In Syria and Ukraine, the Russian Federation uses five similar tactics

Many approaches to the war in Ukraine have been practiced by the Russian army in Syria, including responses to allegations of war crimes.

Russia is losing in northern Ukraine and withdrawing troops, but this should not be expected to bring the end of the war closer, warns a senior researcher at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. James Martin (USA) Hanna Notte. The experience of the military operations of the Russian army in Syria shows that Russia is waging war in separate phases and may try to return to where it did not achieve initial success. Observations of Russian military tactics in Syria help to understand many of the tactical approaches of the Russian army in Ukraine, Notte noted in an interview with DW.

Deutsche Welle: Photos and videos from the Ukrainian Bucha, from where Russian troops retreated, caused an international shock. What conclusions did you draw from Russia’s response to alleged war crimes by the Russian army?

Hannah Notte: We are seeing very familiar patterns of Russian disinformation in response to evidence of the Bucha massacre. On the one hand, this is the dissemination of alternative versions of what happened in order to divert attention and sow doubts, but also attempts to create a narrative that would somehow fit into the general plot of the so-called “special military operation”, including the “denazification” of Ukraine.

A couple of examples: the representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, said in connection with Bucha about the “provocation of the Kiev regime” in order to destroy the course of peace negotiations and added that it was generally an order from the United States in order to shift the blame to Russia. Versions of what happened in the pro-Russian telegram channels agree that it is the Azov servicemen who are guilty of killing supposedly pro-Russian civilians. One of the State Duma deputies said that the videos from Bucha are similar to allegedly fake videos of Syrian activists from the White Helmets organization. The most recent was a call to hold a meeting of the UN Security Council, probably to get an opportunity to present their version of events and sow doubts about the evidence. The overall reaction is completely unsurprising to me, given the experience of Russia’s military and disinformation campaign in Syria.

– Do you think Bucha is a kind of “excess” of the war? Or could the massacres be a consequence of the Russian narrative about the “denazification” of Ukraine?

– You know, the Russian army has for many years been facing accusations from international organizations of targeted attacks on civilian targets – hospitals, as in Syria, and on civilians. I fear that this is not an isolated case, but, as you said, the consequence of a narrative that dehumanizes the other side. In Syria, the Russian side denounced its opponents as “terrorists” and in Ukraine as “Nazis.” For a moment, let’s think and realize that for the Russians, the “Nazi” is the most terrible imaginary enemy, given the losses of the USSR in World War II. Using this narrative, the Russian authorities have been psychologically preparing their population for many years for the alleged threat from Ukraine, and thereby facilitate the commission of such crimes.

There is another reason that makes me fear that this case will not be an isolated one. One of the “DNR” leaders warned that, quote, “the Kyiv regime may repeat such provocations in other villages”, thereby signaling that we may see similar attacks on civilians or that we should prepare for them.

– Analyzing the approach of the Russian army during its military campaign in Ukraine and Syria, you identified several similar tactics. Tell about them.

– I have identified five parallels. The first is that Russia is waging a sequential war, that is, dividing military operations into separate phases. The second is the tactics of besieging cities and bombarding besieged territories, the third is the creation of so-called humanitarian corridors, which should be treated with a grain of salt. Another parallel is the situation with foreign fighters, it is complex: Russia accuses Ukraine of attracting foreigners, but at the same time intends to use them itself. Finally, other parallels are disinformation and the accusation of the other side of using civilians as human shields.

Nevertheless, despite the parallels, it is worth remembering the fundamental differences between military objectives and the scale of the military operation in Syria and Ukraine. I think that the stakes for Russia are completely different.

– With regard to consistent war. Could you explain what you mean?

– In Syria, we observed that the Russian military, which joined the side of the Bashar al-Assad regime in September 2015, at various stages of the war, stopped their fighting in certain regions in order to focus on others. Thus, in early 2017, the Russian Defense Ministry created so-called de-escalation zones in the western regions of Syria, which freed up resources and helped Assad’s troops take control of the territory in the east, and also helped to regroup forces and restore resources. And in 2018, the Syrian military, with the support of Russia, returned and seized the so-called de-escalation zones – with the exception of Idlib, which today remains outside the control of the Syrian leadership.

And now back to Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation announced a week ago the end of, I quote, the “first phase of the military operation” and that now the Russian military will concentrate on the Donbass. Here I see my task not in drawing attention to the parallels in the approach of the Russian army in Syria and Ukraine, and not in the fact that we can see the attempts of the Russian army to divide military operations into separate territorial sections and phases, because the attack on Ukraine has a completely different dimension, but to prevent misplaced optimism and the desire to breathe a sigh of relief. Withdrawal from the north and focus on the Donbass does not mean that hostilities in the rest of Ukraine are over.

– As for the siege of cities and the creation of humanitarian corridors by the Russian army. What does the Syrian experience provide for understanding the war in Ukraine?

– Unfortunately, the Syrian precedent suggests that such corridors should be taken with great caution for several reasons. Will explain. A good example is the siege of Aleppo in 2016, which lasted for what seemed like more than half a year. Russia opened humanitarian corridors, but civilians did not trust them very much – there was practically no international monitoring, and they did not take the risk of leaving the city. Trust is necessary to understand that you can get out alive.

Further, the problem was that those who refused to leave the city were considered by the Russian army as a target. The explanation was this: everyone could leave, and if they stayed, then these are terrorists. The danger is that we may see similar schemes in Ukraine. We see how difficult it is to create humanitarian corridors in Mariupol. The International Red Cross announced just the day before that it could not reach the city. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation promises the opening of another humanitarian corridor, which should appear on the initiative of Turkey, but we have to see what happens from this.

One final point: the difficulty is that normally civilians in Syria were given a choice. They could leave and stay in Assad-controlled territory, or go to other regions, such as Idlib, a northwestern province that is still under opposition control. And in Mariupol, we see that it seems that residents are forcibly evacuated to Russia, without giving them a choice.

– With regard to the involvement of foreigners in this military conflict. How is the recruitment of Syrians by the Russian army going?

– Yes, the picture seems somewhat ambiguous. Last week, I came to the conclusion that the recruitment of volunteers was stalling, although Russia announced 16,000 volunteers, mainly from Syria, but also from other countries that are allegedly ready to enter the conflict on the side of the Russian Federation. But after this statement, little was seen of the movement of the Syrians in the direction of Ukraine – the same was said by representatives of the Pentagon. Then there was a rather curious statement by the RF Ministry of Defense that the leaderships of the “LPR” and “DPR” allegedly declared that they wanted to defend their land themselves. In other words, the signals were such that the idea of ​​foreign volunteers was rejected.

But in recent days we have seen reports that, indeed, hundreds of Syrians have entered Russian territory, probably for basic military training, and that they may soon be in Ukraine, which means that the recruitment of volunteers in Syria may be gaining momentum. Probably, Russia is experiencing a shortage of manpower and feels babouta greater need for Syrian mercenaries, although I doubt that this will necessarily help Russia change the course of the military campaign, because the number of recruits will not be sufficient.

– As for the parallels with the topic of chemical weapons. Russia has spoken many times about the threat of its use by Ukraine, although there is no evidence of its presence. And under what circumstances is Russia able to use it itself?

– To begin with, let me say that the threshold for the use of chemical weapons in military conflicts was greatly reduced during the war in Syria. Because even after the announced destruction of chemical weapons by Syria, we observed its repeated use, and Russia actually covered the Syrian leadership, protecting it from being held accountable for these facts, including before the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The UN Security Council, as well as Western countries, could not prevent this “red line” from going beyond.

Well, now the question is – will Russia use chemical weapons in Ukraine? This question is not only about whether Russia fears repercussions and accountability. I think that war crimes like the Bucha massacre show that Russia cares very little about being accused by the international community of such crimes.

But the question is also whether the use of chemical weapons will be useful from their point of view, is chemical weapons effective in a military conflict? If you look at the Assad government and its use of chemical weapons, they were used in close connection with the conduct of conventional warfare against armed opposition, that is, they were tactically and operationally associated with the goals of military operations and served the purpose of collective punishment of the population in those regions where opposition and where the Syrian military used the tactics of siege and violence against all residents – civilians and armed.

As for Ukraine, one should first ask oneself whether the war of attrition has already begun: a number of experts will answer this question in the affirmative. In such a war, the degree of violence against the civilian population should be increased. Here one can conclude that the use of chemical weapons may make sense, especially if you do not take into account such things as fear of consequences.

I would like to finish by adding that even if Russia does not use chemical weapons, it is beneficial for the Kremlin to make regular statements about the alleged preparation of chemical attacks by Ukraine and false flag operations, in order to later blame Russia for this. First, such statements reinforce claims addressed to their own population about the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction allegedly emanating from Ukraine. Of course, these statements sow fear in Ukraine itself – the very fact that this can happen. Then, in the West, conspiracy theorists pick up on these statements and sow doubts – they say, maybe it’s like that, or maybe it’s not, and suddenly Russia is right … So this is a very convenient tool that costs Russia quite cheaply.

–