Karl Nehammer and his Interior Minister Karner wanted all the fame but no responsibility.
The situation was serious. In contrast to his intelligence service DSN, the Interior Minister was once again unable to cope. He will have to answer numerous questions in the coming weeks.
1. Why did the Army Intelligence Agency HNaA not immediately pass the information on to the DSN?
On August 8, 2024, Karl Nehammer revealed in ZiB2 that “the Army Intelligence Agency, which received the information”, was the first to be warned. This information came from the NSA, the largest secret service in the world.
2. Why did the HNaA investigate on its own?
Counter-terrorism is the task of the civilian intelligence service DSN in the Ministry of the Interior. As the military’s foreign intelligence service, the HNaA has no powers within the country. Nevertheless, the HNaA is said to have conducted its own investigations for days. However, the military service has neither the sources nor the knowledge that would enable the DSN to successfully investigate “Islamic terrorism”.
It is still unclear when the HNaA passed on its information and the results of possible illegal “investigations” to the DSN.
By conducting its own investigations, the HNaA may have lost crucial time. If the DSN had found out everything from the HNaA early on, the concerts could probably have been protected and secured.
3. How was the DSN informed about the danger?
The crucial warnings to the DSN came from the CIA. They were derived from the analysis of the Austrian messenger messages collected by the NSA for the CIA.
For years there has been a silent agreement between US services and the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna: The NSA monitors and evaluates all Austrian telecommunications via satellites and from stations such as the IZD Tower next to the UNO City and from the roof of the US Embassy in Vienna’s Boltzmanngasse. It can read all messenger messages from WhatsApp and Telegram to Signal. As part of the Counter Terrorism Group CTG, the CIA forwards data sets to the DSN in Vienna.
The NSA’s comprehensive extraction of Austrian data is illegal. But it is tolerated by the BMI because it is often the only way to get timely information and warnings.
4. Why was the stadium searched further despite the all-clear from the Interior Minister?
Shortly before the cancellation, officials from the Ministry of the Interior cordoned off and searched the Ernst Happel Stadium with around 60 officers, according to employees of the event organizers. The accomplice of the Ternitzer IS man, who worked for a facility company for the concerts in the stadium, is said to have come to work with a backpack, but left the stadium without it, according to work colleagues.
Eyewitnesses report that the stadium was searched again with dogs early in the morning after the cancellation, and a third search followed in the afternoon.
5. When was it clear that the terrorist was not alone?
On the morning before the cancellation, DSN officers searched the Ternitzer apartment and arrested the suspect. It was probably only through the Ternitzer’s quick confession that the DSN learned enough about the second suspect to be able to arrest him.
At the press conference on Thursday morning, the Interior Minister maintained the warning: “The situation was serious, the situation is serious. But a tragedy was prevented.”
At this point, the minister could not rule out that there were other perpetrators.
6. Why did the Ministry of the Interior allow the organizers to decide on the concerts despite the high terror alert level?
As Director of the DSN, Omar Hajjawi-Pirchner stated: “At no point did we push for the event to be cancelled.” The cancellation probably came about through other means. The US embassy informed Swift management that the Austrian authorities might not have the situation under control.
The Austrian organizer “Barracuda” came under pressure from two sides: from the US management, which no longer trusted the security; and from the Interior Ministry, which wanted to celebrate a success but did not want to take any risks.
One thing is clear: If there was still a residual risk that there was a bomb in the stadium, the BMI itself would have had to ban the concerts.
7. Is the organizer responsible for assessing a terrorist threat instead of the Minister of the Interior?
No. That is the sole responsibility of the Interior Ministry. But the Interior Minister was obviously unable to give the organizer a reliable risk assessment – and thus shifted the responsibility onto the Barracuda management.
In addition, the organizers were never informed in detail and were largely in the dark until the end.
8. What could have happened if the concerts had been held?
The main danger was not in the stadium, but in front of it. Thousands of “Swifties” had traveled from all over the world. Their destination was the square between Meiereistrasse and the stadium. On August 8, the Interior Minister had no plan for protecting tens of thousands of young people in this square.
Nevertheless, Gerhard Karner was willing to let the event take place.
9. Whose success was in preventing the attack?
The DSN made a decisive contribution to the investigation with a little late information at the last moment. The work of the DSN was important in thwarting the attack.
The Interior Ministry and the Minister of the Interior are making themselves important. They were not in a position to make the right decision themselves. Shifting the responsibility for the safety of tens of thousands of people from the minister to the organizers is unreasonable and irresponsible.
10. And who is at fault?
The Federal Chancellor and the Interior Minister are celebrating themselves as saviors. The risk and damage due to the costs of 32 million euros and lost revenue of around 100 million euros are shared between the organizers and the City of Vienna.
The only person who knew immediately what to do was the mayor of Vienna. Michael Ludwig reduced the price of admission to the Vienna swimming pools for the Swifties. In doing so, he did significantly more than the Minister of the Interior and the Federal Chancellor.
