CDA conflict especially difficult for VVD

Wopke Hoekstra’s hesitation to talk to GroenLinks about forming a new cabinet partly stems from his doubts whether Jesse Klaver’s party is stable enough, you heard in circles around the formation. The GroenLinks leader would not be able to control his supporters, especially when it comes to refugees, so it is difficult to make agreements about that.

After the explosive indictment of Pieter Omtzigt against his own party, this is an ironic observation. Because which potential negotiating partner is now unstable?

Hoekstra himself reacted cheerfully on Friday morning to the influence that the new turn of the internal CDA struggles will have on the formation. „We will continue with the exploratory conversations. As far as I’m concerned, nothing has changed.”

The situation is different for the other possible participating parties. The VVD has the greatest interest in Hoekstra indeed succeeding in restoring unity in his party. Mark Rutte holds on to the CDA just as firmly as a coalition partner, as the PvdA and GroenLinks do to each other.

If the CDA were to disappear, there are few options left that the next cabinet would not pull even further to the left. After all, D66 certainly does not want to work with JA21, an alternative that Rutte already suggested. And preferably not with the ChristenUnie or the much more conservative SGP. All that remains is newcomer Volt, which with three seats can also help the VVD-D66-PvdA-GroenLinks combination to a majority. Rutte finds it difficult to legitimize such a coalition with his electorate, which wants a more right-wing course.

Hoekstra’s authority has shrunk with Omtzigt’s memo anyway

Also read: The main objections from Pieter Omtzigt’s damning CDA memorandum

The VVD, according to the Binnenhof, is concerned about the new escalation at the CDA, but also assumes that Hoekstra will be able to put things in order. Rutte himself, an expert in the field of internal power struggles with the number two (Rita Verdonk in 2006-2007), will do everything in his power to keep the CDA at the table.

In any case, with Omtzigt’s memo, Hoekstra’s authority has dwindled. Internally, but also with his future co-negotiators. Hoekstra will always be asked about the topics that the temporarily disabled MP is excited about – restoration of the rule of law, for example, the level of the minimum wage and the role of the Netherlands in the EU: ‘And what does Enschede think about this?’

Those happen to be topics that the progressive bloc thinks the same about. Also for another reason, the CDA conflict on the left doesn’t even look that bad. Hoekstra, one finds in that corner, now has less right to make firm demands, for example his blockade of the combination GroenLinks-PvdA.

Where Hoekstra might have thought two weeks ago that he would have to take the absent Omtzigt into account a little less – he turned up on 25 May. officially reported sick – his mandate is suddenly less firm after the leaked Omtzigt memorandum. He may not formally vote in the fifteen-member House of Representatives faction, but with his 342,000 preferential votes, Omtzigt remains a significant factor. He will really want to get a grip on a new coalition agreement – ​​and otherwise his supporters will.

That also increases the dilemma for Hoekstra to get rid of the troublesome Omtzigt, if he wants to clean up in a fit of resolute leadership. There is also a moral and social aspect: someone who complains about ‘insecurity’ within the party cannot simply be kicked out without reputational damage.

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