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Marcos Jr.’s Defence Cooperation Policy: The Genie Cannot be Resealed

The Philippines has always been strategic in its political and economic relationships, both locally and internationally, and its defense cooperation policy plays a significant role in shaping that stance. With the recent appointment of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. as the country’s defense secretary, there have been concerns about how his policies would impact the Philippines’ foreign relationships, particularly with the United States. In this article, we examine Marcos Jr.’s defense cooperation policy and how it affects the Philippines’ diplomatic relations with its allies. We discuss whether or not there is any truth to the notion that Marcos Jr.’s policy will worsen the country’s foreign policies or if it is merely a case of trying to put the genie back in the bottle.


The Marcos Jr. administration’s defence cooperation policy, which seeks closer ties with the U.S., has faced criticism from both domestic political opposition and even his own sister, Imee Marcos. In a recent hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which she chairs, Marcos grilled the defence and foreign affairs chiefs over the new sites under the U.S.-Philippine Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) announced on 1 February this year.

While many have celebrated President Marcos Jr.’s “strategic reboot” with the U.S., some believe it marks a swing too far back towards the U.S. This perception was heightened by the administration’s messaging and thoughts about a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan and “Quad” patrols in the South China Sea, exacerbating concerns about the Philippines aligning itself too closely with the U.S. against China.

China’s expanding business footprint in the Philippines has created a powerful lobby, keen on side-stepping geopolitical and territorial disputes like the West Philippine Sea, where the country faces immediate territorial incursions from China. This has created a strong opposition to the EDCA sites, with governors of two of the three proposed provinces hesitant to host the sites.

The administration’s messaging on Marcos Jr.’s defence cooperation policy has lacked clarity at times, raising concerns about U.S. intentions and the impact of foreign troop presence on local communities, adding further complexity to the issue.

The national security establishment does not treat the defence of Taiwan as a core national security interest, with their immediate concern being improving deterrent measures for future South China Sea territorial disputes. This diverges from the messaging of the U.S., Australia and Japan, who seem to enlist the Philippines as part of a broader China containment club.

Overshadowed by the threat of broader conflicts, the operational-level objective of military facilities hardening under EDCA is not being debated on its own terms, which impairs the long-term robustness of the U.S.-Philippine security partnership, providing China the opportunity to take advantage of the uncertainties.

In reality, EDCA is not a return to the scale of pre-1992 American military basing in the Philippines. The Philippines must do more to articulate the rationale behind Marcos’ defence cooperation policy and emphasise its limited purpose, which should help to allay concerns about the country becoming a lily pad for American troops’ forward posture in Asia.

By providing counter-arguments against sceptics of engagement with the U.S., Filipino defence officials stand a better chance of gaining confidence with a Philippine public that is overwhelmingly critical of Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Strategically, China has further pushed Filipino fishermen from fishing grounds and continued dangerous manoeuvres. Any sustainable defence engagement policy must reconcile both past realities of Duterte’s wariness of the U.S. and the principled defiance of Aquino III against China to protect Filipino sovereignty.

The Philippine security establishment has the duty-bound responsibility to respond to operational threats, and so it cannot avoid taking calculated risks to improve the country’s force posture, even as the country navigates through sensitive geopolitical terrain. Ultimately, any new administration must reconcile these realities as it charts its course into the future.

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