, the Minister of Education, Yangon Chief Minister, Chief Minister of Mandalay Province, Chief Minister of Magway Province, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s personal lawyer and health doctor were also taken away. Waiting for nearly 30 people. According to local media and social media in Myanmar on the 2nd, some chief ministers of some provinces have returned home that day. Second, Myanmar’s national television station suffered a “technical” suspension, and after it resumed broadcasting later, it became the main channel for the Myanmar military to issue a state of emergency and announce the creation of a new government. Third, complete social control. Measures include suspending domestic and international flights, temporarily shutting down banking and financial services, issuing curfew orders, and once cutting off the Internet and communications in major cities. Fourth, quickly complete the transfer and removal of power, announce that national power will be transferred to the control of the commander-in-chief of the National Defense Forces Min Aung Lai, and appoint at least 11 new federal ministers. At this point, the Myanmar military has established a civilian government headed by Acting President Min Rui to stand in the foreground to represent its own interests.
At the same time, the public opinion field formed a tit-for-tat confrontation between the Myanmar military and the NLD. The spokesperson of the NLD government initially stated publicly that it hoped that the people would not act rashly and abide by the law. However, the statement released on Aung San Suu Kyi’s social media at noon on the 1st began to emphasize not to accept the military’s actions and to fight back. The Myanmar military stated that there was a large-scale “fraud” in the general election last November, saying that the actions of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD made democratic elections meaningless.
As the saying goes, the rain is about to come, and the occurrence of the “February crisis” in Myanmar has actually been foreshadowed, and some important clues can be seen from the key issues before and after the election last year. Myanmar has held three national elections since 2008, and last year’s general election can be said to be the most violent incident. The intensity of party competition is evident. On a weekend in early October, a family in Magway Province, Myanmar, was attacked by more than 100 people after playing the NLD’s victory song. A leader of the NLD’s township executive committee and his family were rescued, but their houses, cars, etc. To destruction. On October 29, members of the Democratic League were attacked by violent elements armed with weapons at a campaign rally, and the rally was threatened before it was held. Near the general election on November 6, the seat of the Election Committee of Bago Province in Myanmar was attacked by bombs and some buildings were destroyed. According to the police, the operation was carefully planned.
When the NLD worried that violence would affect the general election process last year, accusations of “election fraud” have been rampant, and they have finally become the reason for the Myanmar military to launch this action. As early as August 2020, the military and its representative Federal Solidarity and Development Party (Gongfa Party) and partner parties began to focus on issues such as the freedom and fair environment of the general election. At that time, Min Aung Lai stated bluntly when meeting with the leaders of 34 political parties that he was willing to do anything necessary for Myanmar. The Gong Fa Party and others expressed their hope that Min Anglai can help in the case of unfair voting. Some participants said that if “fraud” occurs, there is no organization that can ask the affected people to ask for help, and they can only seek the support of Min Anglai.
After the results of the general election were released, accusations of “improper behavior” and “fraud” by the NLD government and the Election Committee triggered a series of protests. On November 17 last year, the National Political Democratic Party held a demonstration in Taunggyi, Shan State, claiming that there had been a phenomenon of “representative voting”, which did not appear in the previous two general elections. On November 22, a demonstration of more than 500 people was held in Bengpiao Town, Magway Province; on the same day, about 200 demonstrators gathered in front of the Miaowadi office of the Gongfa Party. On January 14, 2021, a demonstration involving more than a thousand people was held in the town of Metyla, Mandalay Province. The protesters supported the military’s request for a review of “fraud” in ballots. At the end of January, similar protests continued to erupt in Yangon and other places.
As the date of the new parliament approaches, the game between the military and the Democratic League has become increasingly fierce. The NLD, the government, and the Election Committee have always denied the military’s accusations, while Min Anglai and others have shown an increasingly tough posture on the topic of “election fraud.” On January 27, Min Anglai stated in a video speech that the 2008 Constitution is “the mother law of all laws” and should be respected, but it is necessary to revoke the constitution under certain circumstances.
The media reported last week that the relationship between the NLD government and the military “suddenly tightened.” The police sent a large number of personnel to various key locations in Naypyidaw, including strengthening the security of the parliament building, because there was news that demonstrators might gather in the capital. . In addition, the NLD and military leaders held talks last Thursday, but they were “unsuccessful.” “We can’t pretend that nothing happened.” A Democratic League member said a few days ago.
2. Significant changes in the development of political power
By accusing all parties of “violating the laws and procedures before voting” and repeatedly stating that they have a responsibility to oppose unconstitutional behaviors, the Myanmar military emphasized its status as the country’s “guardian” and constitutional defender. Taking action provides a basis for legal principles and public opinion. However, the unbalanced development and inherent tension between Myanmar’s existing power structure, institutional arrangements and agenda are the root causes of the “February crisis.”
In the view of the Myanmar military, their dominant power in the development of the country’s democratic politics is facing increasingly significant challenges. One manifestation is that it is increasingly difficult to check and balance the NLD through the existing democratic election system.
As we all know, Myanmar is a multi-party country with large and small political parties established on the basis of different values, such as development, democracy, and ethnicity. Among them, the Democratic League and the Gongfa Party are the most representative. As the largest opposition party in Myanmar’s political arena, the Democratic League won the 2015 and 2020 general elections. The front with it as the core and its supporters is an important part of the political struggle structure in Myanmar. The main members of the Gongfa Party were born out of the military, and they are the spokespersons and important defenders of the Myanmar military in the political arena. With this party as the core, its supporters and allied parties form another front. At the same time, there is another important force in Myanmar’s political arena-the minority political parties that were previously regarded as “king makers” in the general election are one of the important targets of the NLD and the Gongfa Party.
Despite the traditional structure of politics, after the last two general elections, the development of various forces has undergone rapid changes. The Democratic League not only won the 2020 general election, but also won 83% of the votes and won 396 seats out of 476 federal parliament seats. The Gongfa Party’s election results showed a downward trend, winning only 33 seats last year. This shows that the Gongfa Party has lost its ability to compete with the Democratic League in democratic elections.
In addition, the NLD’s sweeping victory last year also deprived ethnic minority parties of the ability to “make kings”, and their status has shown a significant downward trend. In this situation, the military no longer has any expectations for checking and balancing the Democratic League through elections under the existing constitutional system.
3. The contradiction between structural dominant power and institutional power
The military may also face further pursuit by the NLD through constitutional amendments. The successive defeats of the Gongfa Party have disappointed the military, and the NLD’s continuous fuss on issues such as constitutional amendments and amnesty for military personnel has greatly stimulated the military and made the latter consider counterattacking. Regarding the issue of constitutional amendment, the interaction and game between the parties mainly revolves around two core issues: the qualifications of presidential candidates and the issue of military representation.
For Aung San Suu Kyi, she hopes to become the president of Myanmar and promote her own design for the development of the country, including the complete transformation of Myanmar into a democratic country and the restoration of civilian control of the military. For the military, it is an important goal to prevent Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming president through the design of the 2008 constitution. But more importantly, the democratic lines and plans promoted under the 2008 Constitution cannot aim at weakening the power of the military. That is to say, in their view, any democratic transformation and political development in Myanmar cannot be “done” on the military.
However, the NLD has proposed on the constitutional amendment agenda to gradually reduce the 25% of the parliamentary seats currently reserved for non-democratic military members in the constitution. This will not only make the military gradually lose the veto power in the parliament, but also make them feel their power suffers. Threatened. In March last year, the China Democratic League launched a vote to amend the constitution, but almost all proposals including weakening the political power of the military and restrictions on presidential qualifications were rejected. To amend the constitution, 75% of parliamentarians must agree.
In addition, there is more tension between the structural dominant power of the military and the agenda and system power obtained by the NLD through the election victory. The two sides have differences and conflicts of interests on many issues. Among them, the Rohingya and the 21st century The issue of the “Panglong Conference” is the most obvious. Regarding the Rohingya issue, although the NLD government and the military have been criticized, the military is the direct target of sanctions and accusations, and their attitude on this issue is quite tough. The right to live in Myanmar. Therefore, the attitudes and opinions of the military and the NLD government on this issue are not consistent.
Regarding the issues of the “Panglong Conference” in the 21st century, the promotion of dialogue and the expansion of participation in the dialogue are what Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD government eagerly hope to see, but the military has never lowered its armed forces against ethnic minorities. “Diwu”) “Let down their weapons” request, that this is a prerequisite for their participation in the national reconciliation and peace process. For this reason, the conflict between the military and the “civil warrior” in northern Myanmar has not been interrupted even during the spread of the new crown pneumonia epidemic last year. This means that although the NLD has made progress on a number of issues since it came to power to promote the country’s economic and social development and promote Myanmar’s further opening up, it has not made significant progress in eliminating differences and contradictions with the military. Therefore, once the tension between the NLD’s agenda, institutional power, and the military’s structural power is rapidly expanding, the latter is likely to take tough actions.
At the moment, Myanmar faces more uncertainties in political, economic and social order. If chaos occurs, then the epidemic prevention and control will encounter more severe challenges. Therefore, it should be welcomed by all parties to peacefully solve problems and ensure the stability of Myanmar’s national order under the Myanmar constitutional government and legal procedures.
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