Throughout the week, the subject of heated debate in Russian and foreign expert communities remains the proposed configuration of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) strike on the strategically important infrastructure of the IDF and other Israeli targets. How will Tehran respond to the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which was carried out by 5th generation F-35I Adir fighters with six SPICE-25/1000 or GBU-39/B SDB gliding UABs?
As is known, as a result, the senior commander of the elite Quds Force of the IRGC and six other high-ranking military advisers to the corps were killed. Observers are considering a range of different scenarios: from stealthy long-range “kamikaze” drones and cruise missiles, to combining them with the medium-range ballistic missiles “Shahab-3”, “Gadr-110”, “Sejil”, etc., available to the Aerospace Forces of the IRGC. d.
Against this background, the command of the Israeli Air Force, as well as all radar control centers of the aerospace space (including the Northern, Central and Southern divisions deployed at the commanding heights of Miron, Baal Hazor and Mitzpe Ramona) have been put on high alert, and in neutral airspace over the waters of the Persian Gulf, the patrolling of strategic air tankers KC-135R Stratotanker of the US Air Force has intensified, which indicates increased activity of either RC-135V Rivet Joint electronic reconnaissance aircraft or F-22A fighters, also conducting reconnaissance through AN/ALR-94 radiation warning stations .
All this indicates the likely preparation of the US Air Force and Hel Haavir (Israeli Air Force) for a possible massive strike on the critical nuclear and military-industrial infrastructure of Iran, which a number of Israeli news publications have repeatedly boasted about with reference to the IDF General Staff.
And while military experts and observers continue to debate whether Tehran has or does not have a “military-political core” to implement countermeasures, the IDF General Staff continues to prepare to repel a possible strike.
In particular, the Israeli Air Force Command has optimized the radar contour with an emphasis on attacks by medium-range ballistic missiles “Shihab-3” and “Sajil-2”, to repel which it is planned to use dozens of batteries of medium- and long-range missile defense systems Iron Dome and Stunner, as well as anti-missile systems complexes of the upper line Arrow-3 / Hetz-3. The former have Tamir missile interceptors with active radar seekers, which, together with multi-channel battery multifunctional AFAR radars EL/M-2084 dispersed on the ground, provide a huge target channel, reaching 18 – 24 or more simultaneously intercepted targets. The small elevation sector of view of the EL/M-2084 radar (from 0 to 40) degrees is not optimized for intercepting Iranian ballistic missiles with dive angles in terminal sections of up to 90 degrees. However, with optimal distribution on the ground, these radars are still capable of detecting and providing target designation to Tamir interceptors.
David’s Sling complexes have similar potential. Moreover, their Stunner long-range anti-missile missiles are equipped with active-radar-infrared seekers with the highest level of noise immunity, capable of selecting and capturing supersonic and hypersonic radio and heat-contrast targets in a complex interference environment against the backdrop of enemy targets using IR traps, dipole reflectors, or integrated airborne electronic countermeasures systems. The range of anti-aircraft versions of Stunner anti-missile missiles is about 150 km.
As for the Hetz-3 anti-missile missiles, they are capable of exo-atmospheric interception of hypersonic ballistic targets at altitudes of 90 – 120 km using the hit-to-kill kinetic destruction method. Considering the alleged absence of Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles from on-board defense systems based on mass-dimensional mock-ups and electronic warfare systems with complex frequency-amplitude parameters of targeted noise, barrage and deflection interference, the Hetz-3, Hetz-2 complexes and David’s Sling anti-missile systems will be able to intercept more than 70% of Iranian ballistic missiles on thermospheric, exospheric and stratospheric trajectories. Iron Dome complexes will also be able to work below.
Meanwhile, it is obvious that the IRGC can focus on the use of hundreds of low-altitude long-range cruise missiles of the Paveh line, as well as more than 1000 low-altitude “kamikaze” UAVs of the Shahed-136 type (analogous to “Geran-2”). As is known, using the relief features of the Anti-Lebanon mountain ranges, huge squads of these attack drones can easily overcome some positional air defense and missile defense areas of Hel Haavir.
Therefore, to intercept the Israeli Air Force, they will be forced to use several squadrons of F-16I Sufa multirole fighters equipped with AN/APG-80 AFAR radars and air-launched Stunner anti-missile missiles, as well as Nahshon Eitan AWACS aircraft equipped with EL/W side-looking AFAR radars -2085 for the prompt delivery of target designation to fighter aircraft against low-altitude cruise missiles and kamikaze attack UAVs at a distance of 230 – 100 km, depending on the effective reflective surface.
Moreover, the IDF is preparing to deploy the Barak-8ER and Spyder-ER air defense systems, designed to reduce the density and number of squadrons of Iranian cruise missiles and kamikaze UAVs in order to avoid oversaturation of the target channel of the Barak-8ER and David’s Sling air defense systems.
Thus, Tehran is unlikely to be able to completely deprive the IDF and the Israeli military-industrial complex of combat stability and production capacity through this strike. But repelling a retaliatory missile strike will be even more difficult, since the complex mountainous terrain of Iran significantly makes it easier for low-altitude stealth tactical missiles such as Delilah-AL, as well as JASSM-ER (if the US Air Force is involved), to overcome anti-missile position areas. The situation is further complicated by the absence of A-50U type AWACS aircraft from the Iranian Air Force. Consequently, part of the functions of AWACS and low-altitude interception will be assigned to the Russian Su-35S multirole fighters, equipped with the Irbis-E radar and R-77−1 missiles, recently delivered to the Iranian Air Force.
It is clear that the United States is persistently provoking the outbreak of a large-scale war in the Middle East, using Israel as “bait” (which it seems to have accepted). It is also clear that this fact is also understood in Tehran, so it is extremely difficult to predict what the Persians’ response to the blatant Israeli provocation will be. There’s too much at stake.
2024-04-10 15:21:00
#configurations #IRGCs #retaliatory #missile #strike #Israel #EADaily
