Iran’s Direct Response to Israeli Strike Sparks New Middle East Conflict

Written by the editors

Iran entered the arena of direct combat with Israel “without gloves,” in response to a strike on its consulate in Damascus. The response was direct, broad, and influential, politically and perhaps militarily, despite Israeli claims that it shot down 99% of the drones and missiles. However, Tehran, which mastered the policy of playing on the edge of the abyss and measuring its steps well, departed from the “policy of strategic patience” with Israel in a controlled and calculated manner.

According to what the American newspaper The New York Times reported from Israeli officials, during its attack, Iran launched 185 drones of various types, 110 surface-to-surface missiles, and 36 cruise missiles. The attack continued for 5 hours, and mainly targeted military bases and structures, avoiding economic or civilian targets.

The American Politico website, for its part, said that these attacks “brought the confrontations between Iran and Israel out of the shadows and through proxies into the open, explicitly and directly,” and that “the response could lead to a major escalation in the region.”

Israel did not publish pictures of the Iranian attack, downplayed its significance, and Israeli military censors imposed a complete blackout on what happened. On the other hand, Iran indicates that the strikes achieved their goals, but the Israeli media agrees that what comes after the Iranian strike will be a different stage than before.

There was much speculation before the strike about its size and location. Iran could have responded symmetrically against Israeli interests abroad, Israeli naval targets, or sites outside direct Israeli sovereignty, but it chose to respond directly in direct messages as well.

Before the strike, Iran adopted a policy of heating up the front to contain any uncalculated responses, especially from the United States and neighboring countries. Washington was aware – through the Swiss embassy – of the timing and size of the strike, and neighboring countries were also informed 72 hours before the operation, according to reports and statements by Iranian officials. .

An Iranian surface-to-surface missile launched during a military exercise (French)

Opportunity calculations and response limits

Iran realized that the strike on the consulate in Damascus was an opportunity to respond directly, not only to it but also to the repeated Israeli attacks over the years, and that delaying it indefinitely or not responding at all carries strategic risks, not the least of which is “losing its prestige” as a regional power and giving Israel the green light to persist and lose. What seemed like an “excuse” that may not be repeated, and his immediate calculations based on the current situation in the region suggested that the strike would be less costly politically, militarily and strategically.

The response was based on ruling out the logic of “swallowing” the Israeli strike and not continuing the policy of strategic patience, but it was based on tactical and strategic factors and calculations as well, the most important of which are:

• The Iranian response to Israel came in the midst of the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip, and is therefore part of the conflict with Israel, which is considered a direct involvement in defending the Palestinian cause.
• The Iranian response will be welcomed and supported by Iranian and Arab people as well, in light of the massacres committed by Israel.
• Failure to respond directly – especially in light of previous Iranian threats – will put Iran in the target of popular criticism and increase pressure on it.
• The Israeli strike and assassination of Iranian leaders at the consulate headquarters was a direct Israeli attack on Iran in connection with the “Axis of Resistance,” and therefore requires a direct response and not through “agents.”
• Iran has realized that managing the war with Israel through the “Axis of Resistance” is no longer convincing to many parties, especially since its allies in Syria, Yemen and Lebanon are receiving continuous strikes from the United States and Israel.
• Israel is considered to be at its most weak moment, sympathetic to the course of the war on Gaza and the internal front is disintegrated, and there was no Israeli military or political consensus on the strike on the consulate in Damascus, which was recorded as another failure for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
• Iran has put into its strategic calculations that launching a strike against Israel at the present time would be at a time when Netanyahu is suffering from his worst situation in 6 months, and therefore it would be a blow to him as well.
• There is a moment of deep doubts between the administration of US President Joe Biden and the Israeli Prime Minister, and the United States was not satisfied with the strike on the consulate in Damascus, and with Tel Aviv’s persistence in the war on the Gaza Strip and its actions in general.
• Iran believes that the United States will restrain Israel from any uncalculated response to the strike for fear of sliding into a regional war that Washington, as well as the countries allied with Israel, do not want. It accompanied this with warnings to the United States to persist in supporting Israel.
• Iran suggested that a “tit for tat” logic would prevail between it and Israel, given that the international situation does not tolerate another comprehensive war in a complex region in addition to the war in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip.
• Iran suggested that any Israeli response – if it occurred – would in turn be calculated, targeted, and could be dealt with and contained.
• Iran realized that its direct intervention would create a new deterrence equation, with the entry of another large and significant front into the conflict with Israel, which would have its precise calculations in the West.

A new equation and pressure on Israel

Analysts point out that the unprecedented Iranian attack on Israel necessarily establishes a new equation in the region, and it was not merely a record of a response to Tehran or a deterrent to Israel from continuing its attacks on its interests. Considering the conflict with Israel since the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, it is considered a new wedge in the theory of Israeli security.

The direct Iranian response – regardless of its military impact – has added a stronger threat to Israel’s geographical depth, and with the calculations of Iranian military power, any other attack may be more powerful and more painful for Israel.

In the post-“Al-Aqsa flood” equation, with the addition of the Iranian response, Israel has turned into a war zone on multiple fronts, with all the pressure this means on the home front, which no longer enjoys security relaxation at a time when the Israeli military machine is moving in every direction.

The Iranian strike is added to the series of security concerns that govern Israeli society, which no longer feels safe, especially since the “Al-Aqsa Flood” strike, and no longer believes in the saying “the army that protects the people,” which severely undermines the theory of stability on the ground and exacerbates the tendency toward “the great escape.”

Then, lightning and limited wars are no longer an Israeli deterrent weapon, as Israel has almost entered into a comprehensive war, which exacerbates its economic losses, as the cost of intercepting the Iranian attack alone amounted to about 1.3 billion dollars, according to Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, in addition to losses estimated at more than 70 billion dollars. Since the “Al-Aqsa Flood”.

The Iranian strike, and what preceded it, confirmed that the Israeli project still depends on the protection of the major powers that sponsored it politically, security and military, especially with the intervention of the United States and Britain in shooting down most of the missiles and drones launched by Iran.

The Israeli War Council meets to discuss options for responding to the Iranian attack (media)

Israel’s complex calculations

Many analysts are asking the extent to which the Israeli Prime Minister benefited from the Iranian strike at this time to restore his internal and external image, especially since he has always linked the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) to Iran, and portrayed the movement as one of its arms in the region.

Observers believe that Netanyahu will return to the narrative of portraying Israel as the “victim” after the Iranian attack, in order to gain new legitimacy within Israel and regain sympathy, especially from the American administration, but Israeli analysts believe that he has completely lost his credibility after the “strategic defeat” in Gaza.

The American New York Times also indicated that President Biden, in turn, had lost confidence in Netanyahu, and privately expressed his concern about Netanyahu’s attempt to “drag the United States, deeply, into a broad conflict.”

Analysts point out that the Israeli response to the Iranian attack will remain primarily governed by the American position and the calculations of Washington and President Joe Biden, which range from the sensitivity of the situation in the region to electoral calculations.

Axios reported, citing official American sources, that President Biden warned Netanyahu during a phone conversation that the United States would not participate with Israel in a counterattack on Iran.

While the United States is in constant contact with Iran – through the Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy – and stresses that failure to contain the conflict may lead to a catastrophic situation in the region, officials in the region warn that escalation may lead to a wide-scale war.

For its part, the British Observer newspaper noted that “the fate of the Middle East hangs in the air, while Israel is considering what response it will make to the Iranian attack.”

The Telegraph newspaper, in turn, drew possibilities for an Israeli response to the Iranian attacks, noting that it may include launching air strikes on military bases or government headquarters, or strikes on the headquarters of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard or its possible presence around Iran, “and then the two sides may stop hostilities, with a feeling “Each party said it took its revenge.”

While Israeli officials call for launching a “major attack” on Iran that may include the nuclear program, others believe that Israel should consider what happened last Saturday a victory after almost all Iranian missiles and drones were shot down without having any significant effect.

In light of international positions and the United States’ lack of enthusiasm for escalation, Israel finds itself in the dilemma of “swallowing” the strike, postponing it, or adapting it to suit the current situation, in order to avoid a major war in the region from which it will not benefit, which may invalidate a previous statement by Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Galant when He said during the aggression on Gaza that “this is a war that will end in Tehran.”