DV: When do you think the war will end?
Ivan Krastev: If anyone knows the answer to this question, it is certainly someone who does not give interviews. Russia started this war, but if you listened carefully to the president’s speech Putin you probably noticed that he was talking about a long, never-ending war. This makes me think that a temporary ceasefire does not mean the end of the war. If Russia stops fighting today, that’s the end of the war, but if Ukraine stops fighting, that’s the end of Ukraine.
DV: Recently, there is more and more talk about the “Global East”, “Global West” and “Global South”. Russian propaganda claimed that the Global West stood alone against the Global East in the face of Russia and China, and the Global South massively supported the Global East. Do you think so?
Krastev: For us Europeans, this war is of existential importance, for many outside Europe, it is just another war. Countries like India or Brazil do not support Russia, but what they care about is not how the war will end, but when it will end.
DV: And China?
Krastev: China’s position is more complicated. We don’t know if China’s peace initiative a week ago is Beijing’s desire to become a spokesperson for the non-Western world, or if it is a step toward more active support for Russia. It’s no secret that Moscow is in dire need of ammunition, and the Russian leadership is pressing China to provide it with this ammunition. Beijing views this war through the prism of the intensifying confrontation with the US, in this sense, military support for Moscow means more problems for the US in Europe, but such support also means a break in relations with the EU.
DV: And did the war really consolidate the West, and especially Europe, as claimed? There were attempts to create a new Europe around Great Britain, the Baltic States and Poland, countries like Bulgaria have a rather vacillating policy and have repeatedly changed their position. Something similar applies to Hungary. Are the West and Europe consolidating?
Krastev: We have to separate things: at the level of governments and at the level of public opinion. At the level of governments, consolidation began from the first day of the war, and European countries did things that few would have believed possible. Think about it: ten rounds of very heavy sanctions against Russia, many of which just 1 year ago seemed almost unthinkable. For example – the freezing of the assets of the Russian Central Bank, which are located in Western banks.
DV: And public opinion?
Krastev: The sociological survey in 10 countries, which was conducted by the European Council on Foreign Policy at the beginning of the year, shows something important: the number of people who think that peace is possible only if Ukraine wins is increasing. In May last year, there was such a majority only among the Poles, and at the moment this is the prevailing opinion in both Great Britain and France. Germany is very divided, but let’s remember that a year ago the overwhelming majority said that the most important thing was to end the war. And in other European countries we observe the same trend: the number of people who see peace only after the victory of Ukraine is increasing. How can we explain it? The research suggests that at least three factors are at play. One is that the Ukrainian military victories of last summer and fall have convinced many more people that a Ukrainian victory is possible. How big it will be, whether the entire territory will be liberated – that is a completely different conversation. Many of those who wanted immediate peace in May thought that Ukraine was doomed anyway and that the war had better end now or more people would die. The second factor: there was a huge fear of a “Putin winter” and that Europe could not survive without Russian gas. But the combination of government policies and a warmer winter turned Putin’s winter into a long “Scholtz Autumn”, and the fear of many turned out to be unwarranted. Third: in all countries we have seen a sharp decline in the fear of nuclear war, and it was particularly strong in Western Europe.
DV: Why did the fear disappear?
Krastev: On the one hand, it became clear that China is strongly opposed to Putin using tactical nuclear weapons. It is also apparent that, similar to the situation in the Cold War years, there is a working communication channel between the US and Russia that reduces the risk of extreme action.
DV: And what does public opinion look like in individual countries and groups of countries?
Krastev: It is a myth that Europe is divided into East and West in terms of war. That supposedly the East was ready to stand with Ukraine to the end, while the West was much more cautious and careful. In fact, if you look at the data, you will immediately see that the East itself is extremely divided. It is precisely in several Eastern European countries that support for Ukraine is weakest.
DV: Bulgaria, for example.
Krastev: Yes, Bulgaria, Slovakia… By the way, Romania is also a country where the desire for peace to be concluded immediately is very strong. Rather, the division is between the countries of Northern and Eastern Europe, which are Russia’s immediate neighbors and which believe that only a Russian defeat can guarantee lasting peace in Europe. Then: countries like Germany and France, which also see Russia as a threat to Europe, but do not rule out negotiations; and the countries of the South and South-East, who fear a long war more than a Russian invasion. But each of these groups has its own particular fears, because nightmares are never pan-European, they are always strictly national.
DV: How has public opinion changed in Europe in this one year?
Krastev: There is a consolidation of public opinion in Europe. Compared to last May, the number of people who believe that there can be lasting peace only if Ukraine wins has increased dramatically. It has changed the most in this direction public opinion in Germany.
DV: How stable is the support for Ukraine?
Krastev: It is fragile because it depends on four factors that can change very abruptly. The most important factor is what is happening on the front: Russian military victories would shake Europeans’ sense that Ukraine can win. The second factor is the feeling of a stronger Europe. In this sense, any crisis in one or another of the European countries can influence public opinion. The third factor that determines public support for Ukraine is US policy in Europe. In this sense the war reaffirmed Europe’s total dependence on the US for its military security. So if something happens in the US, if there is another president with a different policy regarding Ukraine, this type of consolidation that we are seeing in Europe is unlikely to last. And the last factor that could break European unity is the intensification of Europeans’ economic fears. Which means that in the long run, support for war will depend on how people feel inside their own countries.
DV: Let’s talk a little about Russia. You know the situation there very well. Could Russia collapse – or, perhaps, will it collapse the world as we know it?
Krastev: Probably both are possible. At this stage, one thing is visible: a large part of Russian society has accepted the war, although many people rather share the idea that “this is not my war, but this is my country”. The more the war progresses, the more visible two completely different processes become. On the one hand – whenever so many people die (and it is a fact that Russia loses an awful lot of people in this war), the mothers of these soldiers cannot allow it to be said that their sons died in vain. Thus the idea emerges that this is an important war, that we know what we are dying for. This idea strengthens as more people die. At the same time, the more people die, the more the mothers of those who have not yet died begin to ask themselves the questions “What exactly are our children dying for?? When will this war end?”. But I have to admit that at this point I am very skeptical that the war will end because the Russians will take to the streets.
Alexander Andreev talks with Ivan Krastev
