The Hamas movement is not an exceptional case in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Even if it was to brag about the operations, other Palestinian organizations had preceded them and astonished their time with operations that were no less massive. The difference was that the means of photography were limited, and the media windows were closed. “Revolutionary Conquest,” known by the name of its leader “Abu Nidal,” killed about two thousand people in twenty countries, hijacked planes and ships, and assassinated politicians. The Popular Front, another leftist group, whose leader is George Habash, carried out massive operations, the most famous of which was the kidnapping of oil ministers at the OPEC meeting in Vienna, and took them on a plane that ended in Algeria. In another operation, three planes were blown up at once at Amman Airport.
Abu Nidal and Al-Shabiyya disappeared in Syria and Iraq, while the Fatah movement continued and became established on its Palestinian land. Its movement and armed activity was part of a national political project. As for Abu Nidal, his rifle ended up with the Iraqi “Baath,” and Habash belonged to the Syrian “Baath.”
Hamas may not survive the major attacks of October 7th. I imagine that the movement’s leadership was aware of this when it adopted the attack plan. Because the conflict is usually governed by the balance of losses. In the past, Hamas did not lack volunteers trained to fight, yet the number of perpetrators of the operation did not exceed the fingers of two hands alone. Balance was part of the calculations of the conflict that both parties endured and lived with. Likewise, Israel, despite the many small clashes, almost does not attack Hezbollah until after every decade, when it sees that its human and weapons capabilities have grown to what it considers a threat to it.
Armed militias do not decide the stages of conflict, and no matter how much they resonate around the world, they are quickly forgotten. The Palestinian Authority, when the Liberation Organization, led by Fatah, lived in exile and managed Palestinian affairs politically, militarily, and socially. After being exiled from Beirut, it returned through the Madrid Conference, then was transformed into a legitimate authority through the “Oslo Accords,” and on its promised soil, the West Bank. Today, it may be hope for the Palestinian person who wants both; Saving his difficult daily living situation and creating an independent Palestinian state.
The Israelis refuse, under the pretext that the authority is unable to bear its responsibility, and that its leadership, “Abu Mazen” and his companions, have aged, and are not as competent as the organization’s late senior leaders. On the other hand, we can say that Israel is devoid of such historical leaders; Rabin. The current Prime Minister, Netanyahu, is viewed by many Israelis as a corrupt and opportunistic figure, and he has not been a partner for peace in all previous endeavors. In order to save himself from prison, he lives in conflict with his rivals and comrades in the party.
The region is facing an extremely dangerous crisis that may grow and expand. In addition to Gaza, the destruction may extend to the West Bank, a war may break out in Lebanon, and the fire may extend beyond that geographically, and for a long period.
I see a similarity between this war and the Beirut war in 1982, when Sharon invaded it, after the attempt to assassinate the Israeli ambassador in London. The irony is that the perpetrator was from the “Abu Nidal” group, and Damascus was accused of it. But the one who paid the price was the PLO, which the Israelis forced to leave for Tunisia, Sudan, and Yemen. In practice, Fatah as an armed struggle movement has ended.
Israeli operations and statements say that it intends to get rid of the organization and most of the Hamas militants, including removing them from the Gaza Strip via Egypt.
In the north, Hezbollah is unlikely to get involved in the war. Because that would mean the return of the Israeli army to southern Lebanon. He is aware that destroying his capabilities will weaken him in Syria, which has become more important to him militarily and politically, and he may lose his complete control over Lebanon itself.
We go back and ask: Why did Hamas carry out this massive attack, or as some call it, “Israeli September 11”? Is it a mass suicide or a resolution of the balance of power? After its attacks, Al-Qaeda members shifted from an organization ruling the state of Afghanistan to living in caves, and ended up with Bin Laden hiding in Pakistan, and his children in Iran. But Al-Qaeda differs from Hamas in that its project was a caliphate state, a historical fantasy that has no place in the modern era, while the Palestinian project is real and has great hope.
However, we are faced with an opportunity, as Churchill said at the United Nations, after the devastation of World War II: “Do not let crises be in vain.”
Hamas chose this path. Israel decided to forcefully change the reality of Gaza and end Hamas. Neither party will resolve the conflict. Hamas will not liberate Palestine with its gliders, and Netanyahu will not destroy the Palestinians’ resolve to establish their state.
#Gaza #exit #scenario #Beirut
2023-10-14 03:35:54