The killing of Saleh Al-Arouri in what appears to have been a “precision strike” deep in the southern suburbs of Beirut bears all the traces of an assassination, signed and carried out by the State of Israel. Mr. Al-Arouri was not only the second person in the political leadership of the Hamas movement, but he was one of the founders and leaders of its military wing and the link, according to reports published between Hamas and Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed group in Lebanon. In this context, Al-Arouri was a pivotal figure.
Israel has not yet announced, and may never admit its responsibility for the killing of Mr. Al-Arouri, who is considered the highest-ranking official in Hamas and the only one whose death has been confirmed since the Israeli Prime Minister issued his promise to “destroy Hamas” after the attacks of October 7th. But all fingers and answers point undeniably towards Israel: Who had the motives? And security information? And the military capabilities to carry out the operation? Above all, who benefits from his assassination?
But the answer to the last question may not be quite as conclusive as it seems. From what we saw in the protests that erupted immediately after Al-Arouri’s assassination in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, the killing of Mr. Al-Arouri – and the five others who died with him – would reflect negatively on Israel, which remains engaged in sustained fighting for a longer period, and at greater cost. Than she had expected. Specifically, it would harm the opportunities that may still be available to Israel to secure the return of the remaining hostages held by Hamas.
However, the greatest danger is that the war, which until now was largely limited to Gaza, even in light of the huge number of Palestinian civilian casualties, could now expand to include all parts of the region. French President Emmanuel Macron was the first of many heads of country to warn of the dangers, specifically calling on Israel not to expand the war into Lebanon. The Lebanese Foreign Minister also made his statement, describing, on the one hand, the assassination as a “war crime” that required an investigation by the United Nations, and on the other hand, he appealed to Hezbollah not to respond.
The spokesman for the United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon issued a similar message, in which he warned that a broader conflict would have devastating repercussions for both Israel and Lebanon, and urged all parties to exercise restraint.
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The clear danger arises from the fact that the attack on Mr. Al-Arouri was not merely an attack on the Hamas movement, but rather constituted a violation of the sovereignty of a third country, Lebanon, and represented a challenge to the supposed protection available to[عناصر] Hamas movement by Hezbollah. The danger currently lies in Hezbollah abandoning its relative adherence to the policy of restraint, which it has adhered to so far, and responding through a comprehensive attack on northern Israel with the support of its Iranian “sponsor.” If Iran decides to intervene in the conflict directly – or appears to do so – this could prompt the intervention of both the United States and the United Kingdom in the conflict.
There have been widespread fears from the beginning that once Israeli forces entered Gaza, the conflict could expand beyond that narrow coastal strip. [أي غزة]. The danger was not that Hamas itself would expand the theater of war, but that others would engage in it on its behalf, seeing the Israeli attack on Gaza as an attack on all Palestinians, and that it would give others the opportunity to settle scores on a larger scale.
So far, the rare positive news is that that hasn’t happened. Of course, there seemed to be a clear reluctance on the part of the major powers – specifically the United States of America, Russia, China, and major regional powers such as Iran, Egypt, and the Gulf states – to slide into intervention, either directly or indirectly. Hezbollah’s apparent decision not to force Israel to defend a second front to its north was particularly striking, and can be seen as evidence that Iran had no appetite for fighting.
It was also not clear to what extent Iran supported – or did not support – the attacks carried out by the Houthi rebels from Yemen, and their targeting of commercial shipping traffic in the Red Sea as a gesture on their part, to express their solidarity with the Palestinians in an attempt to pressure Israel and its allies, to reduce the scale of the attack. On Gaza. On other potential fronts, both Egypt and Turkey have generally stayed away from any escalation as well.
The United States, for its part, seemed confused, in a reflection of the conflicting political winds in Washington. It sent increasing amounts of military equipment to the region, while Israel called, publicly and secretly, to reduce its operations in Gaza. But currently, it may seem that the doves in Washington They began to make progress over the hawks who saw what was happening [في غزة] A pretext for a strike against Iran.
Two months later, it appears that the decision has been taken to withdraw the US aircraft carrier “Gerald Ford” from the Mediterranean and return it to America. While this would mean little in military terms, symbolically, it might lead to the belief that President Joe Biden has no appetite to become an interventionist in a new war at the beginning of a year that will witness US presidential elections.
As for the other potential parties in any possible expansion of the conflict, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, and China have all shown greater interest in mediating rather than taking a position with one of the parties. As for Russia, it is still preoccupied with Ukraine and the remainder of its intervention in Syria. The European Union is also greatly concerned with the Ukrainian file, and what it will have to do if the United States of America effectively reduces its support for the Kiev government. The United Kingdom is likely to face the same dilemma, but it cannot realistically act alone in the Middle East without the United States or the European Union.
In the Cold War era, it was often said that Moscow and others made a sport of fishing in murky waters. What we are currently seeing in the Middle East since October 7 is exactly the opposite: we see a clear interest on the part of the major powers and those of the regional countries as well in their efforts to avoid anything that would actually expand the conflict, and they also seek to influence and limit Any ambitious drive for any of the agent groups. Even those who could be considered allies of Hamas, such as Hezbollah, have so far remained at a distance from engaging in the war.
Almost no one seems to want a broader war in the Middle East at the moment, but that does not mean, of course, that it will not happen. The killing of Mr. Al-Arouri in Lebanon represents an extremely dangerous moment. The longer the fighting in Gaza lasts, the more likely such dangerous moments will occur. The sooner we agree on another ceasefire, the better.
But it’s also perhaps worth noting that neither 24-hour-a-week news bulletins, nor history in general, has much to say about wars that are averted for whatever reason. Let us hope that this time next year we can look back to 2024 and think not about how the Gaza war sparked conflict across the Middle East, but about how and why a broader war did not happen.
2024-01-10 22:01:48
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