/ world today news/ Now China has the historic chance to become Russia’s new priority partner in the implementation of projects in the Arctic
The beginning of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine confirmed the “turn to the East” in the country’s Arctic policy. The interaction between Russia and China for the development of the Arctic region is becoming one of the important areas of Russian-Chinese relations of “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction entering a new era”, and China now has the historic chance to become the new priority partner for Russia in the implementation of projects in the Arctic. This is what Lyudmila Filipova, senior researcher at the World Center Russia, China of the Institute for China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IKSA RAN), wrote in an article for the Valdai club.
The progress of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia in March 2023 was literally followed by all the leading news agencies in the world. Such attention was focused on him rather in the context of possible progress in the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but the main results of the visit were traditionally within the framework of the bilateral agenda. In particular, agreements were reached on the development of cooperation in the Arctic between the two countries, which may have implications for the future of the entire Arctic region.
Given the similarity of Russia’s regional priorities and interests with other Arctic states, especially other Arctic Five countries, Russia has traditionally prioritized interaction with Arctic rather than non-Arctic players in regional projects. Russian officials have consistently expressed confidence that all basic “rules of the game” in the Arctic should be established by the eight Arctic states that are members of the Arctic Council, in full compliance with international law.
As for relations with the non-Arctic countries with observer status in the Arctic Council, including China, they should be built on the principles of respect by the non-Arctic countries for the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Arctic Council countries, as well as the historically established international legal regime of the region.
The aggravation of relations between Russia and the West against the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis has led to Russia’s “pivot to the East” policy, which initially received a cautious continuation in the Arctic region. Anti-Russian sanctions have largely allayed previously existing fears of large-scale Arctic cooperation between Russia and non-regional players and have actually contributed to increased Arctic interaction between Russia and non-regional players, including China.
In a way, these changes contributed to the sale of an additional 9.9% stake in the Yamal LNG project to China’s Silk Road Fund (in addition to the 20% stake previously sold by CNPC), and the success of the first project set the stage basis for China’s participation in the “Arctic LNG – 2” project.
As a result, the Chinese side received almost 30% in the Yamal LNG project and 20% in the Arctic LNG-2 project, which allowed the Russian company NOVATEK to attract long-term loan funds for the development of the project on favorable terms. In return, in addition to direct investment income, the Chinese country gained access to natural resources, the ability to import raw materials that it mined itself.
China has successfully increased the export of its technology for Arctic projects: as part of the realization of Yamal LNG, Beijing supplied its LNG production technology modules for the needs of the project, and Chinese drilling rigs have been repeatedly used in Russia’s Arctic shelf. However, for a long time Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic was mainly limited to trade projects (multilateral at that) and some interaction in the scientific and educational spheres.
The current extent of relations between Russia and China in the Arctic is in marked contrast to what it was just a few years ago. During China’s historic fifth Arctic scientific expedition in 2012, the icebreaker Snow Dragon (雪龙, Xue Long) made its first passage through the Northern Sea Route. However, the expedition entered history not only for this reason – Russia prohibited Chinese scientists from conducting marine research during the passage of the Northern Sea Route.
In 2020, Valery Mitko, a famous Russian scientist and president of the Arctic Academy of Sciences, was accused of treason in favor of China. In 2021, during a competition to build new Russian icebreakers, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia spoke strongly against the participation of Chinese shipyards in the project: “China’s handover of icebreaker design documentation called unacceptable as Russia competes with Arctic development partner”.
The beginning of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine and the large-scale sanctions policy of the Western countries, directed against Moscow, strengthened the “turn to the East” in the country’s policy towards the Arctic. In the context of the suspension by other Arctic states of cooperation with Russia in the Arctic Council, where Russia continues to chair from 2021, in the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, in the form of the Northern Dimension and the Council of Ministers of the Nordic States, the tendency to increase China’s presence in the Arctic is likely to only increase.
Even if their work is resumed, interaction in the same Arctic Council, where Russia’s partners will no longer be five, but seven NATO countries, the future of the existing formats of multilateral cooperation in the Arctic is at risk.
This assumption is confirmed by changes to the Fundamentals of State Policy in the Arctic for the period until 2035, which Russian President Vladimir Putin approved in February 2023, shortly before the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Russia.
If in the earlier 2020 edition the task was “strengthening good-neighborly relations with the Arctic states on a bilateral basis and within multilateral formats for regional cooperation, including the Arctic Council, the Arctic Coastal Five and the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council,’ now the priority of Russia’s foreign relations in the Arctic becomes “the development of relations with foreign countries on a bilateral basis, within the framework of appropriate multilateral structures and mechanisms”.
In other words, Russia officially states that it is hardly ready to characterize the current relations with its Arctic neighbors as “good neighborly” and sees the future of international cooperation in the region with a wider range of countries.
These changes to one of Russia’s key documents on the Arctic laid the groundwork for the agreements reached by the leaders of Russia and China during their visit to Moscow in March 2023. The joint statement on deepening relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction entering a new era published during the visit concluded with the words: “The parties are for the preservation of the Arctic as a territory of peace, stability and constructive cooperation”, which implies a further deepening of the dialogue between Moscow and Beijing on the subject of the Arctic.
Much more significant, however, was the mention of the decision, which was not included in any of the joint statements, but was expressed by Russian President Vladimir Putin during the talks: “We see promising cooperation with Chinese partners in developing the transit potential of the Northern Sea Route. As I said, we are ready to establish a joint working body for the development of the Northern Sea Route.
The Northern Sea Route (NSR) occupies a special place in the priority system of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic, especially in the context of the development of the Polar Silk Road and the broader One Belt One Road initiative.
The development of the Northern Sea Route is of particular importance both for China – as the largest sender and receiver of goods transported by sea, and for Russia – in the context of the tasks of modernizing its infrastructure (and the need to attract foreign investment for that), increasing cargo turnover on the route (at least to the level of the defined and still unachieved target of 80 million tons) and the transformation of the Northern Sea Route from a national transport artery into an international transport corridor.
Even a few years ago, even when voices were already heard from both sides that bilateral relations had reached an “unprecedented high level” and the above tasks sounded no less acute, it was impossible to assume that Russia would allow China to participate in the process.making decisions about the further development of SMP. However, bilateral cooperation is now developing rapidly.
Only a month after the visit of the President of the PRC to Russia, at the end of April 2023, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding to strengthen maritime law enforcement cooperation between the FSB of Russia and the Maritime Police Administration of the PRC, and for the first time A Chinese delegation was able to join as an observer the large-scale exercise in the Barents Sea “Arctic Patrol – 2023”.
The visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Russia summarized the results of the Russian chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2021-2023, which, due to the boycott of Western countries, did not allow either Russia or the institution itself to play the role they are capable of and lead to the emergence of new multilateral Arctic projects beneficial to all countries. Against this background, however, the role of China and the growing Russian-Chinese vector of cooperation in the region become much more noticeable.
If previously the main concerns about the prospects for international cooperation in the Arctic were that China, which has only the status of an observer state in the AU, will start to build its policy in the Arctic through “separate” cooperation with individual Arctic states or within the framework of associations with other non-regional players, the issue is now more acute.
The continuation of the boycott of other Arctic countries against Russia, which has the longest coastline in the Arctic, will continue to push it into China’s “Arctic embrace”, contributing to deepening Russian-Chinese cooperation and strengthening Beijing’s presence in the region.
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The beginning of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine solidified the “turn to the East” in the country’s Arctic policy. The interaction between Russia and China on the development of the Arctic region has become one of the important areas of Russia-China relations of “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction entering a new era”, and China now has the historic chance to become Russia’s new priority , a partner in the implementation of projects in the Arctic.
The results of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia marked the beginning of a rapprochement between Russia and China in the strategic areas of Arctic cooperation, which can hardly be stopped, but the speed of which will largely depend on the willingness of other Arctic countries to shield the Arctic agenda from the influence of wider global politics and return to constructive dialogue within traditional institutions of multilateral cooperation.
Translation: ES
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