FAA Report Finds Boeing’s Safety Culture Needs Substantive Upgrades
A scathing report commissioned by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has revealed that Boeing’s efforts to improve its safety culture have fallen short. The report, written by a panel of independent aviation experts, highlights a disconnect between the company’s senior management rhetoric about prioritizing safety and the perception of front-line employees. The report comes in the wake of the two fatal crashes involving Boeing’s 737 MAX aircraft in 2018 and 2019, which were caused by a flawed flight control system design that Boeing concealed from the FAA during certification.
One member of the expert panel, Javier de Luis, has a personal stake in fixing Boeing’s safety culture as his sister died in the second 737 MAX crash. De Luis emphasized the most concerning finding of the report, stating that there is a gap between what is being said at the executive level and what is believed and heard at the working level. While Boeing’s leadership claims that safety is their top priority and encourages employees to speak up about safety issues, there is a lack of trust and belief among the workforce.
The report highlights “inadequate and confusing implementation” of Boeing’s safety culture efforts. It also raises concerns about how Boeing manages engineering employees responsible for internal oversight on behalf of the FAA. The panel found that these employees may be fearful of raising safety issues that could cause delays in certification or production. The report acknowledges that Boeing has made some changes since 2020 to encourage employees to speak up, but it concludes that the current culture still allows for retaliation, particularly regarding salary and furlough ranking.
Boeing’s white-collar union representing engineers and technical staff, the Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace (SPEEA), supports the report and believes it can be a catalyst for positive change. The union states that there is a disconnect between the messaging from Boeing headquarters and the messages employees receive from their direct supervisors. SPEEA also highlights the fear of retaliation that prevents employees from speaking up.
The panel, consisting of independent experts and representatives from various organizations, including the FAA, NASA, major airlines, and unions, has made more than 50 recommendations to address the deficiencies in Boeing’s safety-management processes. The panel reviewed thousands of pages of Boeing documents, conducted surveys, and interviewed FAA and Boeing employees across six locations.
The report calls for Boeing to develop an action plan within the next six months that comprehensively addresses each recommendation. It emphasizes that successful adoption of these recommendations will improve safety for Boeing’s workforce, operators, and the public.
In addition to the overall disconnect between Boeing’s leadership and employee perceptions, the report raises other serious concerns. It highlights the departure of senior engineers during the pandemic, resulting in a loss of expertise needed for FAA oversight. The report recommends enhanced retention and workforce hiring. It also reveals that Boeing neglected its engineering unit focused on “human factors” before the MAX crashes. The report recommends expediting the development of human factors as a highly prioritized discipline within Boeing.
The panel also found that input from Boeing test pilots about aircraft performance or issues is not consistently delivered to higher-level managers and executives. To address this, the report recommends giving the top pilot position on a jet program enough authority to ensure pilots’ concerns are adequately considered in decisions related to flight safety, pilot training, and human factors.
Boeing introduced a Safety Management System after the MAX crashes, but the report states that front-line employees lack understanding of their role in this system. The report recommends implementing communication and feedback methods to strengthen awareness of how the system should operate.
While the report acknowledges that improving safety and quality at Boeing will take time and sustained attention, Javier de Luis, whose sister died in a MAX crash, emphasizes the need for faster action. The report has prompted the FAA to conduct a thorough review and determine next steps, while Boeing has expressed its commitment to reviewing the panel’s assessment and learning from their findings.
In conclusion, the report’s findings highlight the urgent need for Boeing to address its safety culture and bridge the gap between leadership rhetoric and employee perception. The recommendations put forth by the panel provide a roadmap for Boeing to improve safety for its workforce, operators, and the public. It is crucial for Boeing to take swift and decisive action to restore trust and ensure that safety remains the top priority in all aspects of its operations.