In the style of the Lebanon War… Why did Israel decide to drop its weapons from the air? – Sky News Arabia Sky News Arabia

This is the first time since the 2006 Lebanon War that the Israeli army has resorted to this military tactic of dropping equipment from the air to supply its forces on the ground.

Footage published by the Israeli army showed a night airdrop in the southern Gaza Strip, where supplies were dropped by parachute from a C-130G transport plane, belonging to the 103rd Squadron of the Israeli Air Force, to the battlefield.

Simultaneously, Israeli tanks arrived in the center of Khan Yunis, after a night of intense fighting that slowed the Israeli advance from the east.

The fighting in Khan Yunis comes at a time when Israel is refocusing its war efforts, which have been ongoing for more than two months, on the south, after bombing northern Gaza and expelling the majority of the Palestinian Strip’s population, numbering 2.3 million people, from their homes.

The secret of the “airdrop”

For his part, the researcher specializing in geopolitical and defense affairs, Hamza Al-Attar, said in an interview with “Sky News Arabia” website, that the Israeli forces’ use of the “airdrop” method via air cargo planes; This comes due to its speed and ability to land larger quantities of ammunition and supplies to the fighting forces without exposing them to real dangers, and in view of the complex geographical nature of the Khan Yunis area.

Al-Attar identified the reasons behind the difficulty of logistical supply via trucks to the Israeli forces, at a number of points, saying:

• The C-130J transport plane has high protection systems against air defenses, and it also has a high payload for transporting materials and weapons.
• The parallel flight of military helicopters, such as the Apache AH64, provides close monitoring of these payloads until they reach the Israeli forces, and if Hamas fighters approach those payloads, they will be attacked immediately.
• The payload, which is dropped by a C-130J plane, lands in spaces behind the advanced lines of the Israeli army to protect it from Hamas fighters.

Field operations position

The researcher specializing in geopolitical and defense affairs spoke about the field operational situation in Khan Yunis, noting that the battles between the Israeli forces and the Hamas movement differed in the tactical aspect in the pre- and post-ceasefire phases.

He explained that before the ceasefire, Al-Qassam fighters were following a tactic to slow down the advance of Israeli forces, lengthen their military supply lines, and increase their losses in vehicles. Because of the difficulty of removing it from the heart of battles under fire.

But this tactic was completely different in the post-truce phase, according to Al-Attar, who pointed out that Hamas fighters moved into direct contact with the Israeli forces to inflict the largest number of human losses on those forces.

He pointed out that Hamas introduced sniper weapons at a higher rate in the southern battles in Khan Yunis, coinciding with hitting military vehicles with anti-armor shells.

These tactics prompted the Israeli forces to abandon their military vehicles and take refuge in residential buildings, according to Al-Attar.