Costa Rican academic Constantino Urcuyo has devoted himself to studying the Chinese presence in Central America since, in 2007, his country became a pioneer in the isthmus and decided to open diplomatic relations with the Asian nation.
The academic director of the Center for Research and Administrative Political Training (CIAPA) and author of books such as “China and the United States: Geopolitics and Strategy in the 21st century” warns that the world context since that first negotiation, which allowed China to put a foot in the region, has changed a lot. While then there were still remnants of the spirit of “compromise” between Beijing and Washington, what would ensue later would be a scene of rivalry between the two powers. In fact, Panama and El Salvador, which approximately a decade later would follow in Costa Rica’s footsteps, would establish relations with China already in light of this new reality.
Despite this geopolitical turn, Urcuyo rules out that the Chinese are going to embark on a direct confrontation with the United States over a region like Central America. For this reason, he believes that the growing rapprochement of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele, towards the Asian power in reaction to the calls for attention that come from the US capital, is due to a misreading of the president that, far from benefiting the country, could harm it. seriously.
What is the balance of the more than 14 years of relations between China and Costa Rica?
They have been cordial relationships, very intense in the first years. President Arias was the one who established them. The governments that followed, that of Laura Chinchilla maintained those relations. The one that followed too, but not with much enthusiasm. And this president that we have now has not gone to China. Xi Jinping came to Costa Rica, and Hu Jin Tao too. In other words, relations have been cordial, cooperative. China, remember, when relations were established, it bought $ 300 million in Costa Rican debt. Lately, I would say that in this administration, relations have cooled down.
What do you think is due to that?
I think we have a president who has not paid adequate attention to foreign policy, because he has been involved in important internal problems, and then he has not had an interest in the Pacific and in what plays in that direction. And I think it is also permeated by what I would call the warming of relations between the United States and China. That has been perceived here by the government and they have not wanted to get into that problem, especially after Secretary (Mike) Pompeo was here in Costa Rica and called attention to the danger of relations with China.
What was the international scene when Costa Rica and China began relations and Chinese interests at that time, and what is the scene and interests today, especially from 2017-2018, when Panama, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador also open relationships?
They are two very different contexts. In 2007, China’s relationship with the United States is the “engagement” relationship, which occurred as a consequence of Nixon’s turn to China and the establishment of relationships in the Carter era. What happened there? Well, the United States approached China because China was the enemy of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union was in an aggressive pose not only in relation to the West, but also in relation to China itself. And so the relationship was a good relationship between the two countries despite their differences. But what happened? At some point before Trump’s arrival, there was concern in the North American political class that China had gone from what they called “the peaceful rise” to becoming an economic power with claims of regional hegemony and world power projection. That’s when that idyll that Nixon and Kissinger established begins to break down. We established relationships when some academics from the US War College argued that the relationship with China was good for Latin America because it meant fostering growth, especially for the countries of the Southern Cone. Today, we are in the age of rivalry between powers. When we started the relationship with China, the situation was more one of cooperation between China and the United States. Today, (Secretary of State) Blinken put it like this: We live in a world where the relationship is going to be characterized by moments of competition, moments of confrontation, and moments of cooperation. The three C’s called him to the current situation. What are we going to see there? That there will be times when they will continue to cooperate, others when they will compete, and others when there will be confrontation, which is the dangerous part of the matter.
“I do not think that China has an interest in a confrontation with the United States for Central America because it is not a token that is very valuable to them.”
What was China’s interest in Latin America in general and in Central America specifically at that time?
In Latin America, buy mineral products, raw materials that serve economic development. In Central America, the interest was the diplomatic battle with Taiwan. How to get the largest number of countries that recognized it out of Taiwan, in order to win that international political battle.
And from 2017-2018?
They continue to buy raw materials in the South. Brazil is a huge market. In Central America, I believe that we must establish differences between Russia and China. It is important because people tend to equalize them. The Russians, because of their experience with Cuba, with Venezuela, with Nicaragua, are entering the field of security. The Chinese are not into it. They are not creating a military and security-type challenge to the United States in their region. They don’t want to get into it because they know this is their backyard. I think the interest is to maintain its projection of power. China, as an emerging great power, wants to have a global presence and influence. In some places it is much stronger. In our field, I believe that their interest is what they have already been achieving: defeating Taiwan in diplomatic relations with El Salvador, with Panama, which is perhaps the most important point for them because of the canal, and then, with Dominican Republic. But I don’t think there is a geopolitical security interest. In Central America, the interest is more geoeconomic. Anyone who believes that he can instrumentalize the Chinese in their differences with the United States is radically wrong. Chávez wanted to do it. And the Chinese did not give him a ball. Because Chávez believed that the Chinese were going to respond to him with the same rhetoric of 21st century socialism and what they made him see was: look, you interest us like oil, we buy oil from you, but don’t get us into the ideological dispute.
Trajectory: Academic Director of the Center for Research and Administrative Political Training, Costa Rica.
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In El Salvador there has been a notable deterioration in relations with the United States and a rapprochement with China. How do you see that approach?
They open a door for the Chinese and advance a little. But I don’t think China has an interest in a confrontation with the United States over Central America because it is not a token that is very valuable to them. And I am also going to tell you one thing: El Salvador has no coastline on both oceans. Bukele is very striking to me. I think that this is a millennial political reaction, which simplifies things in the sense of: “ah, well, the gringos put out a list of corrupt politicians, so I’m going to have drinks with the enemy of the gringos.” It seems simplistic to me, especially because the possibility of a North American response in the Salvadoran case can be devastating, that is, you receive 20% of GDP in remittances. And they have 2.5 million Salvadorans with TPS. They begin to return people to them and put a tax on remittances or prevent the trafficking of remittances, and the millennial’s chest is over. This little game is extremely dangerous for El Salvador. It is one thing to affirm sovereignty and say: look, don’t get involved in what you shouldn’t get into. All that rhetorical game is nice. But going to ally with an enemy about whom the Americans do not cease to warn that it is dangerous, how am I going to make this movement of an alliance? And what does El Salvador have to offer China? Apart from the diplomatic question, of special zones? I think that this is not a bargaining chip in the relationship with the United States in its area of influence.
China’s position in the country at times has been ambiguous. Do you think they could think of a direct confrontation with the United States?
No. They are not for that. I have the impression that as the Americans withdraw from other parts of the world they will retreat onto their own beaches; and we, for better or for worse, are one of those beaches and then they are going to strengthen discipline in the region. That will motivate those who get out of the basket to face the consequences. They will not be the Chinese because they do not have troops or many people in these parts; they will be the rebels to the wishes of Washington.
It gives the impression that this approach is to be able to have financing. Would they be willing to risk the card of financing an authoritarian project in the country?
No. Behind the Chinese are 5,000 years of political experience. When city-states were formed and Plato and Aristotle talked politics, the Chinese had 2,000 years of having city-states. They are people who have strategic patience, they are prudent. Have they clashed with the United States over Venezuela? No. What China is doing is a version of affirming its world presence and affirming it gently, because they are not of great rhetoric.
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