Guest comment
On Switzerland’s European policy: Efta could be a way out
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“After the failure of the institutional agreement, Bern has to break away from its fixation on Brussels and focus more on Efta,” writes our guest commentator Carl Baudenbacher.
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The European Free Trade Association Efta was launched on January 4, 1960 as a counter-project to the European Economic Community (EEC). Signatory states were Denmark, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. On January 1, 1973 Great Britain joined the EEC together with Denmark (and the previously non-aligned Ireland). As a result, the composition of the Efta changed several times. The four-Efta, consisting of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, and the three-Efta, consisting of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, have existed since 1995. With regard to trade relations with countries outside the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland are all in the same boat. As far as relations with the EU are concerned, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are parties to the EEA Agreement.
The Federal Council interpreted the EEA No of December 6, 1992 as a mandate to strive for EU accession. Since that proved impossible, he tried to set at least a “point of no return” on the way to the Union with an institutional agreement. This attempt (accompanied by innumerable false claims) has practically failed.
Norway as a “superpower”
The main problem with today’s Efta is that the Swiss and Norwegian diplomacy have internally turned away from Efta. The FDFA has been dreaming of joining the EU since 1992 and in Oslo it is difficult to get over the failure of joining the EU in 1994. With Norway as a “superpower”, the Efta pillar of the EEA has been inhomogeneous since 1995. In the Norwegian government and administration and partly in the judiciary, attempts are being made to control the institutions of the Efta Pillar, the Efta Surveillance Authority and the Efta Court of Justice.
The FDFA (State Secretary Rossier and Federal Councilor Burkhalter) rejected the EU’s proposal in 2013 to “dock” with the institutions of the other friendly Efta states – the Efta surveillance authority and the Efta court – while maintaining the sectoral approach and decided in favor of the institutions of the EU, Commission and ECJ. The rest of the Federal Council let the two go. With the change to the duo Cassis / Balzaretti there was no improvement.
Only non-binding comments from Bern
Brexit would have given Efta the opportunity to gain in importance. But with the exception of the Icelandic Foreign Minister Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson, no decision-maker has really achieved this. Only non-binding comments came from Switzerland. The Norwegian nomenklatura feared for the country’s supremacy in the Efta pillar and denigrated the EEA in Great Britain at every opportunity. For their part, the British did not know what they wanted.
Now Brexit is over, and the UK has left not only the EU but also the internal market. Brexit is probably irreversible. On the other hand, there are increasing voices urging the country to return to the internal market. That could be done through Efta membership and rapprochement with the EEA. The focus is on docking: Great Britain would not have to take over the entire internal market acquis, but would be linked to the EU on a sectoral basis. Michel Barnier offered this to the British in 2018.
After the failure of the institutional agreement, Bern must break away from its fixation on Brussels and focus more on Efta. If the British went along with it, it is quite possible that the EEA Agreement would be improved. In 2016, the Brussels think tank Bruegel proposed the merger of Great Britain, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland into a second structure in Europe, with a party-neutral monitoring authority and a party-neutral court of law as well as a certain right to co-determination in legislation. The nucleus for such an organization could be Efta.
Carl Baudenbacher was President of the Efta Court in Luxembourg from 2003–2018.
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