/ world today news/ India has no desire to engage third parties to mediate its bilateral disputes and believes that it is capable of solving its problems with other countries on its own. However, it appreciates the support of its partners in negotiations through informal channels, in international forums and in facilitating meetings between the parties.
This is what the researcher from the Faculty of World Economy and International Relations of the National Research University Higher School of Economics Nivedita Kapur wrote about in an article for the Valdai International Discussion Club.
In 2021, the UAE ambassador to the United States, Youssef al-Otaiba, announced that the United Arab Emirates was participating in the settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan, which had declared a ceasefire along the border earlier in the year. Although this announcement came as a surprise to many, there is a long history of mediation and negotiations through unofficial channels between the two conflicting countries in South Asia.
However, this history is full of numerous failures, when, apart from short-term stabilization, nothing can be achieved. Therefore, for many years, India has preferred to resolve any disputes on a bilateral basis. There is now no reason to believe that India has significantly changed its fundamental position, which has evolved taking into account India’s historical experience and its growing capabilities in the global system.
The Evolution of India’s Position on International Mediation of Bilateral Disputes
Before the 1972 Simla Agreement, when India and Pakistan announced that they would settle their disputes through bilateral negotiations, there were several instances of international mediation on Kashmir between the two countries. These included the efforts of both the United Nations (1948) and the Soviet Union (the Tashkent Agreement of 1966).
The US and the UK intervened after the Sino-Indian War of 1962, pushing India and Pakistan to negotiate. However, none of these efforts resulted in a comprehensive settlement of the dispute, although in some cases they helped reduce border tensions. An exception was the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan, which was negotiated with the efforts of the World Bank.
As India gradually strengthened its position and assessed the results of the mediation experience as unsatisfactory, it decided to focus on dispute resolution through bilateral contacts. As far as Pakistan is concerned, this was enshrined in the 1972 Simla Agreement, signed by both sides and reaffirmed in the 1999 Lahore Declaration.
India’s position remained unchanged and in 1993 New Delhi rejected US President Bill Clinton’s offer to mediate the dispute with Pakistan. In 2019, US President Donald Trump again raised the issue of Kashmir mediation, but the Indian government refused.
In the same year, when Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi raised the issue of Moscow’s mediation between the countries, the Indian government had to step in to clarify its position. The then Indian Ambassador to Russia Venkatesh Varma stated: “Russia understands and fully supports New Delhi’s position that disputes between India and Pakistan should be resolved on a bilateral basis based on the Simla Accords.”
This position was also confirmed in the UN Security Council, where India strongly opposes the discussion of the Kashmir issue in international forums. Its position was supported by all permanent members except China. While this does not mean that major powers have completely abandoned the usual practice of pushing countries to negotiate through backroom diplomatic channels, India’s point of view is respected by partners.
This also applies to the ongoing dispute between India and China. They are conducting bilateral negotiations and are still unwilling to invite a third party to solve their problems. Therefore, in 2020, when Trump offered to mediate between India and China, his initiative was rejected by New Delhi.
China also made its position clear, stressing that the two countries have already established mechanisms to resolve their issues and are not willing to mediate. The Biden administration, for its part, has made it clear that the US supports a resolution of the India-China border dispute “through direct negotiations between the two parties”.
Moscow is also sympathetic to India’s position. Russian Ambassador to India Denis Alipov noted in 2022 that “Russia has no plans to mediate between India and China”unless both parties expressly call for such intervention. As the ambassador noted, “the parties regard the territorial dispute between them as a purely bilateral issue” and Moscow respects this position.
How is India dealing with the deteriorating situation along the border with China?
There is no denying that there is a steady rise in tensions on the India-China border, which New Delhi says is a result of China’s aggressive actions.
A change in China’s behavior was noted as early as 2012, when the number of incidents increased along the entire line of effective control, but the situation changed dramatically after the clashes in Eastern Ladakh in 2020, when for the first time since the 1962 war .there were casualties on both sides, including 20 Indian soldiers. India believes that China has not only increased the number of incursions in various areas of the Line of Actual Control, but is also going beyond its previous claims.
India sees this aggressive Chinese stance as part of a broader pattern of China’s behavior toward its neighbors as it gains more power and seeks to expand its influence. India has therefore stepped up its efforts to build border infrastructure and strengthen relations with friendly regional stakeholders, pointing out that China’s actions are “destroyed the basis of bilateral relations”.
This means that a return to normal Sino-Indian relations for New Delhi depends on peace on the border. Although the situation on the Line of Actual Control remains “very complex”, the parties still interact with each other through established problem-solving mechanisms “peace through dialogue”.
This means relying on established mechanisms for negotiating disagreements. In particular, since 2020, meetings have been held regularly under the India-China Border Consultation and Coordination Working Mechanism (WMCC) and the Senior Commanders’ Meeting (SCM) on disengagement in the border areas in Eastern Ladakh. While the WMCC has held 25 meetings since 2020, the SCM has completed 18 rounds of negotiations.
Although full disengagement has not yet been achieved and both sides are estimated to have thousands of troops and advanced weapons in the region, decisions within the SCM have indeed led to four rounds of disengagement. Established in 2012, the WMCC runs parallel to the military-level negotiations with a goal “dealing appropriately with border incidents”.
Other political dialogue mechanisms were frozen for a time immediately after the 2020 incidents, but gradually resumed their work to discuss the contentious issues. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval met in New Delhi in 2022 with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who also held talks with Foreign Minister Subramanyam Jaishankar.
The most frequent compared to other high-level meetings were the negotiations at the level of foreign ministers within the framework of the SCO and the G20 in 2020, 2021 and 2022. In April 2023, for the first time since 2020, the ministers of defenses of the two countries met in New Delhi on the sidelines of the SCO defense ministers’ meeting.
These meetings were mainly used to confirm the respective positions. India has made it clear that the border issue will not be ignored while discussing the broader issues of the bilateral relationship. However, both sides have demonstrated the ability to conduct dialogue without the interference of third parties. In addition, the two nuclear powers recognize the need for dialogue at various official levels, even if there has been no meeting at the leaders’ level since 2020.
How can partners help?
So, given that India prefers to settle disputes with its neighbors on a bilateral basis, how can partners help it? In addition to the direct mediation discussed above, they can provide assistance in a variety of ways. We are talking about negotiations through informal channels, supporting international forums and facilitating meetings between countries.
For example, Moscow in September 2020 became the venue for the first ministerial-level meeting between Wang Yi and Jaishankar since the border clashes. The talks took place on the sidelines of the SCO foreign ministers’ meeting, where both sides agreed to continue dialogue to reduce tensions.
The example of the UAE also shows the utility of efforts through closed channels to facilitate negotiations. At the same time, such efforts are clearly limited, as the discussion of the main issues between the disputing parties is still conducted in a bilateral format.
So while India does not expect third-party mediation, it appreciates the support of its partners. In this regard, the US has officially stated that India can “count on” Washington’s support when it faces challenges from its northern neighbor.
So far, Russia has refrained from taking sides in the Sino-Indian dispute and has maintained a neutral position, which suits New Delhi. As countries take certain positions based on their national interests, Russia’s position as an independent player not too dependent on China is in New Delhi’s interest.
In general, India has shown no desire to engage third parties to mediate its bilateral disputes and believes that it is capable of resolving its problems with other countries on its own. The established mechanisms ensure dialogue with China, which if successful “will create conditions for the restoration of normal bilateral relations”.
Translation: ES
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