“Lebanese Debate” – Abdullah Kameh
In the “Kahhala” incident, it is not only the incident itself that is important as much as the political and security events that preceded it and those that will follow.
It seemed clear, since before the presidential vacancy, that the opposition forces were continuing to confront Hezbollah in a harsher manner. At that time, I attended the “Tayyouneh” confrontations, with all their experience and transformations, which were used in the course of adjusting the mood of the Christian environment. Later, the presidential vacancy came at a time when there was no room available to secure consensus on the alternative.
With all the Christian forces rallying behind a logic that says that they have the right to be named in the first place, the opposition forces found a favorable climate that prompted them to prefer the “challenging” candidates in the face of “Hezbollah” over the “centrists”.
As a result of the transformation, the opposition forces built an assessment that they could achieve breakthroughs, and they were helped by the fact that the “Shiite duo” lost a significant Christian team.
In the opposition’s account, the amendment of the prevailing political “approach” must contain influential elements that lead to achieving a “political strike” targeting the party and its allies. In her belief, the first strike was actually achieved as a result of a “political rift” between Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement. At first, the opposition supported the candidacy of Michel Moawad, and later on Jihad Azour. Today, a discussion is being proposed within the framework of putting forward a third candidate, on the condition that this time it takes place in conjunction with outside powers.
Between these and those, security turmoil occurred and is still occurring, some of which are deliberate and others are coincidental, such as the “Ain Ebel” and “Kahala” incidents, which coincided on the same day, and their effects were as strong as those intended.
According to the current course, it is not possible to hide that the results that followed the two incidents were “orchestrated”, by inferring the opposition forces’ intensification and waiting for the opportunity, starting with the shift that took place in the speech of the head of the Kataeb Party, Sami Gemayel, who openly called for “taking exceptional steps and moving from the traditional method of political action to another site,” and not least the call of the 12 deputies from the opposition to “broad consultation among themselves to comprehensively reconsider the path of confrontation with the party system and its allies, calling for the launch of a new phase of confrontation.”
In practice, what is feared is that talk will turn in the next stage to the executive framework, sympathizing with actual measures that the opposition forces seem to be facing politically and on the ground.
In addition to the political test, the party will be in front of a stage of testing movements (or interventions) on the ground of a popular nature, especially at specific highly sensitive points on the lines it uses for “transportation”, which is exactly what the opponents aim for. In speaking of transformations, it is noticeable that the Kataeb Party’s discourse is ahead of the “Lebanese Forces” discourse.
If the latter is waiting for the content of a signal coming from abroad to understand the trends in the next stage, and it does not seem within reach, as there is no decision to completely ignite the Lebanese situation, but rather to heat the environments and employ events and invest them, then the “brigades” present themselves as a project capable of “effective confrontation.” Using the results of what was achieved in “Al-Kahala”.
In fact, after the “Kahala Incident”, “Hezbollah” went to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the path, starting with the truck’s slide and what followed, stressing that it began within approximately 3 hours of the accident’s life, fearful and avoiding being drawn into any reaction, despite the repeated provocations. Which reached the point of launching “sectarian insults” towards his members who remained committed to the directives, which prompted him to show his weapon directly, and then the shooting was nothing but observing the elements of the “accompaniment and protection” attacks that began to be launched against them accompanied by the spread of weapons from the other side, and later their use .
Although the evaluation process will, of course, include all aspects of the incident, it must be noted that a point that causes the party’s sensitivity is related to the delay in the army’s intervention. If the army was able to move quickly in the vicinity of Ain al-Hilweh camp with the help of the “Commando” regiment, then why did it leave “Al-Kahala” in the custody of the Intelligence Directorate alone?
What is certain is that the party will not let the process of assessing the situation exceed the possibility of the incident recurring in the future on other lines that share the same amount of sensitivity. on the possibility of similar incidents occurring in the future.
The party must take into account the wager of those forces to take advantage of the tense atmosphere that arises in the face of the party or is working to create it. It believes that it has removed an effective cover from it (or removes it). In fact, some of those forces have arranged their papers on the basis that targeting the party’s members While carrying out their tasks, from Shuya to Tayouneh to Kahala, he suggests a break in prestige that began politically and will end militarily.
2023-08-12 04:47:52
#AlKahala.. #worst #expected
