Less than a year ago, an investigation by the Lithuanian media “15min” with the participation of “Nekā peresika” revealed that in the construction of the 500-kilometer-long Polish-Lithuanian Gas Interconnection (GIPL) pipeline with the help of a Latvian company, parts made in Russia may have been supplied from a factory that also supplies the Russian military industry.
AS “Conexus Baltic Grid” (“Conexus”), which manages the Latvian gas infrastructure, invested 14.7 million euros in the ambitious project.
Jūrate Damulīte, the head of the Research Department of “15min”, said that the Lithuanian state company “Amber Grid”, which manages GIPL, discovered the marking of the Russian factory “Eterno” on the parts of the pipeline by scraping off the paint.
“Eterno” is a company of the Chelyabinsk plant “ChelPipe” group, from which most of the materials for the construction of pipelines in the Baltics came from until the Russian invasion of Ukraine, because they were cheaper than those produced in Europe.
Even before the start of construction of GIPL, a scandal broke out in Lithuania when it became known that pipeline connections for this facility were also ordered from Chelyabinsk.
The Lithuanian gas infrastructure company “Amber Grid” instructed to use only components produced in the European Union in the project. Instead of Russian parts, the builder ordered the same parts from the Polish factory “Tasta” and the Romanian “Sara”.
However, the allegedly Polish and Romanian details described in the documents were visually different from what was delivered in reality. The certificates contained less information than they should have.
The declared raw materials differed from those used in the Polish factory. Suspicious fittings were delivered not directly from the factory, but by the Latvian company “Conti Chemical Company”, reported “Nekā personalika”.
The program found out that the same parts manufactured in Chelyabinsk were used in the GIPL connection, which were ordered to be replaced, but parts documents were forged through Latvian “Conti Chemical” and Polish “Tasta”.
Last week, the Financial Crimes Investigation Service of Lithuania conducted searches in several objects in Lithuania, at their request the State Police did the same in Latvia. It does not disclose which facilities it visited.
Conti Chemical Company’s office did not respond to “Nothing Personal” when asked if there had been a search last week.
Meanwhile, in Lithuania, the general contractor of the project “Alvora” has been sued due to the scandal. As a result of the scheme, 157 sections of the strategically important pipeline do not have valid quality and safety certificates.
Amber Grid believes that Alvora has built non-certified components into the pipeline design and that they need to be replaced.
The Chelyabinsk production group belongs to the TMK company, whose owner was Dmitrijs Pumpjanskis until the spring of last year. He was among the first group of oligarchs closest to Russian dictator Vladimir Putin to be sanctioned by the European Union right after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The Chelyabinsk factories changed hands, but they are still on sanctions lists due to sectoral restrictions, the program reported.
“Conti Chemical Company”, registered in Riga, is one of the main suppliers of gas pipelines in Latvia, also for the state company “Conexus Baltic Grid”.
The company is owned by three persons – Samuil Antokol (55%), Arkady Kogan (30%) and Viktor Brod (15%). The company was founded in 1994 as a subsidiary of the Swiss company “ABC Conti”. The Swiss company was managed by the then scandalous Grigory Luchanskis.
Conexus board chairman Uldis Baris said “Nothing personal” that until the beginning of the war, the delivery of products from this factory was a standard practice, but after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Conexus no longer bought such pipelines or fittings.
He is also quite sure that the products delivered to Latvia from other countries are authentic, because specialists who deal with these parts on a daily basis should be able to recognize them.
Fittings, pressure equipment and other parts used in main gas pipelines must be registered in the Register of Dangerous Equipment of Latvia. This is done by independent inspection bodies – mostly private companies.
When the pipeline is put into operation, the overall safety of the construction is evaluated, not the origin and documents of each part.
“Conexus” explains that suppliers require two certificates – from the manufacturer and from an independent inspection body. Conti Chemical Company is a regular supplier of gas pipelines and equipment.
Those involved in the Lithuanian project believe that Andrejs Vainšteins, the representative of the Chelyabinsk factory, was involved in the organization of the scheme.
He himself wrote on the social network “LinkedIn” that he once interned with the Latvian MEP Tatjana Ždanokas (LKS) and in this role allegedly helped to organize a conference on cooperation between Europe and Russia in the field of energy.
Neither Weinstein nor Ždanok was contacted by the program this week, but after the news about Ždanok’s cooperation with the Russian special services came to light, Weinstein deleted his biography from LinkedIn.
2024-04-07 19:12:32
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