Dutch Safety Board: The Netherlands was not well prepared for the crisis, too little attention for the elderly | Inland

Although much was still unclear in the first phase of corona, in the Netherlands there was a lack of a good crisis structure, unambiguous and clear decision-making and good long-term communication to society.

The OVV, led by Jeroen Dijsselbloem, conducted research into the Dutch approach to the corona virus. Was the Netherlands prepared for a pandemic? “The government thought so beforehand, but we weren’t,” says Dijsselbloem at the presentation. For example, the central role of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport – at the time still under the responsibility of Hugo de Jonge – was not discussed. For example, the minister had no authority to direct healthcare institutions and municipal health services.

silent disaster

This research focused specifically on nursing homes, where many residents died of corona at the beginning of the pandemic. The OVV speaks of a ‘silent disaster’ in the nursing homes. “The priority was to relieve the burden on hospitals,” says Dijsselbloem. “Signals from nursing homes barely got through at first.” It took a long time before they received sufficient protection, they had to contend with a shortage of protective equipment, and too little was tested for corona. As a result, they had to be locked.

This had “a major social and psychological impact” on residents, staff and loved ones, says Dijsselbloem. Loneliness prevailed among nursing home residents, and family members were often unable to say goodbye to loved ones.

Not taking responsibility

The research council is also cracking the structure of decision-making and its communication during the corona crisis. It was not always clear who had the authority to take a certain decision, and the many committees and consultations – including in ‘t Torentje and in the Catshuis – created a diffuse form of decision-making.

The government also did not always take responsibility for serious decisions. For example, the Outbreak Management Team (OMT), led by Jaap van Dissel, was one of the most important advisers to the government and was involved in almost all important consultations. But it was also pointed to too often, according to the OVV. The OMT took on a ‘responsible instead of an advisory role’, says Dijsselbloem. “Difficult choices with regard to the measures were already incorporated in the OMT recommendations instead of being submitted ‘transparently’ to the House of Representatives.” Such decisions and accountability should be left to politicians, the Council believes.

In the summer of 2020, the cabinet viewed the situation too brightly too quickly. While the infection figures were rising again, the cabinet decided to reduce the crisis structure. “While the second wave was just arriving.” As a result, immediate action had to be taken in September.

blind stare

Dijsselbloem also outlines how the government has focused on certain aspects of crisis management: the pressure on (IC) care, and quantitative indicators such as the R-value and infection numbers, were given too much value. “These figures seemed hard, but in practice they were mainly indicative due to the delayed pass-through of the incubation period of the virus and the limited testing capacity in the spring of 2020. In reality, there was limited visibility of the virus.”

“Qualitative signals, which are surrounded by more uncertainties, were previously set aside in this field of tension,” according to the Council. This also applies to elements such as psychological problems in the population, loneliness and learning disabilities among young people. According to the OVV, the cabinet could have been advised by experts other than the OMT in this regard.

This report is the first in a series of evaluations, with two more to come later. The second part will probably be released around the summer.

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