Many will remember the arrows against the alleged expropriation from Motorways for Italy by the state against Atlantia, the listed controlling holding of which i Benetton they own 30% of the capital. Those were the dramatic months following the collapse of the Morandi bridge, which was followed by an interminable ballet that lasted three years and closed in June of this year with the acquisition of Autostrade per l’Italia (Aspi) by the consortium led by Cdp. The reasons for that barrage? Without Aspi, it was said, Atlantia would collapse. And again: a company listed on the market is not undressed, compromising the minority shareholders. Forgetting that stock investing is typically an investment of risk, a risk that also includes the loss of assets. Now to clear the field of so much demagogic liberal emphasis there are the factual results. Atlantia, even without Aspi, is alive and well. And more than before. In half yearly just published by the Benetton infrastructural holding a key figure emerges. There industrial marginality of Atlantia is even improved, even without the contribution of Aspi.
In presentation to analysts one was published table comparison of the data of Atlantia with and without the contribution of Autostrade per l’Italia, after the sale to Cdp. Well the turnover fell from 4.4 billion in 6 months of 2021 including Aspi’s revenues to 2.8 billion without Autostrade’s revenues. But, here’s the surprise, the gross operating margin (revenues less costs industrials), which is what measures industrial profitability, increased relative to revenues. Today it is valid without Aspi 1.72 billion out of 2.8 billions in turnover, against 2.5 billion with Aspi on 4.4 billion in turnover. The weight of the margin on revenues thus rises without the contribution of Autostrade al 61% of revenues against the 57% insured before the sale of 88% of Aspi owned by Atlantia.
Therefore, Atlantia has seen its already high industrial marginality increase by 4 percentage points. Certainly on a smaller pie of revenues that will be lacking from now on to the listed holding, which, however, has by no means lost its edge on the data that matters for the market, which is profitability. To pull the sprint to the new accounts of Atlantia is the strength of the numbers Abertis, of which Atlantia owns 50% plus one share. The increase of the post Covid traffic it has boosted the accounts and margins of the large Abertis conglomerate which operates on European markets. Instead, the airports, gives Adr to that of Nice still penalized by the downturn in airport traffic. The richest asset, however, and which is worth over 80% of Atlantia’s turnover, is the Spanish giant Abertis, which in fact more than compensated for the loss of Aspi’s contribution to the accounts.
But the sale of Autostrade not only did not affect Atlantia’s formidable profitability: it also had other indirect benefits. The holding company got rid of more in one fell swoop 8 billion in debts at the head of Aspi who now pass under the cap of Cdp and the consortium that took over Aspi. And then there is the collection of 8.1 billion for Atlantia from the sale. Money that in large part, as the top management of the holding wrote in the presentation of the accounts, will end up remunerating the shareholders, Benetton in the lead with their share of 30%. Dividends therefore already insured in 600 million a year and which will rise, according to Atlantia’s managers, between 630 and 650 million per year by 2023.
Those 8 billion in proceeds will also be used for small ones acquisitions in the infrastructural mobility sectors, but guaranteeing Atlantia’s shareholders a flow of dividends of at least 600 million a year for the next 10 years. After all, the same amount of money that the shareholders of Atlantia collected in the years before the collapse of the Morandi Bridge. It should also be added the benefit of not having to put your hand to your wallet for investment and maintenance costs which will pass as a burden to the state. In fact, in the latest industrial plan of Aspi, Atlantia had undertaken to invest by 2038, the expiry date of the concession, the beauty of 21 billion. And only in the period 2020-2024 the amount of expenses for Aspi would have been 8.6 billion, double those incurred in the 2015-2019 period. Money on paper, knowing full well that this amount of money, which would inevitably halve Aspi’s future profitability, would go straight into the hands of the State buyer.
Between the collection of 8.1 billion, the lower debt for another 8 billion and the minor problems deriving from twenty years of bad maintenance of the Autostrade network, for Atlantia and the Benettons, the game with the State ends in the end with a dry success. None penalty economic, after the dramatic tragedy that has brought out a picture of greed from unscrupulous profits, carefully keeping investments and maintenance low, in order to guarantee Benettons ever more abundant dividends for twenty years. Other than “the Benettons and the shareholders of Atlantia cannot be damaged”. It is no coincidence that the stock on the stock market has started to rise again for months.
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