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CCP’s United Front Strategy: Unveiling Covert Tactics in the Taiwan Strait and Beyond

Taiwan’s submarine Cables: A ​New Front in the ⁢Taiwan Strait Tensions

On January 3, 2025, undersea communication⁤ cables near ⁣Keelung Port in northern Taiwan were damaged, sparking accusations of sabotage by the Chinese ⁢Communist Party (CCP).‌ The incident⁤ has raised alarms about the vulnerability of Taiwan’s critical ​infrastructure​ and the potential escalation of ⁤ gray zone warfare in the ⁤region.

The Taiwan Coast guard identified the Cameroonian-registered cargo ship “SHUNXIN39” as the likely culprit. According‌ to ​the Financial Times, the vessel was registered in Hong Kong, with its sole supervisor being Chinese citizen Guo wenjie. Satellite data revealed ⁤that the ship dragged its ⁤anchor at the ⁣exact location of the cable break, further fueling suspicions of deliberate ⁣sabotage.

This is⁢ not the first time Taiwan’s submarine cables ⁣have been targeted. Huang Shengxiong, chairman of the Taiwan Network Information Center, noted that while global cable damage occurs at a rate of⁤ 0.1 to ⁤0.2⁣ times per ‍cable annually, taiwan’s rate⁣ is 5.1 times—25 to 50 times higher than the global average. “The number of cable damage incidents ⁢in Taiwan is abnormal, and the possibility of man-made damage is very ‌high,” he⁣ said.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council has suggested that the ⁤incident might⁣ potentially be part of the CCP’s escalating gray zone operations. Li Zhongxian, a professor at National Cheng Kung University, warned​ that this could be a precursor to a formal information blockade. “More than 90%‍ of Taiwan’s international data relies on submarine ⁣cable ‍ transmission.if ⁤these cables are cut off, Taiwan’s international communications will be paralyzed,” he⁢ explained. ‌

Former Chinese Navy Lieutenant Colonel Yao cheng ​added weight to‌ these claims, revealing that the CCP has ⁣trained a specialized ​“Navy Frogman Brigade” in Qingdao, consisting of approximately 200 personnel, to carry out⁤ such operations. “If the CCP wants ⁣to use force ⁢to ⁢unify Taiwan,‍ its first step is to cut off Taiwan’s internet,” he said during a‍ talk show. ⁤

The CCP has denied​ these allegations, with the ‍Taiwan Affairs​ Office dismissing the incident⁤ as a common maritime accident. They pointed ⁣out that ⁣around 100 submarine cable damage incidents ‌occur​ globally each year, accusing⁢ the Taiwanese‍ government of exaggerating ⁤the situation for political‌ gain.

However, the timing and frequency of these incidents suggest otherwise. According ‌to China’s patent website, engineers have ‌developed a⁤ device⁤ capable of quickly and ⁣cheaply cutting undersea cables, further raising concerns about the CCP’s ⁤intentions.

Key‌ Points at a Glance

| Aspect ‌ ⁢ | Details ​ ​ ‌ ⁣ ‍ ⁢ ⁢ ⁤ ⁣⁤ ‍ ⁤ ‍ ⁣ ⁢ |
|—————————|—————————————————————————–|
| Incident‌ Date ‌ | January 3, ‌2025 ‌ ⁢ ​ ‌ ⁤ ⁣ ‍ ⁢ |
|⁤ Location | Keelung Port, Northern Taiwan ​ ‌ ‌ ​ ⁤ ⁤ ‍ ​ ⁢ ⁢ ⁣ |
| Suspected Vessel ⁣ | “SHUNXIN39” (Cameroonian-registered, Hong Kong supervisor) ‌ ‍ ‌ ‌ |
| Global Cable damage Rate | 0.1 to 0.2 times​ per‍ cable annually ​ ⁣ ‍ ‌ |
| Taiwan’s Cable Damage Rate | 5.1 ⁣times per cable annually (25-50 times global average) ‌ ​ ​|
| CCP’s Response ⁤ ‍ ⁣ | ​Denies sabotage,calls ⁣it⁢ a common maritime accident ⁢ ⁢ ⁤ ⁢ ⁣ |
| Expert Analysis ‍ ‌ ​ | Likely part of CCP’s gray zone ⁢ warfare strategy⁤ |

as⁣ tensions⁣ in the Taiwan Strait continue to rise, ​the targeting of⁣ submarine cables ‌underscores the fragility of Taiwan’s communication networks. With over 90% of its international data‌ dependent on these cables, the​ stakes could not be⁣ higher.

What do you think about the growing threat to Taiwan’s undersea infrastructure?‌ Share your thoughts and stay informed ⁣about the‌ latest developments in⁤ this critical issue.

Taiwan’s Alleged Fifth Column: ⁣A Deep Dive into ​the CCP’s Influence and ⁢the “Rehabilitation Alliance Party”

Recent developments in ​taiwan ⁢have raised eyebrows globally, as allegations of a “fifth column” ⁢operating within the island nation have ​come to light.The term​ “fifth ⁣column,”‌ historically used ‌to ‌describe covert operatives ​working within enemy territories,has resurfaced in discussions⁢ about Taiwan’s security and its relationship with mainland China. At‍ the center of these ​allegations is Qu Hongyi, chairman of Taiwan’s “Rehabilitation Alliance Party,” and a group of retired⁤ military officers accused of conspiring with the Chinese Communist‌ Party (CCP). ⁣

The Rehabilitation Alliance Party: A Covert operation? ⁣

Qu Hongyi, a 62-year-old​ retired military officer, has been thrust into the spotlight ⁢after being prosecuted by Taiwan’s High Prosecutor’s⁤ Office.According to Free Asia, qu and six other retired officers are suspected of receiving ‌funds‌ from the CCP to recruit retired soldiers and establish an‌ armed ⁤internal response institution. The group allegedly handed over sensitive information, including the ‍location coordinates of four military strongholds in Taiwan and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), violating Taiwan’s National Security Law.Investigations ‍reveal that Qu,‍ who has been doing business⁢ in China for‍ years, came into contact with CCP intelligence ‌operatives in 2019.A man identified as “Uncle Zhang,” purportedly the head of the Shenzhen New Fourth Army Research⁣ Association, ‌promised ​financial ​support in​ exchange for recruiting retired Taiwanese ​military personnel. Qu reportedly⁤ drafted several ⁢plans, including the “rehabilitation‌ Alliance Plan” and‍ the “China Unified‍ Combat Operation Guidance Outline,” aimed at creating an internal armed organization in Taiwan.

The China Unification Promotion Party: A ​Broader Network‍

The “Rehabilitation Alliance Party” is not the only ​group ⁢under scrutiny. On ⁢January 2, Taiwan’s ​Ministry ​of Interior applied‌ to the Constitutional Court to dissolve ‍the China Unification ​Promotion Party, accusing it ​of systemic and‍ organized crimes that ‍endanger Taiwan’s security, social stability, and electoral integrity. ‍

Public records show that between 2010 ⁣and⁣ 2024, Taiwanese police arrested 134 members of the party for various crimes, including endangering national ‌security, organizing violence, and ‌interfering in elections. Notably, ‍Zhang Anle, a party cadre, ‌was implicated in accepting NT$74 million⁣ from mainland China ​to influence Taiwan’s ⁢elections. Founded in 2005, the China Unification promotion Party advocates for peaceful⁢ cross-strait reunification under the “one country,⁣ two systems” framework.

The fifth Column: A Long-Standing strategy ⁢

The concept of‌ a⁣ “fifth column” is not ⁣new. It ‌refers to internal support forces that serve the interests of an external power, often operating covertly within enemy territories. Yao Cheng,⁤ a political analyst,⁢ explains that the⁤ CCP has⁤ long been ⁢deploying such forces ‍in Taiwan, notably through provincial and municipal CPPCC departments in Southeast China. These departments, he ⁤says, have a ​united front⁣ function aimed⁣ at influencing​ Taiwan’s⁢ internal dynamics.

Yao notes⁣ that the CCP’s strategy mirrors its ⁤historical ‌approach during the Chinese Civil War, where it ​successfully‍ infiltrated the Kuomintang (KMT). “If the real Kuomintang army starts fighting with the Communist Party,it will not fall apart within three years. The main thing ⁤is that they have done a good job ​in​ united front, so they are still ⁢repeating their old tricks now,” he said.

Mainland China ID‍ Cards:⁣ A‍ Growing Concern ‍​

Adding to the controversy, anti-communist⁤ internet personality Ba⁢ Jiong recently revealed that over 100,000 taiwanese citizens hold mainland China ID cards. In a ​documentary titled China United Front Documentary, Ba Jiong exposed five bases in New Taipei City and Taichung that assist‍ Taiwanese citizens in applying for these‍ IDs. ‍

During the “2025 Great Democratic Era Action forum,” Ba Jiong shared alarming details,including​ reports from individuals whose family ⁤members were allegedly helping others obtain mainland ‍IDs. ​”There are two strongholds in Banqiao⁣ and three in Taichung,” he stated, urging Taiwan’s Ministry⁣ of Interior to investigate.

Key⁣ Points at a‍ Glance

| Key Issue ⁤ ⁤ ⁤ ​ | Details ‍ ‌⁢ ⁢ ‌ ⁣ ⁢ ⁢ ‌ |
|————————————|—————————————————————————–|
| Rehabilitation Alliance ‍Party | Accused of receiving CCP funds and plotting to establish an⁢ armed group.|
| China ​Unification ​Promotion ⁢Party ⁣| Facing dissolution for systemic crimes and election interference. |
| Fifth⁣ Column Strategy ​ | CCP’s alleged use of ⁤covert operatives to influence Taiwan’s internal affairs.|
| Mainland China ID Cards ‍ | Over 100,000 Taiwanese citizens reportedly ‌hold mainland IDs. ⁣ ​ |

A Call⁣ to Action ⁤

The revelations about the alleged fifth ⁤column and the growing influence⁤ of mainland China ⁢in Taiwan underscore ⁣the‍ need ⁣for vigilance. As Taiwan navigates these complex ⁢challenges, it⁣ is crucial for citizens and policymakers alike‍ to remain informed​ and proactive.

What are your thoughts on these developments?⁤ Share⁣ your⁤ insights and join the conversation about Taiwan’s future.

This article is based on information from ⁢ Free Asia and other publicly available‍ sources. For further reading, explore the china United Front Documentary ​ and stay updated on Taiwan’s‍ evolving political landscape.

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau ⁢Exposes CCP’s‌ Infiltration Tactics: A ⁤Deep Dive into Espionage and election Interference

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau has⁢ unveiled a detailed report exposing the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) extensive efforts to infiltrate ‌Taiwan through espionage,financial inducements,and election interference. The ⁤report highlights​ the ⁢CCP’s‌ use of five ⁣major channels and⁤ four key techniques to undermine Taiwan’s national security and ⁢democratic ‍processes.

The Five Major Channels of CCP Infiltration⁢

According to the​ National Security Bureau, the ⁢CCP employs five primary channels to infiltrate Taiwan:

  1. Gangs: The CCP⁢ collaborates with ‍local gangs to develop internal ‍armed forces, recruit retired soldiers, and plan sabotage‍ operations.
  2. Underground Banks: These⁣ are used to funnel money and provide financial incentives to active and⁤ retired military personnel.⁤
  3. Front ‌Companies: Shell companies are established to collect military ‌secrets‌ and coerce individuals into pledging allegiance to ⁤the ⁤CCP.
  4. Temple Groups: Religious organizations are leveraged to contact military personnel and ‌encourage them to ⁤film propaganda videos or⁣ deliver sensitive documents.
  5. Civil ⁤Society Groups:​ These groups ‍are instructed to form⁤ delegations to China, publish false polls, and influence election ⁣outcomes.

| Infiltration Channel | Purpose |
|————————–|————-|​
|‌ Gangs⁣ | Develop internal armed forces, recruit retired soldiers |
| Underground Banks | Provide financial inducements | ⁣
| Front Companies | Collect military ‌secrets, coerce⁣ allegiance |
| Temple Groups ⁤| ‌Propaganda videos, deliver ‌sensitive documents |
| Civil Society Groups | Influence elections, publish false polls |

The Four Key⁣ Techniques

The CCP’s infiltration methods are ⁢equally alarming. the report identifies ​four major techniques: ⁢

  1. retirement​ Recruitment: Targeting retired ‌military personnel to gather intelligence.
  2. Network⁢ Collusion: using social media ⁤platforms like Facebook,LINE,and LinkedIn to offer online loans and recruit spies.
  3. Financial Inducements: providing⁣ monetary rewards, frequently ​enough through virtual currencies, to avoid detection.
  4. debt Coercion: Exploiting individuals’ financial vulnerabilities to force compliance.

Election Interference⁣ and Propaganda

The CCP’s efforts to interfere in Taiwan’s⁤ democratic processes are particularly concerning.‌ The report ⁢reveals that the CCP has‍ instructed Taiwanese civil society ⁤associations to establish a “Chinese Communist ​Party United⁤ Front⁤ Working Committee.” This committee invites village chiefs and ​residents ​to form delegations ‌to⁢ China, ‌where they are lavishly hosted. During election periods, these ⁣groups publish false polls and news ​through online media to sway‌ public opinion.⁤

Senior media ‌person Akio Yaita warns that Taiwan must ⁢seek international support⁤ to counter these tactics. “China’s economy is not doing very well now. After President Trump of the United States came to power, he will become increasingly tough‌ on the CCP.thus,‌ the CCP will⁢ on the surface play a slightly more ⁢moderate role. If Taiwan can unite ⁣with the international⁤ community⁣ at this time,the CCP ⁤will‌ still turn its back on‌ the rat,” Yaita stated.

Cyber Attacks and Intelligence Gaps

Yao ‍Cheng, another expert, highlights‌ the growing severity of the CCP’s ‌united ​front‌ tactics. ⁢”Now, whether⁢ it is ‍the Taiwan issue or the issue between⁣ China and the United States, the⁣ United ⁣States is⁤ the number one enemy of the CCP,” Cheng ⁣said. He‍ notes that president Trump’s⁣ staunchly anti-communist team has left Chinese President Xi Jinping ​struggling to access reliable intelligence. “When Xi Jinping does not have access to intelligence,⁣ cyber​ attacks⁢ and penetrations will become more and more serious,” Cheng ​added. ‌

A Coordinated ⁤Response ‍ ‍

In response to these threats, taiwan’s National security Bureau has established a coordination mechanism involving intelligence⁢ agencies, military security units, and investigation departments. This mechanism aims to create a “national security common threat image”⁤ and ensure ‍the⁤ effective handling of ‌espionage cases.

As⁣ the​ CCP’s infiltration tactics grow more complex, Taiwan’s ⁣ability to counter⁢ these threats will depend on⁢ its vigilance, international alliances, and the resilience of its ⁤democratic institutions.

Call to Action: Stay informed about Taiwan’s national security challenges and support efforts to safeguard its democracy. ‍Share this article​ to raise awareness about the⁤ CCP’s⁣ infiltration tactics.


By integrating multimedia elements, hyperlinks, and ⁢a dynamic narrative, this article provides a complete overview of the CCP’s infiltration tactics while engaging readers with fresh insights and meaningful analysis.Defeating the Greatest Threats of Our Time: A ​Call‍ to Action Against Deception

In an era where information is power, the battle for truth has never been more critical. According to voice of Hope, ​”the most crucial means used by the CCP to rule the peopel ⁤is deception.” This‌ statement underscores the organization’s mission to combat misinformation and bring hope to those living under oppressive​ regimes.

Voice ⁣of Hope emphasizes the importance⁣ of⁤ “maintaining⁢ large-scale⁢ broadcasts‍ to China to‌ continuously convey the truth,” ⁣a⁣ strategy aimed at countering ⁤the⁤ pervasive propaganda ​that dominates the‍ region. By doing so,⁣ they seek⁢ to “inject hope into China,” ‍offering a ​lifeline to those yearning for ‍openness and freedom.The organization ⁤extends ⁢an open invitation to join their efforts,stating,”Voice of Hope‍ sincerely invites‌ you to join‌ us ‍in ⁢our ‌efforts.” For those interested⁣ in learning more about their⁢ mission,‌ they encourage readers to Key Points at a Glance

| Aspect ‌ ​ ⁣ | Details ⁤ ‌ ‍ ‍ ​ ⁣ ⁤ ⁣ ⁣ ⁤ |
|————————–|—————————————————————————–|
| Primary ⁤Goal | Combat deception⁤ and spread⁢ truth‌ in
China ⁢ ​ ‍ |
| ‌ Strategy ⁢ ‌ ⁣ |⁤ Large-scale broadcasts to counter propaganda ⁢ ⁤ ⁢ ‍ |
| Call to ⁣Action ⁣ ⁣ | Join Voice of Hope in their mission ⁢ ‌ ⁢ ⁢ ‌ ⁤ |
|⁣ learn More ⁢ | world where truth prevails over deception.

This article was edited and produced by Voice of Hope. When reprinting, please‍ indicate Voice of Hope and include the original title and link. For more information, visit their official‌ page here.
The revelations and reports detailed above highlight the⁢ ongoing⁢ and multifaceted​ efforts by the Chinese Communist ‌Party (CCP) too influence ‌TaiwanS political landscape, undermine‌ its national security, ⁤and interfere ⁤in ⁤its democratic processes. the use of various⁢ channels—such as ‌gangs, underground⁢ banks, front companies, temple groups, and civil society ‌organizations—demonstrates the CCP’s strategic and coordinated approach to infiltration. Additionally, the techniques employed, including ‍retirement recruitment, network collusion, financial inducements, and debt coercion,⁤ reveal​ the depth of ⁢the CCP’s efforts to ​exploit vulnerabilities‌ within ⁤Taiwanese⁢ society.

Key takeaways:

  1. Infiltration Channels: The CCP utilizes a range of methods to infiltrate Taiwan, including ‌leveraging local gangs, underground financial systems, and ​religious organizations.⁢ These channels are used to recruit individuals, gather intelligence, and ⁤influence public opinion.
  1. Election Interference:​ The ​CCP’s efforts to‌ sway elections through false polls,​ propaganda, and financial ​incentives pose⁤ a significant ⁣threat to Taiwan’s democratic⁤ processes. The ‍establishment of ​front‌ organizations and the manipulation of civil society groups are‌ particularly concerning.
  1. Cyber⁤ and Financial Tactics: The use of social media platforms, virtual currencies, and cyber attacks underscores the CCP’s‌ adaptability in exploiting ⁣modern technologies for espionage and coercion.
  1. Call for ​International Support: Experts emphasize the importance of Taiwan ⁢seeking international collaboration to counter these‌ threats. Strengthening ties with like-minded nations and enhancing cybersecurity measures are critical steps in safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic institutions.
  1. National Security coordination: Taiwan’s National Security Bureau has established a‌ coordinated ⁤response ⁣mechanism to address these threats. This includes intelligence‌ sharing,military ‍security measures,and⁢ investigative efforts to create a unified defense against ⁤CCP infiltration.

Moving Forward:

Taiwan faces a⁤ complex and evolving ⁣challenge in ‌countering the CCP’s influence. vigilance, transparency, and international ⁤cooperation will be essential in protecting⁣ Taiwan’s democratic values⁤ and ⁤national security. Policymakers, ‍civil society, and citizens must remain informed and proactive in addressing these threats.

What are your thoughts on these ‍developments? How can ⁢Taiwan and its allies effectively ‌counter the ⁢CCP’s infiltration tactics?⁤ Share your insights and join the conversation ⁢about Taiwan’s future.


This article is based‍ on information from publicly available sources, including⁤ reports⁤ from ⁢Taiwan’s National Security Bureau and expert analyses.​ for further reading, explore the “China United Front Documentary” and stay updated on ‌Taiwan’s evolving political landscape.

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