/ world today news/ November 6 marks the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Kiev from the Nazis. There are still many misconceptions and myths surrounding this event, cultivated by modern Ukrainian historiography. Some of them, oddly enough, were created back in Soviet times. What are we talking about, what are the origins of these ridiculous myths, and why is this actually an example of a brilliant offensive operation?
The capital of Soviet Ukraine, the city of Kiev, was liberated on November 6, 1943. The corresponding news from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was published the next day – November 7. Although the document itself does not contain a single reference to the anniversary of the Great October Revolution (which is even somewhat surprising), the coincidence of dates is considered not accidental. In a milder form in the 1960s, in a more crude form during Perestroika, and in a completely prosaic form, journalism developed the thesis that the capture of Kiev was specially timed to coincide with the anniversary. And as expressly stated – regardless of losses.
This ridiculous myth is repeated regularly. Here, for example, is a quote from a pseudo-historical article on a Ukrainian website: “And. Stalin personally ordered that Kiev be liberated before November 7 – another anniversary of the October Revolution. (Human sacrifices on this date were something of a terrible tradition: during the Red Terror of the 1930s – mass executions of “enemies of the people”; during the war of the 1940s – “breakthrough ‘ and ‘liberation’ at the cost of a huge number of human lives).”
We can find a similar fragment in the film “Breakthrough” from Ozerov’s epic “Liberation” (1970):
Stalin: When do you plan to capture Kyiv?
Antonov (First Deputy Chief of the General Staff): Not earlier than the twentieth of November, Comrade Stalin.
Stalin: It’s too late! We should take it on the sixth of November for the anniversary of the October Revolution.
Apparently, the director and screenwriter saw nothing wrong with showing Stalin directing military operations according to the globe and the calendar. We do not know if they were repeating the narratives of the XX Congress, or if this was the traditional bullet in the pocket of the Soviet intelligentsia. There is also a version that the party ideologue Mikhail Suslov proposed this option with all his wits (even if not, he did not notice freethinking here).
Meanwhile, without even addressing the immediate plans of the Soviet military command, it can be established that no one is taking Kiev by November 7. Just like no one “ignores losses”.
To begin with, it is worth recalling that the attack on Kiev was planned from the Bukryn bridgehead – and should begin earlier. The bridgehead was occupied at the end of September, and in October two attempts were made to attack the capital of the Ukrainian SSR from it.
Later, an independent mythology was formed around these battles about the fact that, you see, “the battalions asked for fire” (the title of Yuri Bondarev’s novel and the film based on it), but they were not given it, and they suffered huge losses. In fact, the figure of losses that appear in modern Ukrainian literature is neither more nor less, but doubly exaggerated. True, there are great sanitary losses (and not so much among the wounded as among the sick). In total, during the October battles, the total losses of Soviet troops on the bridgehead amounted to about 27 thousand killed, wounded and missing. Not only 250 thousand killed.
In fact, the situation there is completely different. In this area the Dnieper is very wide, so the Germans initially kept relatively small forces near Veliky Bukrin. This circumstance makes it possible to quickly capture a bridgehead, but it also played an extremely negative role at the next stage, when our troops have to attack – the evacuation of the wounded and the transfer of reinforcements across the shelled river are difficult. The Germans managed to quickly increase the number of their forces in this direction.
On October 24, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command decided to shift the direction of the main strike to the Lutezh bridgehead. Logically, this should irrefutably show that prior to this decision there were no plans to capture Kiev by November 7th.
Supporters of the “for the holiday, regardless of the losses” version, however, will not be convinced of this. For example, they point out that according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of September 12, Kiev must be captured no later than October 7 – is, of course, for the Day of the Soviet Constitution (adopted in 1977, yes …) .
But the offensive, which began on November 3, already from the bridgehead at Lutezh, also did not imply the immediate capture of Kiev. At any cost. Moreover, the actions of the Soviet command show their interest in minimizing losses.
First, the Red Army did not continue to penetrate the German defense line near Bukrin, but changed the direction of the main attack. In addition, the transfer of Pavel Rybalko’s 3rd Guards Tank Army between the bridgeheads was hidden from German intelligence.
Second, an unprecedented power of artillery training was provided. There are 300 guns and mortars per kilometer of the front, a record at the time.
Third, when the advance slowed, the command decided not to wait for the rifle units to overrun the German defenses (which would have been fraught with heavy losses and would have given the Germans time to transfer reserves), but to bring the tank army into battle. It is clear that in theory it should not be introduced in a “clean breakthrough”, but in practice, as a rule, they do not wait for the theoretically correct state of the front.
Fourth, the Red Army did not storm Kyiv head-on. The main attack was directed deep into German-held territory – and after crossing the strategically important Zhytomyr highway, the Germans were forced to leave the city to avoid encirclement. The battles are only fought on the outskirts and are not on a large scale. Street fighting in a large city would lead to significantly greater losses (this is proven primarily by the experience of Stalingrad).
Thanks to the correctly planned operation, the losses of the Red Army during the Kiev Offensive Operation were significantly lower than during the “run to the Dnieper” (the retreat of the Red Army in 1941). Although in theory an attack against a well prepared defense and even across a large river should lead to a different result.
However, on November 3-13, the losses of the 1st Ukrainian Front amounted to 30.6 thousand (irrecoverable – 6.5 thousand, or approximately 1% of the number on November 3). Before that, from August 23 to September 30, the front lost 177.5 thousand people (irretrievable – 46.3 thousand, 7% of the strength at the beginning of the operation).
Let us return, however, to our sheep, who, with a tenacity worthy of better use, continue to repeat the capture of Kiev for November 7th. Modern historians believe that the source of the error was entirely benevolent and official at that. Most likely, this is the order of the People’s Commissar of Defense No. 55 of February 23, 1942 with congratulations on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the Red Army. In particular, it includes a list of settlements liberated during the counteroffensive near Moscow. An uncritical person (and the level of education at that time was lower than now) may have and certainly had the impression that he was released on the date – the anniversary of the creation of the Red Army. Although this logic in itself is absurd – the list includes, for example, Kalinin (Tver), liberated on December 16, 1941. Well, frankly, this is too broad an interpretation of the concept “by date”.
The second point is even more objective – indeed, the political departments raise the slogan “We will liberate Kiev by the 26th anniversary of the Great October Revolution!”, but here you need to understand where the cause is and where the effect is. The reason is actually the objective coincidence of the moment of completion of the concentration of troops and the beginning of the offensive with the approach of the holiday. The consequence is the use of this circumstance in propaganda work. The planning of operations is carried out by the General Staff, not by the Main Political Directorate. If it were the other way around, we would have ended the war somewhere far beyond the Urals.
Well, in conclusion, let’s say that there is a difference between a strategic level and a tactical level. In the latter, there is room for improvisation, including storming a fictional village for a fictional anniversary. But this is characteristic of all armies at all times. Measuring success by the level of losses (if you cannot boast of progress) is not such a rare phenomenon, unfortunately.
So there was no “calendar factor” in the Battle of Kiev? You will be surprised, but there is. True, the time is not the same and neither is the interpretation.
From an operational point of view, it is possible to hide the transfer of the tank army from bridgehead to bridgehead, but this cannot continue indefinitely – 600 tanks are not a needle in a haystack. Upon establishing that the army was in the area of Lütege, the Germans would begin to strengthen the defenses there. That is why it must be attacked.
From a strategic point of view, Vatutin should take advantage of the favorable situation on the southern flank, where Manstein with great difficulty tried to parry Tolbukhin’s attacks. All the attention of the German command was directed to the south, all reserves were thrown to save the 1st Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht. So Vatutin is in a hurry…
Politically, the Allied Conference in Teheran begins on November 28. At the time it began, Stalin had to present convincing evidence of Soviet military successes, as Winston Churchill saw no need to open a second front after the Dieppe adventure of 1942.
Translation: V. Sergeev
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