Isolated systems are often cited as leak-proof and compromise-proof. Such platforms control critical infrastructure systems and store backups, for example, remaining disconnected and thus invulnerable to corporate network compromises and other types of remote attacks. Or not, as a security researcher has shown, who used radio signals emitted by SATA cables to transmit information.
Photo: Publicity / Ben-Gurion University / Canaltech
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It’s an ingenious attack, developed by Mordechai Guri, director of research and technology at the security research labs at Ben-Gurion University in Israel. He demonstrated how, using malware specifically designed for this purpose and called SATAn, it would be possible to make the components send data from isolated systems at a distance of up to 1.2 meters, allowing the extraction of information that was believed to , were proof of commitment.
The virus in question not only separates the data that will be transmitted, but also performs specific read and write operations that lead to the emission of electromagnetic signals, ranging from 5.9995 to 5.0006 GHz; from this combination, it is possible to transmit specific characters that, in this case, correspond to the leaked information.
 
As a proof of concept, Guri was able to transmit the English word “secret” from an isolated system to a nearby computer equipped with a receiver. Up to 1.2m, as said, the integrity of the message is enough to be understood, while above that, it starts to speak. The idea, then, would be to use it in a direct attack, in which the criminal has physical access to the device that will be exploited.
The proof of concept presented by Guri also found that virtual machines generate drops in signal quality, while the use of scramblers on the disk itself can serve as a defensive measure. The idea is to use systems that monitor specific read and write actions, adding noise and preventing a detectable signal from being emitted; the alternative prevents data leakage, but can also generate greater wear and tear on the equipment, in addition to requiring accurate programming work.
As it is a proof of concept, there is no evidence of the use of SATAn in practice. On the contrary, there are countless cases of intrusion into theoretically isolated systems, especially when we talk about espionage operations and infrastructure systems.
