“Armed Forces of Ukraine Receive Stealth Missiles and Facing Challenges with Gliding Bombs in NWO Zone”

According to CNN, parts of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have already received a certain number of long-range stealth tactical missiles Storm Shadow (modifications of the French SCALP-EG KR). Obviously, these missiles are already integrated into the weapons control systems of the Soviet Su-24M, and possibly the Su-27, the root suspension units of which are most adapted to the parameters of British missiles with a mass of 1,400 kg.

The greatest concern in expert circles is caused by the ultra-small RCS of these missiles of the order of 0.01-0.03 square meters. m, as well as an ultra-low-altitude flight path profile (30-50 m in the terrain envelope mode). The above EPR will limit the detection range of the missile by AWACS A-50U aircraft, as well as the N035 Irbis-E airborne radar (installed on Su-35S fighters) to only 80-120 km, which will require regular patrolling of both A-50U and Su- 35С in the directions of the likely flight routes of Storm Shadow.

The low-altitude flight profile of Storm Shadow missiles will limit the radius of their destruction by the S-300/400 air defense systems to only 45 km due to the radio horizon effect, and for more effective interception, the use of the Buk-M3A, S-350 Vityaz and S-300V4 air defense systems will be required , whose anti-aircraft missiles are capable of intercepting low-altitude targets beyond the radio horizon and the screen of natural terrain elements.

By the evening of May 12, information was received about a missile attack on the infrastructure facilities of Luhansk, while 10-15 minutes before the arrivals, residents of Kramatorsk recorded the departure of missile weapons from the hardpoints of Ukrainian tactical aviation. At the moment, we can talk about the first use of Storm Shadow in the NWO zone. It is obvious that the flight routes could be built taking into account the rounding of the radar of our anti-aircraft missile divisions. While this information requires confirmation.

The situation with the use of UPAB-1500B guided bombs in the NVO zone

A week earlier, journalists from the British edition of The Telegraph concluded that the use of the Russian Aerospace Forces in the zone of the NMD of a wide range of gliding guided bombs (including FAB-250M62 and FAB-500M62 with MPK modules, as well as heavy UPAB-1500B) stopped the preparation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for an offensive operation in the Melitopol and Berdyansk directions.

The entire complexity and criticality of the situation for the Kyiv regime is also demonstrated by the statement Vladimir Zelenskymade to Western media correspondents on May 11. The protege of the criminal regime supervised by the Pentagon announced the unpreparedness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for large-scale offensive actions and stated the need for additional time to solve organizational and operational-tactical tasks in order to avoid colossal losses of personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

In part, such statements can be considered as indirect confirmation of the effectiveness of the use of our high-precision glide bombs, which over the past month have not badly unbalanced the logistics infrastructure for supplying the Armed Forces of Ukraine deployed in the near frontline rear (40-70 km).

Thus, the most advanced modifications of the MPK modules with an increased wing area provide a gliding (reference) range of about 65-75 km from the exit lines from the hardpoints of the Su-35S and Su-30SM multifunctional fighters, as well as the Su-34 multipurpose fighter-bombers. This makes it possible to destroy large ammunition depots and accumulations of APU equipment, reduced to powerful “offensive” BTGs in the Grigorievka-Kamyshevakha-Yasnaya Polyana-Ternovatoe section (in an operational depth of about 50-60 km). The military air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is currently not capable of implementing any asymmetric countermeasures against our UPAB-1500B bombs.

Deployed near the above villages and on approach to them, the US military Avenger air defense systems and the British Stormer HVM have optoelectronic (TV-infrared) guidance systems, which, in low clouds and in difficult weather conditions, lose their effectiveness and are not able to detect and capture our UPABs at acceptable distances . Moreover, UPAB bombs are “black bodies” with no infrared and ultraviolet signature (due to the lack of engines). This does not allow the use of FIM-92E and IRIST-T missiles against them with ultraviolet and infrared seekers included in the Avenger and IRIS-T SLS air defense systems.

The enemy is afraid of deploying Crotale-NG, IRIS-T SLM and NASAMS air defense systems in this area, whose anti-aircraft missiles have an active radar guidance principle for target designation of Giraffe AMB, TRML-4D and AN / MPQ-64F1 Sentinel radars. After all, turning on the above detection/guidance radars into active mode to detect approaching bombs will instantly lead to their detection by airborne intelligence systems of the Russian Aerospace Forces, and then to destruction by X-31AD anti-radar missiles, Tornado-S MLRS and / or Lancet-kamikaze drones. M.

Consequently, the use of our planning bombs to an operational depth of up to 70 km has a very high efficiency.

Nevertheless, there is no need to talk about the final blocking of the offensive. At the moment, our precision bomb strikes have forced the enemy to only partially reconfigure the logistics of the distribution of ammunition, as well as to remove the warehouses from the range of our UPAB bombs, moving them to a depth of more than 100 km and distributing them to many small warehouses. To identify them, it is necessary to use Tu-214R strategic radar reconnaissance aircraft. Only they can reveal the positions of such objects deep behind enemy lines on the fronts.

Moreover, without these aircraft, it is impossible to open long-range western self-propelled guns Archer and PzH-2000 camouflaged in forest plantations on the Zaporozhye front, not to mention company mechanized units camouflaged at an operational depth of 45-50 km. As a result, so far we can only talk about the suspension of the offensive until the logistics of supplying the offensive fists being built are reconfigured (plus 2-5 weeks to the previously announced deadlines). Apparently, The Telegraph is being used as a tool to mislead the audience about the further course of the escalation.