Table of Contents
- 1 The problem of intellectual anthropocentrism
- 2 The “minimal concept” of death
- 3 “Play the possum” and feign death
- 4 **How does Susana Monsó’s “minimal concept of death” challenge the traditional anthropocentric view of death, and what implications does this have for our understanding of animal consciousness?**
Being aware of death, an exclusively human affair? It is this belief that the philosopher Susana Monsó refuted in his recent work, Playing Possum: How Animals Understand Death (“Playing the opossum. The awareness of death in animals”, untranslated). According to her, animals do have an understanding of death, although very different from ours. Explanations.
Susana Monsó, a Spanish philosopher specializing in the theory of animal consciousness, seeks to describe the experience of non-human creatures. What is it like to be a bat, a frog, a beetle? His latest book, Playing Possum : How Animals Understand Death (Playing the opossum: awareness of death in animals, not translated) published in October, is part of this approach. Monsó wonders if other species than ours have, like us, an awareness of death. The approach might seem strange, especially coming from a philosopher. The history of philosophy, from the ethics of Antiquity to existential thoughts, seems to have established that the awareness of death is a strictly human reality. The eminently abstract and complex nature of the concept should exclude a priori beings who do not have cognitive capacities as developed as ours. Whether or not we believe in the afterlife, to think about death we must distinguish the body from the soul, matter from consciousness, and explore notions such as eternity, inevitability, universality, etc. Many still doubt the fact that animals have a “theory of mind”, that is to say an ability to represent others as having, too, a consciousness made up of affects, thoughts, etc. How, in this case, could animals conceive of the inevitable and irreversible interruption of the consciousness of a being – or a possible life of the soul separated from the body?
The problem of intellectual anthropocentrism
Susana Monsó invites us to protect ourselves from what she calls“intellectual anthropocentrism”. Anthropocentrism in general is the tendency to view everything from our own perspective or human interests, as if the world was made for us and in our image. But this anthropocentrism is more ” intellectual “asserts Monsó, when we think that a particular concept (the idea of death) has as its only form that which human beings give it. This common position has the drawback of making death a rigid concept. On the contrary, the author seeks to show that this concept is available according to different degrees of complexity, without being able to be reduced to ours, itself otherwise imperfect and inaccurate. If knowing death were necessary to have the concept of it, we would in fact be deprived of it in the same way as animals, incapable as we are of imagining our own non-existence or of knowing what the afterlife is. We must therefore accept that, never knowing it, we can understand it with more or less precision, and be open to other ways of conceiving it. Monsó’s approach is interesting in that it decorrelates the concept of death from its so-called epistemic vocation: we can conceive something without knowing it. Even if the concept of death is imprecise, it is nonetheless an attempt at intellectual understanding, and as such deserves our interest.
The “minimal concept” of death
It is in this context that Monsó develops the idea of a “minimal concept of death”, namely the necessary and sufficient criteria which make it possible to affirm that a being grasps death in an intellectual way, and not only from physiological reactions. This minimal concept assumes three elements. It must, on the one hand, allow the animal that owns it to distinguish “with a minimum of precision” the deceased subjects of others (sleeping, absent, etc.). He must then to understand “fundamental semantic content”namely “non-functionality and irreversibility” : the animal must consider that a corpse will never again be able to achieve what it judges living beings capable of. The predator, for example, has a concept of death if he says to himself after killing his prey: this one will no longer flee. Finally, a concept is not innate, but the result of a learning ; in this way its content can vary depending on the individual, and make possible a multiplicity of behaviors that cannot be predicted in advance. The same predator can learn, through hunting, to be wary of corpses and their tendency to putrefaction, but it can also never make an association of this type.
Excluded, from this point of view, are beings like ants which, according to Monsó, have a simply physiological relationship to death. They are endowed with an olfactory faculty which allows them to identify their deceased congeners. via the acid generated by their corpse, in order to evacuate them from the anthill. This ability, however, does not allow them to distinguish dead ants from those that have been coated with acid as part of an experiment, and which are mechanically expelled from the anthill. The relationship between ants and death is not the result of a cognitive learning process capable of changing their behavior and refining their reading of reality; it’s an instinctive reaction.
“Play the possum” and feign death
Quite different is the case of animals endowed with a more complex cognitive structure and of which Monsó multiplies the examples during his investigation. We retain here that of theopossuma small mammal (and the only marsupial in North America) which gives its title to the work. The latter is capable of feigning death by simulating its markers: reduction in body temperature, putrid exhalations, bluing of the tongue: « The thanatose [le fait de feindre la mort] is the final piece of the puzzle because it is a mechanism whose very existence strongly suggests that the concept of death is omnipresent in nature. It is not – and we can never emphasize this point enough – because the opossum itself understands that it is feigning death, or does it on purpose, but because to explain the thanatosis from the point of view of evolution, it must be postulated that deceived predators have a concept of death. »
Monsó concludes that we make the concept of death something eminently abstract because we are, at least in the geographical areas which have the privilege, she specifies, rarely confronted with it. The idea is of course not to deplore it, but to realize the contingency of our notion of death, so different from those developed in natural spaces where death represents a most everyday and banal reality.
**How does Susana Monsó’s “minimal concept of death” challenge the traditional anthropocentric view of death, and what implications does this have for our understanding of animal consciousness?**
**Interview: Do Animals Understand Death?**
**Introduction**
Welcome to World Today News. Today, we delve into a fascinating discussion surrounding animal consciousness and the concept of death.
We are joined by two esteemed guests. Firstly, Dr. Emily Carter, a behavioral ecologist specializing in animal cognition, and Professor David Miller, a philosopher of mind with a keen interest in animal ethics.
Our conversation will revolve around the intriguing work of philosopher Susana Monsó, who challenges the assumption that an awareness of death is exclusive to humans.
**Section 1: Challenging Anthropocentrism**
* Dr. Carter, Monsó argues that we need to move beyond what she calls “intellectual anthropocentrism.” Can you explain this concept and why it’s crucial in understanding animal cognition?
* Professor Miller, how does Monsó’s perspective on the concept of death challenge traditional philosophical views? Do you see any potential implications for our ethical treatment of animals?
* Both guests, do you agree that our limited understanding of death as humans might be hindering our ability to comprehend how other species might perceive it?
**Section 2: The “Minimal Concept” of Death**
* Professor Miller, Monsó proposes a “minimal concept of death.” What are the key elements of this concept, and how does it help us distinguish between instinctive reactions to death and a more cognitive understanding?
* Dr. Carter, Monsó uses the example of ants to illustrate a purely physiological response to death. Can you share other examples of animal behavior that might fit this category, and how do these cases differ from those demonstrating a “minimal concept of death”?
* Should the presence of a “minimal concept of death” influence how we interact with and manage different animal populations?
**Section 3: Playing Possum and the Thanatosis Enigma**
* Dr. Carter, Monsó focuses on the opossum’s ability to feign death as a compelling example supporting the “minimal concept of death.” How does this behavior demonstrate an understanding of death beyond mere instinct?
* Professor Miller, some may argue that the opossum’s behavior is purely instinctive and doesn’t necessarily imply a conscious understanding of death. What counter-arguments might Monsó present?
* Does the observation of thanatosis in other species, such as certain insects and fish, strengthen Monsó’s argument for a widespread “minimal concept of death” in the animal kingdom?
**Section 4: Rethinking Our Understanding of Death**
* Dr. Carter, what are the broader implications of Monsó’s work for our understanding of animal intelligence and consciousness?
* Professor Miller, do you believe that Monsó’s thesis could lead to a paradigm shift in how we approach the ethics of animal welfare and conservation?
* Both guests, what further research is needed to deepen our understanding of death perception in animals, and what impact could such findings have on our worldviews?
**Closing Remarks**
Thank you, Dr. Carter and Professor Miller, for sharing your insightful perspectives on this compelling topic. We encourage our viewers to continue exploring the work of Susana Monsó and engage in thoughtful discussions about the intricate relationship between humans, animals, and the inevitability of death.
