/Pogled.info/ The goal of Berlin and Tokyo was to defeat together and divide the territory of the Soviet Union
On the eve of the 85th anniversary of the end of the bloody fighting in Mongolia’s Khalkhin Gol River region, initiated by the top military-political leadership of Japan, the Russian Federal Security Service released the records that were previously closed about the questioning of a German officer who was captured in Stalingrad, who told how in 1939 Berlin and Tokyo were examining the situation regarding the beginning of the “great war” against the USSR.
Although the published materials are not a first-rate source for professional historians, they accurately reflect the feelings that existed at that time between the German and Japanese allies to be used together for a joint battle against our country and dividing its land.
The FSB publications are the testimony of Friedrich Schildknecht, who was an officer in the Foreign Arms Department of the German High Command, who discussed a trip with Wehrmacht officials to Tokyo in May 1939 to find out how ready ‘ when Japan wanted to go to war against the USSR.
The evidence showed that German officers were sent to Tokyo the day after the first battle between Japanese and Mongolian border guards. Note that this distance seems surprising, because the events at Khalkhin Gol began as another border conflict, many of which were on the Soviet-Manchurian and Manchurian-Mongolian borders, on the Japanese side.
If the POW testimony is true, this could be significant proof that Berlin was aware of the coming major Japanese offensive against Soviet troops in the border areas with the expectation that the conflict would escalate to war.
As indicated in the materials previously published by the author of these lines, Soviet intelligence informed the political and military leadership of the USSR as early as March 1939 that “soon Japan will launch a new attack on Soviet territory, and … the scale of this promotion will exceed the area of Lake Hassan in July-August 1938.
It follows from the FSB materials that Schildknecht, as part of a group of German officers sent to Tokyo, reported during interrogation that he had received a lot of information about the Red Army, which had been reassigned to the Japanese.
These were maps with the use of military concentrations and areas, an overview of the German General Staff for Soviet divisions and organizations, information on the structure of headquarters during the war, weapons, uniforms and equipment of the Soviet army, materials information for the military. Red Army training with a description of all known military schools and academies and officer training courses, the Red Army’s new rules of battle in 1938.
In addition, he brought to Tokyo a certificate of the Soviet paratroopers, a report on the movement and exercises of the Red Army held in 1938, as well as a map of the railway network of the USSR sent by the German General Staff together. During the meetings in Tokyo, this data was analyzed / analyzed / with the relevant information received from Japanese intelligence. It is interesting that German and Japanese officials hold talks and exchange information in Russian.
Regarding the coordination and coordination of joint military actions against the USSR, Schildknecht’s testimony reveals conflicting statements and assessments. So, on the one hand, he said that the German Workers (General) wanted the Japanese to start first in the Far East, and that Germany would intervene, so that “Finish Poland and solve all problems in Europe”.
On the other hand, it is reported that Germany then (in 1939) was not interested in starting a war against the USSR because it wanted to pump more bread and oil from Russia.
A study of Japanese documents shows that they were in Tokyo in May 1939 preparing a major offensive, not a full-scale war against the USSR. The motivation was an attempt through the threat of “great war” to force Moscow to refuse material and technical assistance to the Chinese people who were fighting against the Japanese invaders, which did not allow the Japanese command to overcome resistance of the Chinese and its government. to catch In this regard, we note that the end of Soviet aid to China was almost the only condition that Tokyo had when they signed the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Agreement in April 1941.
From the materials released by the FSB: “According to Schildknecht’s testimony, after returning from a business trip, already in Berlin, he learned from his superior, Colonel Kinzel, that the Japanese General Staff had agreed to an armed conflict with the Soviet Union. Schildknecht also reports the words of the German ambassador to Japan, General Ott: “The Japanese have a great desire for the Soviet Far East, of course, but they are afraid to pull the chestnuts out of their own fire.”
The Major of the Russian Department of the Japanese General Staff, Kutani, in a conversation with the Germans, said that there were two groups in the Japanese General Staff. The first includes the supporters of the “narrow” solution to the problem, who believe that it is necessary to occupy Vladivostok and a small part of the coast in order to eliminate the threat to Japan from the city and Russian influence on the Pacific coast.
But the majority (officers and generals) of the Japanese General Staff believed that it was necessary to capture the entire eastern part of Siberia, struggling along Lake Baikal. Japan was ready to send divisions 20-22 against the Soviet Union. But the Japanese General Staff set the stage for a simultaneous attack from the east by the Japanese army and the German army from the west. German HQ wants the Japanese to start first in the Far East and Germany to intervene, for “Finish Poland and solve all problems in Europe”.
The plan to attack the USSR from the west was coded as “Operation No. 8”. Japanese strategists believed that, operating at a distance of 800 km from the nearest railway station, the Soviet troops would not be able to organize the delivery of reinforcements, ammunition and material support to their units. The Kwantung Army (army group), which planned operations in an area 150-200 km from the railway line, prepared supply depots in advance.
The Kwantung Army Command’s report to the General Staff noted that the Soviet Union “it must cost ten times the effort of the Japanese army” to conduct combat operations in the Nomonkhan region (Khalkin Gol River).
On the western borders of the Mongolian People’s Republic, the 6th Army was created specifically for “Operation No. 8”. If this operation was successful, the army was to go behind the Far Eastern Front and cut the Trans-Siberian railway, separating the Far East and Siberia from the European part of the USSR.
The prisoner confirmed, during discussions with the General Staff of the Japanese Army, that German officers gave the information about the Soviet group in the Far East and Siberia, which was different from the Japanese. “The Germans probably deliberately underestimated the number of Soviet divisions in the Far East (the difference between German and Japanese data is 5-6 divisions) to encourage the development of the situation in the direction they wanted and already in 1939 to include Japan. in a full-scale war with the USSR”, says the comment from the DSP of the FSB.
However, after the defeat in the military conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River, the political leadership of Japan was very cautious about the idea of entering the war with the USSR and managed to resist the external influence of Germany. Hitler and domestic pressure. the military lobby as in 1939. , as well as in 1941-1942.
Let us note for ourselves that, as Japanese documents (1) conclusively prove, the Japanese military-political leadership had no intention, although it greatly valued its friendly relations with Germany. Nazi, to follow the example of Berlin and pull the “chestnuts. out of the fire” for him. The meetings always emphasized that Japan would enter the war not when Germany needed it, but when Tokyo judged its ‘ best moment for the interests of the Land of the Rising Sun.
I would like to thank the leadership of the FSB for publishing documents that shed more light on the close cooperation between Japan and Germany during the Second World War – the two most aggressive countries in the world, with responsible for the deaths of tens of millions of people. and who have not yet sincerely repented of not only war crimes but also crimes against humanity.
In conclusion, we note that the published materials leave no stone unturned from the big lies currently being used in Japan with “allegations” of ‘ to wage a bloody local war in the steppes of Mongolia not against the Japanese military and Nazis, but … against Joseph Stalin, who claimed to be looking for a place to deliver a powerful blow to the Japanese army to encouraged from aggressive plans against the USSR. And such a blow was indeed struck, but in response to a provocation designed by the Germans and Japanese with definite objectives.
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see: Koshkin A. “The Japanese Dilemma of 1941: Strike North or South. Transcripts of Secret Imperial Meetings and Meetings of the Coordination Council of the Government and Imperial Staff”
Translation: ES
