Donald Trump has long made it clear that no one speaks for him. Nonetheless, it is probably safe to say that if elected he would pursue a foreign policy consistent with that of his first term. Regarding Europe, he would be likely to highlight many of the same problems he already has: inadequate defence spending, a lack of energy diversification and trade protectionism. Many Europeans acknowledge these problems. They could therefore create opportunities for America and Europe to work together—if they resist the temptation to cast Mr Trump as the problem.
Although many NATO states have raised defence spending since he was in office, Mr Trump would point out that they need to do more. Since 2014 non-US NATO members raised defence spending by more than $600bn. That substantial figure is less impressive when considered as 31 countries’ spending increases, spread over ten years. Yet there is progress. Eighteen NATO members will spend at least 2% of GDP on defence in 2024, compared with just three countries in 2014. Mr Trump deserves some of the credit, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine explains the rest. His typical negotiating style of deploying threats, for example by saying that America should not defend spending laggards, induces movement towards his desired position.
However, NATO still has shortcomings that European leaders can see. Germany’s Zeitenwende, a historic shift to address years of neglecting its defence, has failed. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine NATO has promised to increase its rapid-reaction forces from 40,000 troops to over 300,000. That promise is likely to be broken, which will actually diminish deterrence. Two years ago Kaja Kallas, then Estonia’s prime minister, caused an uproar by revealing that NATO’s defence plan for the Baltic states was to “allow them to be overrun before liberating them after 180 days”—spelling certain destruction for her country. (Estonia, formerly one of those spending laggards, is predicted to spend close to 3.4% of GDP on defence, the second-highest fraction in the alliance. Mr Trump should praise this rise.)
On energy issues Mr Trump would probably start where he left off. During his term he advocated “open, fair and affordable energy markets” and pushed for a continued diversification of energy sources. He believed that European energy supplies should come from newly energy-exporting America, not Russia; in 2020 he cautioned Europeans at Davos about dependence on “unfriendly energy suppliers”.
Europe could work with Mr Trump on that, and he would for example enthusiastically supply American liquid natural gas as a lower-carbon energy source. But he wants a robust energy system, and set of policies, that can propel prosperity. He is not fixated on systems dominated by intermittent renewables. Coal would also have its place in providing baseload. And he would be interested in collaborating on nuclear energy, recently cited as a useful adjunct to renewables by the European Commission.
Europe, Mr Trump would point out, is now setting itself up for dependence on China for renewable-energy systems and electric vehicles. China accounts for 90% of the supply of rare-earth elements needed to manufacture renewable-energy equipment. It makes 60% of wind turbines and electric-car batteries, and controls a majority of the world’s production of solar panels. Mr Trump wants to reduce American dependence on critical minerals, so would be a willing partner to Europe in the effort.
Mr Trump would certainly return to his “favourite word” on transatlantic trade: reciprocal. His campaign is already preparing a Reciprocal Trade Act, which aims to match the tariffs imposed by trade partners in order to protect American workers. His views on reciprocity would probably lead to a closing of the trade gap with the EU. His separate proposals for across-the-board tariffs, which go beyond the tit-for-tat reciprocal ones, may also be motivated by this goal—or by his analysis that the EU is not as open as it should be to American goods. Europe and Mr Trump should be ready to make market access equal and reciprocal.
On trade with and business in China, America and Europe could present a united front. China is trying to force the deindustrialisation of both through unfair competition, and both could develop joint counter-strategies. One promising sign of that is the reaction to Chinese overcapacity flooding the European market with cheap electric vehicles. Citing this “injurious subsidisation”, the EU recently voted to impose, over five years, 45% tariffs. Together Mr Trump and European leaders could address the difficulties of doing business in China, including preferential treatment of domestic Chinese firms and efforts to limit market access. And as someone minded to reduce America’s massive trade deficits, Mr Trump would surely be sympathetic about the one Europe has with China: it has increased from around €40bn ($44bn) 20 years ago to ten times that today.
There are many other issues that Europe should see as opportunities in the event of a second Trump term. The EU Commission report on competitiveness issued in September was dire in its assessments, from overregulation to lack of innovation to slow growth. Mr Trump would probably agree about many of these problems. He too tried to free America from “the crushing weight of bureaucracy” during his first term, insisting that for every new regulation adopted eight old ones were to be removed.
Where both sides see a problem in common, co-operation becomes possible. A pro-growth, pro-freedom partnership is possible. Instead of framing him as destroyer of an old order, Europe should consider how Mr Trump’s disruptive nature might help to position Europe for a better future.
Nadia Schadlow was a deputy national security adviser for strategy in the Trump administration and is a fellow of the Hudson Institute and Hoover Institution.
