/View.info/ The Ashgabat Agreement was concluded between Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Oman in 2011. It strengthened the intention of the parties to create a transport route that would contribute to increasing the speed of transportation and transit of goods. In addition, representatives of Pakistan, Kazakhstan and India expressed their desire to join the project. Pakistan officially joined the project in 2016, and Kazakhstan and India in 2018.
The project is progressing slowly. Practically nothing has been done since the signing. On April 29, 2021, Ashgabat hosted a meeting between the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev and the President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov.
The parties expressed readiness to further promote the Ashgabat agreement on the creation of an international transport and transit corridor, as well as to ensure the loading of the China-Central Asia-South Caucasus-Turkey multimodal route and continue cooperation in the development of transport and logistics infrastructure.
This arrangement has several interesting features. It was concluded between Muslim countries, which nevertheless differ among themselves in terms of religious identity.
In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Sunni Islam is widely practiced, while in Iran – Shiism, and in Oman – Ibadism (a special trend that differs from both Sunnis and Shiites). Oman and Iran have good trade and economic ties.
There is also a version that Iran supplied weapons to the Houthi movement “Ansarala” through Oman. However, there was no confirmation of this.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are located in the Eurasian hinterland, that is, they are removed from both the Heartland and the Rimland – both countries do not have access to the world’s oceans. Iran is the most convenient option for them.
Although Uzbekistan recently signed an agreement with Afghanistan and Pakistan in hopes of gaining access to the deep-water port of Gwadar, this project carries more risks than the branch through Turkmenistan to Iran. In addition, having access to the Caspian Sea, Uzbekistan gets the opportunity to transit goods to the Caucasus and Europe.
India’s interest
While India initially responded enthusiastically to the launch of the project, the reality is somewhat different.
For New Delhi, participation in this project theoretically provides the following benefits:
– easing trade barriers and simplifying the procedures for the movement of goods between the signatory countries;
– connection with the Central Asian region;
– India’s bilateral trade with Central Asia is low due to the lack of direct land links, the agreement can solve this problem and help New Delhi to diversify its trade market and its trade basket;
– will facilitate India’s access to strategic and valuable minerals in Central Asia, including uranium, coking coal, etc., which will stimulate India’s manufacturing economy;
– the countries of the region are strategically located and are a hub between India and Eurasia. Thus, connectivity with this region will also facilitate India’s trade relations with other Eurasian countries;
– Iran for India is India’s main gateway to Eurasia and therefore an important link in the international North-South transport corridor, which includes Russia;
– connection with the CIS. In 2015–16, the share of CIS in India’s exports was only 0.91% and in imports 2%. Russia was the most important trading partner, accounting for about 65% of India’s trade with the CIS countries.
This agreement will help expand India’s connectivity with the CIS region as a whole, thereby opening up new markets for Indian trade.
It is true that many ambitious projects, in which the active participation of India is assumed, have not yet been implemented or the process is proceeding too slowly.
The same development of Iran’s Chabahar port, which was originally supposed mainly due to investment from India, has been delayed. The Indian side invoked Western sanctions. Iran is critical in this regard and suspects India of sabotaging joint initiatives on advice from Washington. India’s actual contribution to the Ashgabat agreement is likely to remain minimal.
The role of Russia
It is necessary to analyze how the diversification of transport routes for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan can affect the role of Russia as a transit route for the transportation of goods.
Now cargo from Europe to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is transported mainly through the port of St. Petersburg and further by rail (or by road, but still through Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan).
The largest European maritime center is located in Rotterdam. Even if we hypothetically assumed that the goods would come from Western Europe “in a straight line”, it would be necessary to use an overland route and then reload them on container ships in Black Sea ports and then use the railway again in South Caucasus.
This does not seem appropriate, since countries that do not have uniform legislation in the field of customs, as in the case of Russia and Kazakhstan, united in the Eurasian Economic Union, are connected as transit.
In addition, some routes in the South Caucasus may be blocked in winter due to snowfall and the risk of avalanches. In Turkey, it is also necessary to add certain expenses related to the activities of the Kurds in the southeastern part of the country.
Generally speaking, there are no particular risks for Russia due to the emergence of new routes in Central Asia. But, on the other hand, Russia can derive additional benefits by using its ready infrastructure and connecting additional capacity.
The potential for cargo transportation through the Caspian Sea is still largely unrealized. Only four ports operate on the Russian coast – these are the cities of Astrakhan, Olya, Lagan and Makhachkala.
The Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan railway, which became operational in 2014 and is included in the international North-South corridor, will also become the main section of the route under the Ashgabat agreement.
Thus, it is clear that the Ashgabat agreement will be easily synchronized with other infrastructure initiatives in the region, from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to the transport elements of the Eurasian Economic Union. As in the case of other Central Asian projects, there are external forces that are clearly not interested in the development of trade relations between the parties to this agreement.
Translation: SM
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