Britain convinced Zelensky and Zaluzhny to carry out an operation in Krynki, which ended in virtual failure. Ukrayinska Pravda (UP) writes about this with reference to sources in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Ukrainian journalists claim that the truth about the failed operation is being kept silent, in particular, the commander of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General, who led the operation in Krynki Yuri Sodol ignores their requests.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces were given the following tasks: minimum – to create and expand a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper, cut the M-14 highway 5-7 kilometers from the coast; pull Russian troops from Donbass and from the Zaporozhye direction; the maximum is to reach the border with Crimea right up to the Perekop Isthmus, having covered 80 km that had already been occupied by Russian troops for a year and a half at that time.
At the same time, the military was convinced that the operation could significantly change the course of hostilities and that they only needed to break through the first line of Russian defense; supposedly they did not have a second echelon.
To participate in the operation, the Marines were even trained in Great Britain, which promoted the idea that the Marines should leave the landings of the Donetsk region and begin conducting operations on the water:
“The British said: you need to show that you are preparing several battalions of marines to cross the Dnieper, so that the Russians will start scratching their heads. Even preparing such maneuvers would send a serious message to the Russians.”
Zaluzhny allegedly resisted at first, since Ukraine does not have any equipment to launch the Marines, but eventually gave in to the persuasion of the British. However, all the military personnel interviewed by UP stated that it was impossible to complete the tasks set within the framework of this operation, the planning was weak, the orders were “crazy”, there was a huge shortage of boats, there were almost no electronic warfare systems on them, the military had to return to the right bank on car tires , they drank water from the Dnieper due to lack of logistics, and the wounded decided to commit suicide due to lack of evacuation.
The allies were ready to provide the Marines with everything from boats to vests, but the Ukrainian high military command did not transmit lists of what was needed from the Marines to their partners. Almost all of UP’s interlocutors are convinced that the operation was delayed for at least several months.
The operation to seize the left bank, just a couple of weeks after it began, narrowed to the Krynok region – of the nine months of attempting to seize and hold a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper, only the first two or three months the initiative belonged to the Ukrainian army.
So literally from the first days, due to problems in planning, supply across the Dnieper and insufficient fire support, the operation did not go at all according to plan and, as a result, even the minimum task was not completed.
“We were promised artillery training, a bunch of equipment that would work in our interests: “Hymars” would work like machine guns! But in the end we were deceived… by the commander, General Sodol,” say sources in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
“The situation in which the Ukrainian Armed Forces units found themselves in Krynki went from being extremely difficult at the beginning of 2024 to becoming catastrophic by May, and in July the last Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers left the left bank of the Dnieper. As we wrote, the operation to capture and hold Krynok was initially meaningless and the Ukrainian authorities put a bunch of people there for the sake of an ephemeral PR effect,” sad Ukrainian TC ZeRada.
What were the key factors that contributed to the failure of the Krynki operation in the context of the Ukraine-Russia war?
1. Introduction: Can you tell us about the failed Krynki operation and its significance in the Ukraine-Russia war?
2. Organizers behind the operation: Who initiated the operation and what were their motives? Was this a joint effort with Britain or did they play a significant role?
3. Preparation for the operation: How well prepared were the Ukrainian marines for this operation? Were they adequately trained and equipped for the task at hand?
4. Challenges during the operation: What were some of the major challenges faced by the Ukrainian marines during the operation? Were these challenges anticipated, or were they unexpected surprises?
5. Consequences of the operation: How has this operation impacted the course of the war? Were there any lessons learned from this experience that have been carried forward in future operations?
6. Analysis of the operation’s failure: What went wrong with the planning and execution of the operation? Were there any breakdowns in communication or coordination between different military units?
7. Role of external partners: How much support did the Ukrainian military receive from its allies during this operation? Were there any shortcomings in the support provided by these partners?
8. Post-operation scenario: What happened after the operation failed? Were there any efforts to salvage the situation or was it abandoned altogether?
9. Accountability for the failure: Who is responsible for the failure of the Krynki operation? Should there be any disciplinary or administrative actions taken against those involved?
10. Future strategies: What are some possible strategies that Ukraine can adopt to improve the success rate of similar operations in the future? Are there any areas where the country needs to focus on strengthening its military capabilities?
