Over the past ten or fifteen years, we have witnessed a profound change in the geopolitical context but also a clear change in the way in which the balance of power between the major powers is exercised. Evidenced by the game of “gain ground »Strategic – successful at this stage – undertaken by Turkey, Russia, China or even, to a lesser extent, Iran. And it is a truism to note that a large part of international relations now takes place “below the dioptre”. The balance of military power or the threat of recourse to force have given way to policies of direct or indirect influence, the conquest of economic markets and often policies of fait accompli.
If one dared to identify the main characteristics of this new context, one would probably evoke the weakening of “norms” and the erosion of international procedures for settling disputes; the emergence of new areas of conflict: cyberspace and the field of perceptions, of course, but I also add what is customary to call “gray areas”; these physical spaces not covered or poorly covered by the law and therefore not regulated by it or abandoned by the law due to the weakness of the entities responsible for implementing it. Finally, I retain in the characteristics of this new context the implementation of “integral strategies” resorting to the combination of all the levers of power: economic, cultural, social, informational, military, diplomatic, etc. General Lucien Poirier is making a comeback!
They maintain ambiguity about their real objectives as long as possible, call on “proxies” whose commitment is easily reversible and whose irresponsibility they can easily claim in the event of a reaction from the international community.
“Reaction threshold”. Concretely, some of our potential competitors are writing a new grammar of hegemony mixing hybridity and asymmetry in all areas. They maintain ambiguity about their real objectives as long as possible, call on “proxies” whose commitment is easily reversible and whose irresponsibility they can easily claim in the event of a reaction from the international community. Finally, their operations link a set of actions which, examined in isolation, remain below the “employment threshold” or below the “reaction threshold” of their rivals. Without engaging in an exhaustive exercise of documenting these strategies, the Russian and Turkish actions in Libya, the actions of the same in Armenia and Azerbaijan or even Russians in Ukraine and Turks in Syria obviously participate in this logic.
In fact, these characteristics reveal in the field of international relations a new area of friction with uncertain rules. In this gray area, the direct and claimed action of States – in particular the use of force – is often disproportionate in terms of costs, financial, reputation, political and diplomatic, while the “clandestine” action of the services to this is insufficiently “global and significant” in the effects it produces. The countries mentioned above have solved this equation; one by recycling, according to his interests, Syrian Arab fighters that he reinforces as much as necessary with a few rare capacities; the other by having created a private service structure but which is subservient to it: the Wagner company; the last, by an invasive underground economic policy.
However, most Western countries, starting with France, are not organized to penetrate this gray zone and challenge the hegemony of our adversaries “at the level”, weigh in the future of these countries and develop policies of lasting influence. Having more or less only classic means, they are forced to enter into the binary logic of “all or nothing”! And so more often than not, they leave the field open to their rivals.
It is obviously not a question of plagiarizing policies or organizations imported “from elsewhere”; from countries with different cultures, histories and ambitions. But we have to get out of the deadlock in which we let ourselves be trapped: that of preferring “ethics without performance” as opposed to “performance without ethics” that we blame our competitors. We cannot remain totally destitute in this gray area. With all due respect to the eternal praisers of Max Weber, there is surely a respectful path for French law between “Executive outcome” and “Blackwater”.
For our country, it would be a question of creating the conditions and the organization allowing to be present “quietly” through a private operator in the “gray areas” of countries in crisis or emerging from crisis in which France has interests
Multi-domain strategies.For our country, it would be a question of creating the conditions and the organization allowing to be present “quietly” through a private operator in the “gray areas” of countries in crisis or emerging from crisis in which France has interests; interests of an insufficient level to justify a sovereign presence but, conversely, of sufficient sensitivity to require effects beyond what the specialized services or indirect strategies can produce (soft power from behind, light foot print ).
It is within this framework that multi-domain strategies with integrated effects would be implemented, the main objectives of which are the stabilization and development of the countries concerned for the purposes of promoting French political, diplomatic and economic interests or even the challenge of the activism of a strategic competitor. This requires not only the decompartmentalization of public policies among themselves but also a decompartmentalization between sovereign action and that of the private sector.
What should be the main skills of this operator? Probably its ability to combine and coordinate as close to the ground as possible a broad spectrum of action capacities (humanitarian aid, economic intelligence, security, training, equipment, development, infrastructure, influence, etc.); also the fact that it would help translate the intentions of countries emerging from the crisis into projects and would not impose imported models on them; the reversibility of all or part of its actions and its “displayed” demarcation vis-à-vis French diplomacy.
This structure, let’s call it “Berlioz” in memory of a master of orchestration, an eminent representative of European humanism and a French composer contemporary with Wagner…
Army General (2S) Didier Castres is a senior associate at ESL & Network. He was previously involved in the military management of international crises at the Elysee Palace, then as head of the operations planning and command center (CPCO) at the army staff and finally as deputy chief of staff in charge of operations at the Ministry of Defense.
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