The sabotage of submarine telecommunications cables in Europe in recent days demonstrates the risk weighing on these infrastructures on which our economy and our security depend, and Canada is not ready to face this threat of hybrid warfare.
“Destroying telecommunications and other types of cables is an effective way of paralyzing, in part, society,” declared Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, emphasizing with his Danish counterpart the increased risk of hybrid attacks of this kind against NATO members.
The Danish navy on Wednesday boarded a Chinese merchant ship piloted by a Russian commander whom it suspects of having damaged two submarine cables which connect Sweden to Lithuania and Finland to Germany via the Baltic Sea. At the end of the day yesterday, CNN also mentioned the possibility of an accident.
The Danish Navy boarded the Chinese ship “Yi Peng 3”. Photo AFP
These strands of optical fiber are highly strategic because they carry more than 95% of the planet’s communications. Cellular calls, banking transactions, YouTube videos, encrypted government communications, etc. Everything goes there.
Several of them have been sabotaged over the past two years and the US military has detected an increase in Russian activities around submarine cables in the North Atlantic that connect us to Europe.
Canada relies on the United States
For Rob Huebert, professor at the University of Calgary and researcher at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, there is no doubt: we are threatened and the threat is only growing since attacking the cables is one of the multiple methods adopted by Moscow and Beijing to harass the allies.
However, “Canada is absolutely not ready” to face this war, indicates the defense expert. He explains that we do not have the capacity to monitor submarine cables, nor to repair them if they are damaged. As with many things, “we assume that the Americans have the capabilities,” he laments.
But the US Navy has only two ships capable of repairing or replacing submarine cables, all owned by private companies, says the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Eight Democratic and Republican senators sent a letter to President Biden just a month ago requesting a review of the vulnerability of the cables and strengthening security.
An opportunity for Canada
Heather Exner-Pirot of the Business Council of Canada believes that Canada could play a key role in this cable war if it gave itself the means to encourage their installation in the Arctic. This would create an alternative to those in the increasingly vulnerable North Atlantic.
There are currently no cables crossing the entire Arctic. The very first should be operational in 2027.
Infrastructure expert for the Arctic, Ms. Exner-Pirot explains that “it is a region which is very difficult to access so it would take very sophisticated actors to attack the cables there and they would be easy to detect”. In fact, she says, there has been interest in the business community for several years to embark on this adventure.
But Mr. Huebert warns that such a project would create new challenges for Canada, whose defense capabilities in the Arctic are extremely limited. The Auditor General herself is concerned, indicating that federal authorities do not have “complete knowledge of maritime activities in Arctic waters and are not prepared to respond to increased monitoring requirements.”
Recent submarine cable sabotages
February 2024
- Four of the fifteen submarine telecommunications cables that pass off Yemen in the Red Sea are cut, causing a drop in Internet traffic between Europe and Asia. Suspects: the Houthi rebels, financed by Iran.
October 2023
- Three submarine cables are damaged in the Baltic Sea, between Finland and Estonia. Suspects: a Chinese ship and a Russian icebreaker which then headed towards the Arctic.
February 2023
- Two Internet cables are cut off the coast of the Matsu Islands, a small archipelago attached to Taiwan. For nearly 50 days, the inhabitants of the Matsu Islands were virtually deprived of the Internet, totally dependent on satellite and microwave links. Suspects: a merchant ship and a Chinese trawler.
In November 2021 and January 2022
- Submarine cables off the Norwegian Arctic archipelago of Svalbard are damaged. These cables are used for scientific research and the Norwegian army. Suspect: Moscow.
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Could diversifying internet traffic routing and investing in alternative communication technologies, like satellite networks, effectively address the vulnerability of undersea cables?
This article highlights a fascinating and timely issue: the vulnerability of undersea cables and the geopolitical implications. Here are some open-ended questions you could ask experts, policymakers, or even individuals in different sectors to delve deeper into the topic, divided into thematic sections:
**Section 1: The Rising Threat**
* How have undersea cable attacks evolved in recent years, and what are the most significant contributing factors?
* The article mentions several suspected actors in recent cable sabotages, like Houthi rebels, China, and Russia. How can we differentiate between state-sponsored attacks and acts by non-state actors? What motivations might drive different actors to target these cables?
**Section 2: Canada’s Role in the Arctic**
* The article suggests that Canada could play a key role in mitigating this risk by encouraging investment in Arctic cable infrastructure. What are the potential benefits and challenges associated with this strategy?
* What specific steps could the Canadian government take to encourage private investment in Arctic cable infrastructure? Would international partnerships be crucial?
**Section 3: Security and Defense Implications**
* Given Canada’s limited Arctic defense capabilities, as mentioned in the article, how prepared are we to protect undersea cables in this region? What measures could be taken to enhance Canada’s capacity in this area?
* How can international cooperation and diplomacy be leveraged to reduce the risk of cable sabotage and ensure the free flow of information globally?
**Section 4: Economic and Societal Impacts**
* Beyond national security considerations, what are the wider economic and societal consequences of undersea cable outages or disruptions? Consider the impact on businesses, individuals, and critical infrastructure.
* The article mentions the Matsu Islands’ dependence on satellites and microwaves after a cable cut. Could alternative communication technologies play a more significant role in enhancing resilience?
**Section 5: Future Considerations**
* What technological advancements or solutions might emerge in the future to mitigate the risks posed by undersea cable sabotage?
**Interview Tips:**
* **Encourage Diverse Perspectives:** Seek out experts from different sectors, like cybersecurity, telecommunications, international relations, and Arctic affairs.
* **Promote Critical Thinking:** Don’t shy away from asking tough questions and challenging assumptions. Encourage interviewees to consider the complexity of the issue and potential unintended consequences.
* **Focus on Solutions:** While it’s important to highlight the threats, strive to balance the discussion with actionable solutions and strategies for mitigating risk.
