We can claim – with a safe heart – that the leaders of the Israeli occupation army go to sleep every night dreaming of only one thing: that the current war, which has become a quagmire for them, will turn into a very classic tank battle, even if it is on the level of the Battle of Kursk (in 1943), which is greater. A tank battle in history with more than 6,000 tanks between the Soviets and the Germans. They are skilled at these types of battles, no doubt, and they have a long history with them, and they train in them regularly and with distinction, but there is one problem, which is that these battles are outdated.
Tanks provide support for infantry and engineers so they can carry out their missions at a safe distance. This is a simple tactic that takes advantage of two strengths of modern tanks: Long-range firepower and advanced sensors.
Tank formations
In fact, Merkava tanks, for example, have the latest technology in these areas, and we do not mean here the “Trophy” system, which only anticipates the next strike, nor the tank’s interactive armor, or the “cage armor,” which is like a steel mesh that protects the tank from bombs coming from Marches. Rather, we also mean that the Israelis have learned a lot from the Ukrainian experience, and among what they have learned is the rule that every tank has a drone that flies above it, scanning the area in real time and giving data to the formation commander and other commands.
When you see a resistance soldier hitting a Merkava tank or a Tiger armored vehicle, you may think for a moment that this mechanism is running alone in the street, but the matter is much more complicated than that, and it does not stop only at the limits of the fact that every tank has a drone, but also relates to tank formations. The occupation forces do not disclose The formations that its tanks and armored vehicles take during an operation, but there are several general forms that are found in all armies of the world, including the occupation army.
There is, for example, the “column” or column formation, in which military vehicles (usually 4-6 tanks, armored vehicles, and bulldozers) simply move in two rows with a distance between them. This formation is usually used for driving on roads, especially during limited visibility or when passing through dense forests. Or rubble. This differs from the “row” formation, in which tanks enter an area next to each other horizontally. This formation is used when attacking a target or crossing open areas. This formation allows forces to pass through an area quickly while achieving the maximum amount of fire from the front. .
(Al Jazeera)
On the other hand, the “command” formation, which resembles the steps of a ladder, provides excellent firepower in front, as well as to one of the sides, and this formation usually leans towards the exposed side to be secured (right or left), while the “arrow” formation allows for excellent fire. In the front and well on the sides, the “circle” formation is a fixed system that provides safety and comprehensive surveillance, and is useful in the case of refueling, resting, and issuing orders to the formations.
There are various ways to build these formations, and move from one to another, and there are additional formations emerging from within those formations, but the idea is the same, which is that the combat squad has the ability to carefully study the location of operations and position itself to achieve the maximum degree of hitting the enemy, securing the forces, and controlling the area. Surrounding 360 degrees.
A model of a Qassami ambush
What the resistance soldiers are facing, then, is not just a stray tank, but rather a complex formation of forces that requires one of two solutions to confront it. The first is a corresponding formation with the same (or greater) strength and capabilities, and this is definitely not available to the resistance. The second is relying on the basic element of irregular warfare. It is a smart surprise, and to understand this idea, let us imagine that a convoy of Israeli tanks is moving along one of the streets, perhaps in a “column” formation, and then receives a missile strike from one of the buildings, from the third floor, at a distance of 50-80 meters.
The initial response of the Israeli division is for the tanks that were not destroyed and the infantry divisions accompanying them to move away from the area of engagement, and the soldiers detonate smoke bombs and walk through its fog to a safe area, then they take a formation directing the firepower to this building while protecting the background, and they begin to fire towards that building. The building is part of the safe zone, whether to eliminate the resistance there or at least to imprison them inside the building until the planes whose coordinates they gave them minutes ago arrive.
But the resistance will not stop at just carrying out a simple ambush. The operational planner knows exactly that this will happen, so the resistance will build what are called complex ambushes. In the example we mentioned a little while ago, this means that there will be another team of resistance fighters, for example, standing in a building on the side. The other side of the road is such that when the two teams fire at the occupation soldiers together, they form a V-shape. This creates what resembles “pincer jaws” on the tank convoy, and it also disperses their fire.
(Al Jazeera)
The matter does not stop at this point in complex ambushes. Rather, different types of weapons are used from different teams of soldiers, with different targeting angles and from multiple areas, not just one place. In the case of the Palestinian resistance, we assume that they prefer to start the ambush with explosive devices, perhaps to stop the progress of the attack. A convoy of tanks and armored vehicles and killing the largest possible number of enemy soldiers in the first strike, and then using armor-piercing shells from one or two opposite buildings as we explained a little while ago, such as the “Al-Yassin 105” or the Kornet, and after that comes the turn of light weapons.
Urban terrain and tunnels
The complex ambush aims to achieve the maximum number of losses in the shortest possible time, and this is understandable. If the resistance soldier does not disappear as quickly as possible (preserving himself and his ammunition), the tanks will hit the building immediately and the planes will come soon. But in this context, the resistance has two additional weapons. Coupled with excellent planning for complex ambushes, they are simply two Urban terrain and tunnels.
The first is a weapon that always stands on the side of the country’s owners when they face an external invader, and to this day urban terrain remains the biggest problem for contemporary armies, from Stalingrad to Grozny to Mogadishu to Fallujah. It serves the defender and allows him to shape the battle site with extreme flexibility, imposing his rules on it and not the other way around. It is mainly the reason why the resistance was able to hide and build multiple complex ambushes.
In addition, the urban terrain simply prevents tanks from advancing, and forces the occupation soldiers at some point to take to the battlefield in classic man-on-man combat. It also prevents intelligence missions from monitoring resistance soldiers as they move along pre-prepared escape lines.
In addition to this comes the tunnel weapon, the most powerful weapon in this war after the resistance’s ability to plan intelligently. We know that there is a series of tunnels extending at a depth starting from 20 meters below Gaza City and at a distance of hundreds of kilometers. They are simply what makes the resistance members ghosts to the occupation soldiers. They appear and disappear in the blink of an eye, and this, along with the urban terrain, is the reason why the resistance was able to hit Israeli tanks and armored vehicles from short distances (less than 50 meters).
Striking from a short distance achieves three benefits to the resistance: it avoids the capabilities of the reconnaissance drone that flies on top of the tank, it bypasses the Trophy system on board, which detects and confronts the incoming projectile, and finally, it enhances the ability of the tandem projectile to penetrate the armor of the tank or reactive armored vehicle, and increases the probability of being hit. Effective military machinery.
In addition, the resistance soldier is sometimes able to reach the tank itself at a zero distance, and here there is no need to use anti-tank shells, but a cheaper tool can be used, which is Armor-piercing explosive devices Like Shawaz, just compare the price of a homemade IED (a few tens of dollars) versus a tank costing millions of dollars.
The above tactics are the reason for the resistance’s success in inflicting on the occupation heavy losses, which have now reached nearly 1,000 Israeli tanks and armored vehicles.
Determination!
All of the above falls only within the operational and tactical scope, but war does not stand on two military legs, but rather one foot is military, and the other is social, political, and psychological. In a widely known research paper published in World Politics in 1975 entitled “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” Andrew Mack, from the School of International Studies at Simon Fraser University in Canada, believes that there is another weapon in asymmetric wars of this type that supports armies. Small, which is “determination”.
Mack says that determination is what explains success or failure in asymmetric conflicts, and the bottom line is that the side with the most resolve wins, regardless of the difference in material strength. In this context, determination is linked to the difference between the two warring forces. If the gap in relative strength between the two teams (the resistance and the occupation in this case) widens, the party that is stronger in numbers and equipment will consequently be less determined and determined, and on the contrary, the parties that are weak technically and numerically are usually more determined. And Azma, because for her the battle represents literally everything.
Consequently, major armies may lose small wars because they are less determined, and with the prolonged tense political situation, they will be forced to withdraw without achieving a decisive military victory. The resistance’s mere steadfastness in this type of war is considered a victory.
This model can be achieved in the current war on Gaza. If we consider the previously announced Israeli goals, which are eliminating Hamas, freeing the prisoners, and controlling Gaza, we will find that they have not yet been achieved at all. Rather, the occupation is currently trying to reformulate its goals inside Gaza to suit what it has faced. Of difficulties during the ground invasion.
In addition, the Israeli interior seems more politically turbulent than ever before, and with the demonstrations taking place all over the world denouncing the unprecedented aggression against innocents, and the beginnings of turmoil in the political bond that began to be strong between the West and Israel, things are already tilting in favor of the resistance. Which possesses only relatively small weapons, intelligent planning, and relentless determination.
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Sources
1- Global Security Military Basics, CHAPTER 4, MOVEMENT, Section II. MOVEMENT FORMATIONS
2- ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE – AMBUSH – US Army Maneuver Center of Excellence
3- Andrew Mack – Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict -World Politics Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jan. 1975), pp. 175-200
4- THE ESSENTIALS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE – PATRICIA D. HOFFMAN, Air University Press (2000)
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2023-12-31 09:59:56
