Nearly a decade after the 2014 attack on Ukraine, the encouraged and irritated Vladimir Putin, more isolated and paranoid than ever, has once again brazenly invaded his neighbor. But unlike in 2014, Ukraine – and the world – were better prepared. The Russian president miscalculated how quickly world opinion would turn against him and how fierce the Ukrainian resistance would be. He misjudged the support of his own people and certainly did not imagine the decisive actions that state and non-state actors are ready to take to pull back the curtain on his lies. Governments have banded together to implement the most comprehensive, coordinated package of sanctions ever imposed on any nation, Esther Tetrouashvili, a former US diplomat at embassies in Central Asia and China, was elected to Foreign Policy by Forbes 30 under 30. law and politics in 2019
But is that enough?
Many observers are discussing Putin’s change: some say he is rational, while others say he is losing track of reality. But people, even authoritarian ones, are inconsistent, so both statements may be partially true. With this in mind, the democratic world must carefully consider what kind of decision Russia and Ukraine can make – or will be forced to make.
To save face, Putin will seek regime change and / or demilitarization of Ukraine, without the possibility of Ukraine’s membership in NATO or the European Union. He expressed this in talks with French President Emmanuel Macron. The wars in Syria and Chechnya show that Putin will continue to escalate, which will make the price of non-capitulation very high for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the people of Ukraine.
Three scenarios can be developed:
Stalemate: Everyone is a loser
Partial defeat for Putin could include accepting Donetsk and Luhansk regions as Russian territories or autonomous regions, as well as recognizing Crimea as part of Russia. The West will have to agree to the gradual lifting of sanctions in exchange for the withdrawal of Russian troops. Private companies can be persuaded to re-engage with Russia.
Putin will then punish those who disagree in parliament, his closest circles and take additional measures to suppress anti-government sentiment. The media will be censored and Russia may adopt the Chinese model of cyber sovereignty to control the flow of information within the country. To prevent further casualties, Zelenski will agree to a ceasefire. This will leave both countries with another frozen conflict – perhaps a little hotter than the others on Russia’s borders – but Zelensky will retain control of the government and Ukraine will potentially join the EU.
Ukraine will need support to rebuild its infrastructure and economy, and a new purge of pro-Russian politicians, citizens and activists is likely to follow. The huge refugee crisis will also be difficult to reverse, as more than 3 million Ukrainians have fled, with millions more expected to leave in the coming weeks.
NATO will still be out of the table, as the two separatist regions would force NATO countries to engage in an endless cycle of military contributions to Ukraine if it joins. Russia will withdraw, be completely isolated from the international order and potentially accused of war crimes against the military and politicians. A roadmap for the normalization of relations will be formulated, but it is not clear under what conditions. The lifting of sanctions will depend on Putin’s assurances that he will respect Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Matt: Putin is achieving his goals
In a scenario in which Russia defeats Ukraine and imposes a repressive puppet regime, Russian forces will brutally destroy Ukrainian troops and civilians, unlike Joseph Stalin in Hungary in 1956. For its actions, Russia will continue to isolate itself and restore the Iron Curtain around Ukraine and Belarus. Ukrainians will probably never really capitulate to a leader installed by Russia, provoking a long-term and brutal uprising.
Considering the resolution of the UN General Assembly condemning the invasion of Russia, the abstentions – almost reflecting membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Seeing Putin’s success, these countries will certainly be encouraged and become allies of Russia in a new multipolar order.
While Putin is still in power, Russian and Chinese plans to separate some economic dependence on the West will continue. In fact, controlling US exports of important technologies such as semiconductors to Russia is reminiscent of those imposed on China, and alternative supply chains and self-sufficiency will once again be a priority for Russia.
Russia’s and China’s project to replace US monetary hegemony will also be accelerated. As early as 2015, when China launched the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, this was partly in response to Western sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Crimea.
China and Russia then agreed to make a currency swap in yuan to ease some of the sanctions, which was recently renewed. Of course, regimes that are concerned that they may one day find themselves in a similar package of economic sanctions will be encouraged to move away from the dollar. Finally, we must not forget that Russia is still a major supplier of oil and gas to Europe. Under this scenario, energy concerns are likely to divide Europe and undermine European interest in prosecuting Russia for war crimes.
Forced Mat: Revolution in Russia
Regime change in Russia will result from an internal coup or popular uprising, as the Russian people and political elite feel the pressure of sanctions. This would lead to a crisis of inheritance. If this happens through a popular uprising, Alexei Navalny, a favorite of the populist Russians, is still in prison and could be eliminated before he has a chance to lead. For the Liberals, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who lives in exile in London, could seek a return, but may receive an unpopular reception.
Theoretically, according to the constitution, Mikhail Mishustin as prime minister should step in as acting president, and elections will be held three months later, but this kind of smooth transition is unlikely.
The most likely successor will come from Putin’s inner circle, but only after a bloody power struggle. The oligarchs will enter the battle, as will the strong regional leaders. Civil society and technocrats may agree on the best results, but such groups do not have a unified vision of Russia. The last time Russia went through a revolution, it was domestic, not catalyzed from outside.
In the events leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev tried to consolidate support in his inner circle before he turned against him in a largely unsuccessful coup. However, this coup paved the way for Boris Yeltsin, a populist figure outside Gorbachev’s inner circle, to come to power.
Russians, though perhaps increasingly annoyed with Putin, will resent the destruction of their economy, and after spending the past two decades rebuilding their sense of identity and national pride, are likely to turn to fierce populism and rebuilding nationalism. My own study of Russian immigration policy shows that Russian populist and nationalist sentiments are growing.
Russia’s middle class, frustrated by the promises of Western capitalism, believes their economic problems stem from immigrants who take away their jobs and minority groups with enormous power. In recent years, the biggest threat to Putin’s regime has come from domestic populist and nationalist opposition. Putin had to strike a very careful balance, often promoting a nationalist identity that is not only Slavic but part of the Russian world, which includes non-Slavic Russians. In recent years, Putin has used nationalist rhetoric to focus the hostility of Russians hurt by Western sanctions to Western leaders, especially the United States. Whatever Russia looks like after Putin, it may not be what Western democracies want.
The West must start making choices now, looking at the opportunities that lie ahead.
The partial defeat is the most likely result of this war, reducing Ukrainian casualties while throwing lifelines to ordinary Russian citizens. Achieving this will require multilateral diplomatic efforts. Europeans must agree to welcome Ukraine into the EU, propose to Putin the lifting of sanctions in exchange for a de-escalation of violence, and negotiate a treaty that gives Russia some assurances that its economic and security interests will be met. Key individuals must be tried for war crimes in absentia.
If a puppet regime is established in Ukraine, then the West must identify lasting consequences for the Russian regime, including maintaining sanctions against key military leaders and the energy sector. Ukrainians will continue to fight, and such rebel groups will seek support from NATO and European countries. Brutal repression is likely in response to such calls for help. Against this background, NATO leaders must formulate for whom and how they will fight. For example, if Russia inadvertently attacks a NATO member in an attempt to quell the resistance movement, will this provoke a military response?
If Putin, after succeeding in Ukraine, somehow stabilizes the Russian economy and then decides to try his luck in other non-NATO countries, such as Moldova or Georgia – again – how will Europe react? Are there any consequences of Putin’s actions? Perhaps it is time to reconsider the articles of the North Atlantic Treaty and create a half-military intervention – something between Article 5 and nothing – as a monitoring or peacekeeping force stationed in countries bordering NATO members. We need to make NATO more flexible so that it can respond to new types of wars.
If leaders are hoping for a regime change, then they must be prepared to deal with the incredible chaos that is sure to follow. The turmoil in the world’s 11th largest economy and a future Russian leader who may be more nationalistic and populist than ever will be difficult to integrate into the existing international order. As Russia’s elite, civil society and regional factions fight for the throne, lines of communication with China and other regional leaders will be crucial in reducing violence, curbing cybercriminals and spreading any chance of a nuclear catastrophe.
To deal with a devastated economy, sanctions can be lifted to provide humanitarian aid to ordinary Russians. If you believe that the most rosy results are possible, that Russia can somehow become a democracy similar to those in the West, then support for civil society may be useful, but Russians are more likely to prefer a nationalist, authoritarian a strong man to stabilize the country. Nations will need to establish relations with this new leader, and in the meantime UN and security alliances need to be reformed to clarify which actions provoke specific joint military and economic responses to acts of unprovoked, unilateral aggression.
As early as 2014, I arrived at the US mission in NATO disappointed, acknowledging that Western countries would not intervene militarily to defend democracy in Ukraine. Ukraine was not and still is not a member of NATO and therefore there would be no military action. While Putin’s military was engaged in a hybrid war, Western nations gave speeches and sent aid, but most did not want to do more. After all, as now, Ukraine is showing the Western world’s greatest commitment to the values of democracy and freedom. Today, Ukrainians and the united response of the world give me hope. But we must have clear goals if we are to build a stronger world to follow.
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