Three very different strategic points of view have a place within the sphere of relations between the United States, Europe and China: that of Beijing, that of Washington and that of Brussels. Each capital sees it differently.
Beijing does not look favorably on the rapprochement of the United States with the 27 and, although it acknowledges that at present there are notorious differences in the way they approach their mutual relations, it denies that Europe is becoming a systemic rival. Washington makes strenuous efforts to make Europe see the importance of a close alliance with America vis a vis its Chinese rival and pressures the Old Continent to emulate US policies that sanction or attempt to displace China. In Brussels, with shades of gray according to the country in question, the community of countries tries to tie ties on each side, towards Asia or towards North America, striving so that the balance does not tip too much towards either of the two extremes.
China, up to now, has emerged as the winner in the search for political, economic and diplomatic rapprochement with the Union, since its geographical proximity has allowed it to develop a very aggressive commercial penetration to the point that goods and services are traded between the two for a whopping 750 trillion dollars. A quarter of European imports come from China and 10% of its exports travel to that destination. The balance of trade in goods is tilted favorably towards China, without a doubt, but the economic interaction between the two groups is such that the Asian country has become a favorite place, a magnet for investment by European companies that aspire to supply from Chinese soil the demand of their markets or to supply the world with all kinds of products.
The United States contribute equally superlative figures to the bilateral relationship with Europe. In the year 2022 they were noted as one of the most important trading partners of the Europeans: they accounted for 20% of European exports and were in second place behind China for external purchases of the Union with 12% of its imports.
What the foregoing underscores is that the economic weight of the 27 countries makes the Union a partner of immense importance for both Beijing and Washington. And, in the same way, in Brussels there is a clear awareness of the relevance of its relationship with both powers. The big problem facing this trilogy is that Europe does not have an internal unity that allows it to establish itself as a key player in the diatribe of power or in the competition for leadership in which the two great powers are embarked.
So you have to temporize. The geopolitical forces Brussels to take pictures at times with the leaders of the great Asian power. At other times to imitate the Americans, for example by imposing conditions on Chinese investments in their geography. That in the field of economics. In the military, reality is much more complex and it is there that true solidarity will finally be settled.
Xi’s tacit approval of Putin’s warlike whims is seriously testing the Union’s priorities.
