/ world today news/ Before the quite likely large-scale offensive of the armed forces of Ukraine, the information environment is “warming up” and “smoke screens” are being created, according to media war experts. On the one hand, the Ukrainian side throws a video with a possible false transfer of armored vehicles to one or another section of the front. On the other hand, the media, including the Western media, talk about the poor training and preparation of the armed forces of Ukraine. Something similar was observed on the eve of the American invasion of Iraq. How not to give in to provocations that have already been worked out?
The Armed Forces of Ukraine have already launched an offensive in the Special Operations Zone — an information offensive aimed not at strongholds, “but at the consciousness of the Russian military.”
On March 31, this thesis was expressed by the military commander of RIA Novosti Alexander Kharchenko, who was in the combat zone, whose message caused a wide resonance in the Russian media space (in particular, the deputy chairman of the Moscow City Duma, to which the journalist drew attention Andrei Medvedev).
Counter-attack on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ivan Shilov, Regnum
On social networks and other open sources, “videos of dozens of armored vehicles” of the Armed Forces of Ukraine appear every day, the military correspondent notes.
The bloggers “accidentally” filmed the movement of enemy equipment – allegedly in different sections of the front, stretching for hundreds of kilometers: in the outskirts of Artyomovsk, Avdeyevka, in the Zaporizhia section of the front or towards the Russian border in the Belgorod region.
“Each of these videos is carefully analyzed … and based on these studies, predictions are made about the upcoming offensive,” Kharchenko noted, referring to the long-awaited (including thanks to numerous publications in the Western media) spring counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
According to the military correspondent, by releasing such often fake videos of the movement of equipment to one or another section of the front (along with real “suicide attacks” on Russian positions), the enemy solves several problems.
First, analyzing the speed of transfer of our forces and equipment to potentially vulnerable areas of the front “to stop a possible breakthrough”, the Armed Forces of Ukraine assess the military logistics capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces and the number of reserves.
Secondly, creating the appearance of attacks (and even the appearance of the beginning of the infamous counteroffensive) allows us to keep our troops on the alert and at the same time identify “problems in the interaction between units and the weak points of their joints. “
Military serviceman from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the reactive system for salvos of fire “Hurricane” (cc) Alexey Mayshev, RIA Novosti
In addition to such demoralization, another tool is used in a large-scale information-psychological operation: creating a sense of false superiority and provoking capricious moods.
“Contradictory statements are being heard from Kiev: some say that a counteroffensive is being prepared, others say that there is not yet the necessary amount of equipment from the West for this,” reserve colonel, military observer Viktor Litovkin told REGNUM.
The same goal – to create the impression that the adversary does not have the forces and means for an offensive – also pursues a series of publications in the Western press about the technical weakness of the armed forces of Ukraine, notes Kharchenko.
Thus, London’s The Guardian published an article at the beginning of the week, according to which Ukrainian tankers cannot control the Challenger tanks that Britain is transferring to Kiev.
“Our guards immediately began to laugh at the incompetent Seluks,” the military commander noted, adding that in fact, armies considered less prepared than the armed forces of Ukraine (for example, the Iraqi army) successfully mastered both Abrams and F -16.
Let us add that the widely quoted interview of Volodymyr Zelenskiy to the Japanese agency Yomiuri, where the Ukrainian president complained about the impossibility of a counteroffensive because the West does not supply enough ammunition to the armed forces of Ukraine, can be attributed to such “disheartening” publications.
The Washington Post “leaked” about Kiev’s uncertainty about the success of the spring offensive due to a lack of tanks. The American publication Politico “gave away” the date of the Ukrainian operation – May – and received criticism from Zelenskyi’s cabinet adviser Mikhail Podolyak for revealing information.
Vladimir Zelensky, (cc) President of Ukraine/Global Look Press
This whole informational smokescreen is reminiscent of the US media campaign in the run-up to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Kharchenko notes.
Then, for example, there were many reports that the Bradley infantry fighting vehicles were unable to move through the desert, which gave false confidence to the command of the Iraqi army. When the invasion began, the Bradleys passed through the country unimpeded.
“If we return to the present and to the situation in the SVO zone, then we must state: the “warm-up” before a new possible offensive of Ukraine and the endless information “smoke screens” are obvious, agrees Alexander Malkevich, head of the journalism department of the Kherson state university, in a comment for REGNUM agency.
“Both the regrouping of the Ukrainian forces on the front line, as well as purely information campaigns, which are definitely behind the Center for Information and Psychological Operations (CIPSO) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, are working for disorientation,” the interlocutor emphasizes.
“It would be wrong not to consider these threats,” Malkiewicz stressed.
“We have to understand that they are working against us and they will work with a vengeance,” he adds.
Just as the enemy is getting new weapons, he is getting technology and technologists to wage information-psychological warfare.
“Given that the West also engaged in propaganda and psychological processing, it is worth saying ‘something that will not appeal to many,'” noted the interlocutor.
ВСУ, (cc) Kay Nietfeld/Global Look Press
“I think there should be military censorship, and not so much in relation to journalists and military correspondents, as they are already trying to apply, but in relation to the information that is spread uncontrollably in various blogs, Telegram channels, audiences,” said Malkevich.
– “We have bred so many “divankors”, that is, “sofa” specialists, that this is a threat. After all, one only has to throw some information – and TsIPSO does this every day – how illiterate, but very self-aware people, strongly motivated and low-skilled, start to spread all this,” he adds.
“Military intelligence and counter-intelligence have objective data on the position of enemy forces,” Malkevich emphasizes.
But it is necessary to pass on information to break the tide of fakes.
“And at the same time, it is time to tighten the screws on the uncontrolled distribution of this kind of fakes, fillers, inflaming passions or downplaying real dangers,” the interlocutor notes again.
– “But this military censorship needs some modern analogue of the Sovinformburo – these are tasks that must be solved. How ready we are for this is a question, but it is vital,” he says.
As for the actual counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, some facts speak in favor of the fact that it is being prepared, Litovkin points out.
There is evidence that NATO countries have transferred to the armed forces of Ukraine a sufficient number of HIMARS multiple rocket launchers, M777 howitzers, artillery ammunition, about fifty tanks and from 1,500 to 2,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, sufficient for offensive operations.
“We have not seen this technique on the front line, and it seems that the armed forces of Ukraine are concentrating this technique to create a ‘fist’ and break through our defenses,” the military expert noted.
So the capabilities of the opponent should not be underestimated. However, Litovkin argued, the ground forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not have sufficient resources to penetrate our defenses.
“As long as they don’t have air support, and they don’t have that — they don’t have enough attack planes, planes, helicopters to cover armored vehicles,” effective offensive action is unlikely, the source added.
Translation: SM
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