‘Metro 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54 are not running. Cause: malfunction of the traffic control system. We don’t know how long this will take. Where possible, use the bus, tram and train.’
It was certainly not the first time that travelers were warned via the GVB’s twitter account last Saturday afternoon that the entire metro network was down. It took a few hours for metro traffic to get going again.
Thursday afternoon it was also hit – then only the North/South line was still running – and for weeks there have been daily reports that metros are running with fewer vehicles.
‘Shitshow’
The transport company gets hit on social media. “What a shit show, delays and breakdowns every week,” tweeted one disgruntled traveler.
That is not right, because the problems can be traced to the new security system. And it is not the GVB but the Transport Region that has opted for this. Within this, the municipality of Amsterdam is the most important player.
Two months ago, the security system was also to blame network crash, like twice earlier last spring. The old security system, which the city council has been saying for years, is on its very, very last legs.
tinkered with passion
Passionately tinkering with the software of the new system by the French producer Alstom followed, after which responsible alderman Egbert de Vries gave the green light for use again a month ago. In a letter to the council, he warned of more disruptions. And, it must be said, he kept his word.
During the disruptions, the traffic control system regularly loses the composition of the coupled trains. As a result, the traffic controller temporarily receives incorrect information on his screen. For example, the order of the trainsets may have suddenly changed or the trainsets seem disconnected from each other. This only concerns incorrect information on the air traffic controller’s screen, but metros cannot run without that system.
The new security system has been regarded as a headache file in the town hall, about which the municipal council now wishes to be informed monthly. The perils are related to the complex course of the Amsterdam metro system. With the exception of the North/South line, which has an exclusive route, the other metro lines share each other’s track.
Different wagons
The internationally accepted software that ensures that metros do not collide and that they run on time is not designed for this. Moreover, unlike many other cities, Amsterdam does not have a uniform fleet, but metro trains of varying lengths and manufacturers, with different doors. That is also complicated for the security software.
Amsterdam has that heavily underestimated, said Karl Bergner (until his retirement at the end of last year, chief of the Vienna metro network) in late September in The Parool. The former chairman of the Metro Committee of the European Public Transport Industry Association knows of no other example of a city struggling for so long and for so much money with a new system of ‘signalling & control’, as it is called in rail jargon.
Bergner called the security decision-making “ill-considered” and “reckless.” He foresees that the current budget of 265 million euros – originally budgeted at 178 million – will not be enough.
‘Known shortcomings’
In the council letter, alderman De Vries indicated in October that continuing to drive longer with the old safety system had the advantage that ‘a number of known technical shortcomings’ in the new system could be solved in the meantime. Other snags in the new system, however, only become apparent in practice. This is one of the reasons why he wanted to start working with the new system again.
For example, metro travelers in Amsterdam may be part of an experiment with an uncertain outcome. D66 councilor Jan Bert Vroege asks De Vries again this week for text and explanation. So to be continued.
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