Political scientist Arnis Latishenko.
Publicity photo
Arnis Latišenko, political scientist, “Latvijas Avīze”, JSC “Latvijas Mediji”
On January 10 this year, US and Russian diplomats began high-level talks that lasted about eight hours. The talks actually affected the European security architecture, Russia’s ultimatums to NATO and the tensions around Ukraine. The United States was represented by US Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman, while Russia was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov.
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Two days later, on 12 January, the next set of talks between NATO and Russia, led by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, took place in Brussels and lasted four hours. Finally, talks at the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 13 January closed the week.
The result seems to have been fruitless and, in fact, the West has not succumbed to Russian pressure. However, is the storm really over?
The Kremlin’s ultimatum
On December 17, 2021, the Russian Foreign Ministry published two surprisingly presumptuous drafts: the Draft Agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States on Security Safeguards and the Draft Agreement on Security Measures for the Russian Federation and NATO Members.
They offered (requested) the United States and its NATO allies to accept an unconditional capitulation and to recognize the Kremlin’s privileged sphere of interests in the countries of the former USSR and the Warsaw Pact. These draft documents are so far-reaching that the Kremlin itself is unlikely to believe in the seriousness of its offer.
Even at Sergei Ryabkov’s press briefing, which once again demonstrated the declining level of current Russian public diplomacy, journalists questioned the feasibility of Russia’s proposals. Nevertheless, Ryabkov continued to communicate in the same manner this year, announcing before talks that NATO should “collect its belongings and move to the 1997 borders.”
If there is widespread mistrust and Russia’s proposals are so unrealistic, how has the Kremlin been able to entice the West into negotiations?
US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken explained the logic of American diplomacy, which is that it is better to negotiate and try to achieve de-escalation than to reach an actual conflict involving “military technical means”.
The Americans have repeatedly stated that they are not going to talk about their allies without their presence. At the same time, as Mr Blinken points out, the Americans are really going to find certain points of contact that will reduce international tensions. Could such points of contact really exist, and could some kind of agreement really be reached?
Potential points of contact
An agreement that Ukraine will never, ever, ever join NATO, as requested by Ryabkov, is not possible and Russia will not be able to receive such guarantees. Such a written agreement would be in clear breach of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that any European State may be invited to accede to the Treaty by agreement of the Allies.
On the other hand, a secret informal agreement with the Kremlin is too risky, as it would be a clear departure from the principles declared by the United States and could be used by the Kremlin for further blackmail. Moreover, such an agreement would probably not be valid with the emergence of a new US presidential administration.
At the same time, it should be noted that Russia has significantly delayed Ukraine’s accession to NATO by launching a war in Ukraine and creating territorial conflicts, and this will not happen in the near future.
At the same time, in future talks, the Kremlin could try to make the Americans more assertive towards Ukraine over the implementation of the Minsk agreement, mainly in connection with the reintegration of the Donbass region into Ukraine. Namely, the gradual implementation of these agreements becomes a condition for the Ukrainian side to continue its supportive policy, such as military or economic, from the West.
At least all parties, including the United States and Ukraine itself, support this agreement. At the same time, it is clear that the effective implementation of these agreements could mean that the Kremlin will be able to gain more influence over Ukraine’s domestic politics through the Donbass region, and could contribute to the Kremlin’s efforts to curb Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.
Another aspect that could potentially be agreed between the United States and Russia is the issue of medium- and short-range missile deployments. The threat posed by missiles is also one of the cornerstones of the Kremlin’s rhetoric.
In 2019, under the leadership of US President Donald Trump, he withdrew from the Treaty on the Elimination of Medium- and Short-Range Missiles, signed during the Cold War, on the grounds that Russia had violated the treaty. In contrast, the Democratic Party condemned Trump’s action and supported the continuation of arms control talks with Russia.
In the context of the ongoing diplomatic process, a certain compromise on the deployment and control of armaments is likely to be reached.
Conclusions
The first round of negotiations is expected to end without significant progress, but it is also self-evident that in such a short format the parties can only identify their positions and the negotiations could continue in various formats.
The Kremlin is likely to insist on a one-on-one negotiation format for the fate of third countries.
The future course and events of the negotiations will show whether Russia’s ultimatum is in fact an instrument to justify further aggression, a means of pressure within the negotiations or a deceptive maneuver that distracts from the real strategy and goals of the negotiations.
Meanwhile, Russia continues to maintain psychological tensions and raise rates, as if rushing to the West. This is reflected not only in the holding of a “gun to Ukraine’s head” of more than 100,000 troops at Ukraine’s borders, but also in the night of 13-14 January, a cyber-attack was carried out on the websites of Ukrainian authorities.
Although there is no evidence that this was done by Russian hackers, as the investigation is ongoing, it is still clear who the primary suspect was, as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joseph Borrell, made clear.
Themes
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