“Lebanese Debate” – Abdullah Kameh
The words of the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, yesterday, during the memorial service for the late Ayatollah Sheikh Afif Al-Nabulsi, and his indication that “the Americans will take us to a painful and catastrophic reality in light of the great intervention and American hegemony in Lebanon,” imply important indications and must be taken into consideration. Take into account, and suggests a future escalation that coincides with the acceleration of two unresolved crises: financial and security in the midst of a political crisis that is no less severe.
In the financial aspect, the “acting” Governor of the Banque du Liban, Wassim Mansouri, decided to stop funding the Lebanese state since the beginning of next week, in response to the escape policy pursued by the business-banking government regarding covering the “exchange” from the compulsory reserve, according to the demand of Mansouri and his companions. This means, in the event that it happens, sending a message to public sector employees, especially civilians, that no money or salaries will be paid to them during the coming months, and then telling other civilians to rejoice in the exchange rate gifts. In addition to the extent of this rhetoric, any similar situation may result in political repercussions – a protest that will spread to the streets, while the reports of all agencies suggest that any similar protest in such unusual circumstances may result in a “mini October 17”.
So there is a “shake” coming. Where are the Americans here? It is easy to find them by scrutinizing the details of the financial rams and the field crises that may withdraw into it, and these words are the result of summaries keeping pace with the American atmosphere in Beirut, to the effect that Washington has moved to play direct roles in what is related to the presidential file, in connection with the results of the review of the “quinquennial meeting.” The last one, which was held in the Qatari capital, Doha, and which delegated to France the last attempt to produce a solution by understanding. On the way to that, it seems that the preparation of the Lebanese arena has begun.
This leads us to the security aspect, which is witnessing a clear heat (or heating) in the Ain al-Hilweh camp and is about to develop further in the coming days, in light of the absence of the group that controls or influences the combatants, especially members of the “Fatah” movement, and the lack of desire among the Islamists, Especially the League of Supporters, from the current round passing without consolidation of gains and presence.
Practically, the visit of the head of the Palestinian Authority’s General Intelligence, Majid Faraj, to Beirut last week and the “Palestinian” meetings he held cannot be isolated from the context of what is going on. Here we do not confirm or deny his involvement in spreading an atmosphere that helped push the “Fatah” movement into battle. Rather, the atmosphere that was reported about the results of his Palestinian meetings suggested that the man hopes (or seeks) to calm the Palestinian movements (and movements) of an Islamic nature within the camps or borders. Of which. It seemed that he had a specific interest in paying attention to the presence of both Hamas and Islamic Jihad movements, especially in the southern camps. Later, it was understood that Faraj was aiming to achieve “security leaps” in relation to the new situation in the West Bank, as if he were linking the squares.
Regardless of going into the details of what is happening in the Ain al-Hilweh camp, due to the lack of an accurate or solid narration, what can be recorded is that Islamic currents of all kinds, especially “Jund al-Sham” and “Muslim youth” and all branches supporting Salafi jihadism, were comfortable with Faraj’s visit. . The field audit indicates that it gained vitality or that it sensed danger from it, so it took the initiative to move. Despite all that is said about the performance of the “Fatah” movement and its militants in Ain al-Hilweh, their loss, dispersion, division, and military impotence, the Islamist fighters, on the other hand, maintain their solidarity and were often the initiators of the attack on Fatah’s points, which shows their desire to Achieving qualitative “field” progress at the expense of movement. This hypothesis must be read for several reasons: perhaps they feel the weakness of Fatah and therefore this deficit must be “liquidated” whether by controlling its positions or trying to modify the map of influence at its expense, and on the other hand it provides “support” for them, and here is the origin of the story . The continuation of these fighters during the 5 days of clashes must be accompanied by military and logistical supplies. The question is: Where do they get weapons from?
In practice, information from the “Lebanese Debate” revealed that the number of current fighters at the Islamic level is estimated at approximately 290 to 300 fighters, which is a moving number. They are divided into approximately 230/240 members belonging to the “Asbat al-Ansar”, the strongest Islamic organization, and 50/60 distributed among the other forces, from Jund al-Sham and the Muslim Youth, who are practically commanded by Bilal Badr and his colleague Haitham al-Sha’bi. On the other hand, there were frequent reports of the entry of a group of extremist Islamic fighters who previously fought in the ranks of “ISIS” from Turkey using smuggling lines. Their number was estimated at 10 fighters at least, without the Lebanese security services being able to confirm whether this number was real or not. or identify them. What opened the door to doubt about the possibility of their presence, was the frequency of sources inside the camp about the death of an unknown person who was accompanied by the Islamic leader Mahmoud Khalil, known as “Abu Qatada”, following an assassination attempt on the latter late last month, during which one of his companions was killed and wounded. The “unknown” dead man was classified as a “stranger” from the camp, and he was not registered there and had no activity in the past, which suggested the presence of foreign fighters or strangers. “The Lebanese Debate” learned that the Lebanese security services, in cooperation with other Palestinians inside the camp, are working on Checking the validity of this possibility.It is attributed to the references following the situation in Ain al-Hilweh, their belief in the presence of these fighters and their direct influence on the course of the battle and the atmosphere that preceded it, asserting that they joined others affiliated with the “Islamic State” organization. On a small scale, they all constitute what can be called the “superior or professional battalion” on the battle lines.
The most important question remains: Who supports the Islamist fighters or revives their “repressed” tendency to control the Ain Al-Hilweh camp and for what purpose? More precisely, who ordered the liquidation of the Fatah leader, Abu Ashraf al-Armoushi, to start this torrent without Fatah being able to stop it? This question opens up horizons, especially since a group of security reports indicated that Al-Armoushi was monitored throughout the last period, and most of his movements were known and monitored, and he was informed of this, which prompted him to change the procedures of his movement periodically. In short, why now?
2023-08-04 04:18:49
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