“This signal at the moment is twofold: on the one hand, it is optimistic for the future, on the other hand – in the current dimension – rather modest. For the EU, it is, of course, a kind of political instrument to show that it works in the direction of being the subject of the game that takes place at its borders, and it also has some value for Poland, because it was on the initiative of Polish diplomacy that the plan was adopted ” – tells the portal wPolityce.pl prof. Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski commenting on the adoption of the economic plan for Belarus.
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wPolityce.pl: The economic plan for Belarus was adopted unanimously. How important is it for both Belarus and the EU itself?
Prof. Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski: Considering the fact that Belarus is ruled by the Lukashenka regime, cooperation with the Belarusian state and its current authorities will not be undertaken. Therefore, I think that it should be seen as an offer for the future, should Belarusian change take place, so that Belarusians would be aware that they would not be left alone, alone. This is one of the main problems that the EU has to cooperate with its government in order to be able to provide economic aid to a country, and that government will not cooperate.
I think that this is the creation of an instrument so that it will be ready when an economic boom occurs, in the hope that the revolution taking place in Belarus will lead to such deep system changes that this cooperation will be possible. Anyway, it is also a psychological impact on the Belarusian society itself, which thus has a signal of support from the Union and thus does not feel abandoned, and at least feels less abandoned. It should be remembered that at the same time a decision was made to sanction Lukashenka’s regime, but excluding Lukashenka himself. The sanctions only cover 40 people, which is very little. This is how the opposition imagined it, and Poland and the Baltic states also envisioned it that these sanctions would apply to all identified regime officials who committed either falsification or violence against the protesters, and therefore should apply to thousands of people rather than 40.
This signal at the moment is twofold: on the one hand, it is optimistic for the future, on the other hand – in the current dimension – rather modest. For the EU, it is, of course, a kind of political instrument to show that it works in the direction of being the subject of the game that takes place at its borders, and it also has some value for Poland, because it was on the initiative of Polish diplomacy that the plan was adopted. As you can see, we managed to gather unanimous EU support for it, which was helped by the Baltic states, the Visegrad Group and the Scandinavian states, Finland for example. This could be achieved in the present situation, given the need to break the blockade applied by Cyprus, due to the absence of Great Britain, which was usually our ally in such situations. The British and Canadians had imposed sanctions a few days earlier. Diplomatically, it is a success for Poland, knowing its weaknesses of course.
To what extent will this economic plan be a tool of closer ties between Belarus and the West? There are strong pro-Russian tendencies in Belarus. Will this adopted economic plan have the power to change these vectors?
At the moment, the situation is dynamic in the sense that Poland and the Baltic states are demonstrating to the overwhelming part of the Belarusian public opinion as their allies, while Russia supporting Lukashenka – on the contrary. As a result, the mood of Belarusians is evolving. This is a process not as violent as it was in Ukraine in 2014, because of course there is no war, but it goes in the same direction. Therefore, the adoption of this plan is of course important in terms of how the outside world is perceived by Belarusians. Rather, it draws them away from Russia and attracts them to Europe and to its immediate neighbors. On the other hand, of course, this is not a violent process – it rather depends on Russia’s moves, on how drastically Russia will oppose and position it as an opponent of democratic changes in Belarus. The stronger it is, the more open it is, the worse it will obviously be perceived and these moods will change. Therefore, the process is in two directions: Russia acts in a negative sense, de facto pushing Belarusian public opinion away from itself, Europe, with the general participation of Poland and the Baltic states, is attractive and the passage of time, I think not so long, will change these the proportions of likes and dislikes – Russia is losing, we are gaining.
The EU formally adopted sanctions against representatives of the Belarusian authorities for election rigging and repression of protesters. What are their dimensions?
Unfortunately, the sanctions are only symbolic, considering the small number of people affected by them: EU – 40 people without Lukashenka, with the slogan that a place must be left to maintain the dialogue, Great Britain and Canada – a dozen or so. The Belarusian opposition rightly comments that there is no dialogue, Lukashenka has refused to dialogue, so there is no process that can be sustained in this way. It is rather a signal of weakness. It is good that any sanctions have been adopted, but they have – as I said – a purely symbolic dimension, they will not have any practical significance for the maintenance of the regime in Belarus.
Thank you for the conversation.
Anna Wiejak interviewed
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