As the new year begins, tensions are rising on the Korean peninsula due to insane statements by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Whenever I give a lecture, I often receive questions such as “Maybe war will break out?” Robert Currin, a researcher at the Middle Valley Institute of International Studies in the United States, and Sigfried Hecker, a professor emeritus at Stanford University, have argued that “the situation on the Korean peninsula has reached the most dangerous situation since June 1950.” 1994 First North Korean Nuclear Force..
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As the new year begins, tensions are rising on the Korean peninsula due to insane statements by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Whenever I give a lecture, I often receive questions such as “Maybe war will break out?” Robert Currin, a researcher at the Middle Valley Institute of International Studies in the United States, and Sigfried Hecker, a professor emeritus at Stanford University, have argued that “the situation on the Korean peninsula has reached the most dangerous situation since June 1950.” Professor Emeritus Robert Gallucci of Georgetown University, who was the U.S. State Department’s special nuclear envoy for the North during the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, also said, “We should consider the possibility of a nuclear war breaking out in Northeast Asia in 2024.” he warned. What the experts who make these claims have in common is that they have experience negotiating with North Korea in the past. In response, former German Ambassador Thomas Schaefer, who served in Pyongyang for 10 years starting in 2007, said, “I do not agree with the assertion that the Korean peninsula is at the gravest risk of war since 1950,” and “North Korea’s hardline attitude is old. This is a pattern of negotiations that has continued since then.” In this way, the “war crisis theory” and the “negotiation pattern theory” seem to be in conflict, but will the year of Koshin in 2024 be the same as the year of Koshin in 1950, or even more so? Let’s think about whether it’s dangerous.
First, let’s compare the military power of the North and South. For four weeks from March 31, 1950, President Kim Il-sung, along with Park Heon-young and Hong Myung-hee, received approval from Stalin for the final plan to invade the South in Moscow. In the Russian Federation Presidential Archives in Moscow, there are 48 telegrams in which Kim Il Sung persistently asked Stalin to approve the invasion of the South (Weddersby, “Revisiting the Korean War 1999”). We also received assurances of support for 242 Soviet-made T34 tanks, the most powerful tanks in the world at the time. In addition to 726 field artillery guns and 211 fighter jets, the North Korean military has received extensive military support and has increased its armored strength. More than 40,000 ethnic Korean soldiers who had been participating in the Communist civil war in Manchuria also joined, and 200,000 troops began a full-scale invasion of the south, led by tanks.
South Korea, on the other hand, did not have the military power to protect its homeland at all. The Korean military at that time was completely asymmetrical. The purpose of the South Korean military, which numbered less than 100,000 and was established as part of the United States’ military support policy (1948-50) for South Korea after the country’s liberation, was to “maintain domestic security.” There were no tanks, but the armored regiment had 27 M8 armored vehicles and 24 M2/M3 troop transport armored vehicles supported by the United States. Just three days after the invasion of the South, the 105th Tank Unit, the main force of the North Korean army, occupied Seoul. South Korea had nothing to do against the North Korean army in terms of both weapons and military strength.
Kim Il Sung secured military food and rice through land reform in March 1946, and from 1948 he gradually began preparing for an invasion of the South. After 1949, he visited Moscow frequently and repeatedly sought Stalin’s approval. Furthermore, in January 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Acheson declared that South Korea would be removed from the defense line, and an invasion of the South became only a matter of time. The last remaining issue was for Mao Zedong of the Chinese Communist Party to promise to participate in the war if the U.S. military entered the war. On May 25, Kim Il Sung received assurances in Beijing about the participation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the war. A complete backup system between China and the Soviet Union was established for Pyongyang.
In contrast, Seoul at that time was in shambles. Some of them communicated with Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang from Seoul, disrupting the political situation in South Korea. Park Heon-young of the South Korean Workers’ Party was inciting armed uprisings and terrorism. The state of chaos was unbearable for a newly democratic nation. Amidst the political turmoil following liberation, the South Korean military did not make any progress. Four months after the South Korean invasion, the South Korean military finally realized the need for tanks, and received six M36 anti-tank self-propelled guns from the U.S. military for training purposes, and formed a tank unit. After MacArthur’s Inchon Landing Operation, the military power of the North and South became equal, and the two rose and fell repeatedly. Through military education provided by the U.S. military, the military command system was built through bloodshed, and a unit was created to repel the enemy. For two years from June 1951 until the armistice agreement was signed, high ground warfare centered on the 38th parallel continued.
Lt. Col. Ferren Burke of the U.S. Army, who participated in the June 25 War, recalls, “It was not a war that tested strength, but a war that tested will.” (“Such a War,” 1963). Looking back on the communists, he said, “They had a strong ambition to unify South Korea into a red state with superior military power.” In particular, he lamented, “In addition to the South Korean military, which lacked training and had lax discipline, the U.S. military suffered great losses,” adding, “The military must prepare as thoroughly as the players who will be playing in a soccer match tomorrow.” Appealed. Still, the fact that the liberal world, including the U.S. military, was able to dispatch ground forces and immediately rescue South Korea was a blessing from God to protect the Republic of Korea.
Seventy years have passed since the war, and various changes have occurred in the North and South. In 2024, South Korea was ranked 5th in the world’s military power, and North Korea was ranked 36th, according to the US military power evaluation company Global Fire Power (GFP). In terms of defense budget items, South Korea was 11th with approximately 53 trillion won (approximately 5.9 trillion yen), and North Korea was 58th with 4.6 trillion won (approximately 510 billion yen). If this is all there is to it, South Korea’s military power appears to be overwhelming North Korea. However, this assessment does not include North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Although the South Korean military outnumbers the North Korean military when it comes to conventional weapons, the story becomes different when nuclear weapons are included. The asymmetry of nuclear weapons eliminates the superiority of conventional weapons. The issue of preventing a nuclear attack by the North Korean military through the Korea-US alliance’s extended deterrence strategy is a serious challenge for South Korea’s security.
South Korea’s economic power overwhelms North Korea in terms of its ability to wage war. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un recently scolded North Korean leaders at Mt. Myohyang for the slump in the local economy and lack of basic daily necessities. This is because they focused only on the military industry and neglected the people’s economy. Due to land reform in North Korea in 1946, just before the June 25 invasion of the South, North Korea’s food production had reached 2.4 million tons, double the level at the time of liberation. The situation is different from 1950, when we secured the ability to wage war, and 2024, when we are unable to secure even basic daily necessities.
However, the recent political turmoil in South Korea is as worrying as it was at the time of liberation. Political divisions over invisible security policies weaken the nation’s defense capabilities. General Secretary Kim Jong-un declared that the constitution would clearly state that South Korea’s territory would be occupied and secured. In addition to a surprise attack such as the sinking of the patrol ship Cheonan or the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, it is also possible that an emergency situation could occur in which Japan would temporarily occupy weakly defended islands in the West Sea. We must open the map of the West Sea and devise proper countermeasures.
Deterrence is most important in war. The best strategy is to win without fighting. However, the point that “if you have no choice but to fight, you must win” is an important point in Clausewitz’s theory of war. Pyongyang is trying to involve Moscow and Beijing in forming a new Cold War between South Korea, the US, Japan, North Korea, China and Russia. However, if we proceed with smart diplomacy based on trained military power, our enemies will not be able to carry out “deadly blows” or even “localized provocations.”
Nam Sung-wook, professor at Korea University’s School of Unification and Foreign Affairs, former director of the Institute for National Security Strategy
Chosun Ilbo / Chosun Ilbo Japanese version
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2024-02-18 07:00:00