Almost a year has passed since the full-scale invasion of Russia – what would be the first conclusion after this year of profound changes in European dynamics?
I guess I should start by saying that all the US financial and military aid that has been given to Ukraine so far is far greater than anyone expected at the beginning of the war, including the Ukrainians and of course the Russians and maybe even including [ASV prezidenta Džo] Biden administration.
This happened because the Ukrainians earned support from America by showing that they know how to use weapons well, that they are really determined to fight, and of course because of their success in first driving the Russians out of Kyiv and later liberating some of the occupied territories.
I am worried about the future. Quite a lot depends on what the Ukrainians will be able to do this summer. In the United States, the problem is not so much public opinion or popular support for Ukraine, which, in my opinion, is quite high – polls show that Americans widely support Ukraine. The issue is the upcoming US presidential election. The Republican candidate will probably be Donald Trump (at least he’s in the lead right now) and he’s said that he doesn’t support Ukraine, that he wants the war to end soon, and so on.
I think there will be a lot of pressure on the Ukrainians in the next six months to win or at least regain a large part of their territory. And if this does not happen, pressure may be put on Ukraine to make concessions next year.
Do you think it is important to make a major breakthrough right now? By this I mean Ukraine’s attempt to retake Crimea.
I think it’s important. I just published an article saying that Ukrainians should try to get Crimea back and that we should support this project. The Biden administration has said nothing at all about Crimea. I think the recapture of Crimea could really be the kind of blow or victory that could convince the Russians that this war was a mistake.
In order to end the war – and by “end” I don’t mean stop it for six months, or even stop it for five or eight years like last time, but end it forever – political change must take place in Russia. I don’t mean that there must be a regime change. I think the Russian elite will have to make a decision that the war was a mistake and that Ukraine has a right to exist.
There should be a change like what happened in France, for example, in the early 1960s when they decided they no longer wanted to go to war in Algeria. It is possible that Crimea could be this defeat.
I have to say that Crimea today is basically an aircraft carrier stuck at the bottom of Ukraine; they have completely militarized Crimea. There are prisons where Ukrainian prisoners of war were held, and where they were preparing for the invasion of southern Ukraine.
It is very important for Ukraine’s long-term security that Crimea is at least neutralized, but it would be much better if it were Ukrainian territory.
Do you agree that regaining Crimea would increase the risk of provoking Russia to go nuclear?
It certainly increases all kinds of risks. But the way to resist the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is what we have done so far, which is to deter Russia, to explain, both publicly and privately, that there will be, as US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has put it, a “catastrophic response”. Other countries, especially China, are also putting some pressure on Russia not to use nuclear weapons. Whether Ukraine takes Crimea is not what determines whether Russia will use nuclear weapons.
Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said in Washington that China would likely attack Taiwan if Ukraine failed. How do you perceive it? And how seriously should we really take China’s support for Russia?
These are two different questions. I don’t think there is an automatic connection between what is happening in Ukraine and Taiwan. There is obviously some sort of symbolic relationship as the Chinese are watching Western involvement in Ukraine and will take that into account when thinking about Taiwan.
In fact, I have thought for a long time that the Chinese do not want to invade Taiwan militarily. They still hope to get Taiwan through political means. I was in Taiwan in October and it is quite clear to me that a kind of Chinese information war, a political war against Taiwan is already underway through propaganda, disinformation and attempts to influence Chinese and Taiwanese politicians as well as Taiwanese businessmen. They also conduct military exercises as a form of intimidation tactic. It’s all part of a coordinated set of measures to put pressure on Taiwan.
China’s role in the war is quite important because it is one of the major powers that actually allows Russia to continue fighting because they buy Russian oil and gas, they export electronics and other goods to Russia that the Russians would otherwise not be able to get. They help Russia continue.
On the other hand, as far as we know, they are not selling weapons to the Russians. They could, but clearly chose not to, which is their balanced response to the conflict.
China can change its mind and that would have a big impact on the war. Either they would start giving Russia weapons or put more pressure on Russia to end the war, which I think they could do if they wanted to. I’m not even sure why they don’t, because I think it would be quite advantageous for China to play such a role from a geopolitical point of view.
Let’s return to the Central and Eastern European region. There are debates about how to rebuild Ukraine, but rebuilding the country involves rebuilding the nation. What do you think will be the impact of the war on the young generation of Ukraine? How will their war trauma affect the rebuilding of the country?
The last time I was in Ukraine, I met with the First Lady, the wife of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky [Olenu Zelensku]who is very concerned about a possible wave of violent behavior among those who are now children and teenagers.
Clearly, there will be people in Ukraine who are traumatized and people who are used to the idea of violence. There is a danger that after the war in Ukraine, politics will also be violent. Much depends on how the war ends. If it ends in a disappointing way, I think people will be angry, and they’ll be angry for a long time.
On the other hand, there are also many very young people who have taken on enormous responsibility and achieved things that are not common – even for younger people in much more “normal” countries, because they do not have such opportunities – either by playing an important role in the army or organizing this incredible civic movement to help the Army and the community.
While traveling last summer, I met an amazing group of very young people in Odessa, some of them teenagers, who were helping people in the occupied territories to escape; they helped the people in the recently liberated areas to rebuild the destroyed, provide food and medicine. Having these experiences at a young age can strengthen you. These people are the future leaders of Ukraine.
How do you see the development of Polish-Ukrainian relations? Will Polish support help Ukraine join the European Union?
All Polish governments since Ukraine’s independence in 1991 have been extremely pro-Ukrainian. The only exception is the government of the “Law and Justice” party from 2015 to 2022. They were not very close to Ukraine, but all previous governments were.
Poland was the first European country to recognize independent Ukraine. Donald Tusk’s government (where my husband was then foreign minister) created the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which expanded trade relations with Ukraine and eventually led to Euromaidan.
The idea that Ukraine should be European has been accepted by almost all political parties. I think it will continue to be important for those in the Polish government.
What about corruption, reforms in Ukraine that started before the war? Will it be different now? And how will it affect the future shape of Ukraine?
There are some very corrupt countries in Europe that have also entered the European Union and NATO.
Turkey is a very corrupt country. Italy is a very corrupt country. The influence of corruption and kleptocrat money is very large in Great Britain and also in the United States. Therefore, I don’t really see how Ukraine is different in this respect.
The problem in Ukraine was not only corruption, it is rather the weakness of state institutions. Ukrainians are very, very good at building popular movements – like their army. It almost resembles a guerrilla army, it is organized from the bottom up. However, they have not been successful in building state institutions, and as a result, Ukrainian presidents have always been tempted to seize them and shape them according to their personal political needs. Of course, there is a danger that after the war, President Zelensky or someone else will want to do the same thing again.
The good news is that it usually fails. Would-be autocrats try to centralize Ukraine and channel money in a certain way, and sooner or later, their plan fails. Ukraine is not a country like Russia capable of creating a strong autocracy. However, (corruption) still needs to be taken into account during reconstruction, because unfortunately big development projects and reconstruction projects become corrupt when a lot of money flows into a very poor place. But as I said, my main concern is not corruption, it is the weakness of the state.
Let’s switch to Poland. Almost 75% of Poles believe that democracy is the best of all systems, while about half say they are not satisfied with its functioning. About 20% believe that the state of democracy is catastrophic. In addition, in the new generation, up to 30% do not know what kind of Poland they would like to live in. Going back to your youth in your twenties (the time you published your first book), what did democracy mean to you then?
I grew up in a democracy and took it for granted, as you take for granted any system you grew up in. But I think that (democracy) seemed almost ideal to the Poles at that time; it was something they wanted to achieve. Democracy, prosperity, cultural freedom and European integration were seen as things that were connected: they were part of the same whole. When people said they wanted one of these (such as democracy), they often meant they wanted all of them.
One of the big mistakes Poland made in the last 30 years was not educating people about what democracy is and how it works. What is the importance of an independent judiciary? What is the point of power sharing? How does democracy create and facilitate compromise so that extremists don’t dictate what happens? I don’t think any of that was taught well in Poland, so that kind of vague idea that we should be a democracy wasn’t really built into the education system and it was taken for granted again that everyone understood what it was and that everyone wants it.
Do you think that the concept of democracy has changed in the region?
I don’t know if the concept of democracy has changed. I think there is more cynicism towards democratic politics and democratic leaders because there was an idealistic view that everything would be perfect.
There has been a lot of corruption in the region, and people naturally attribute that to the political system that exists. While much of the region – and Poland in particular – has seen extraordinary levels of economic growth across all social strata over the past 30 years, people feel they deserve more or expected more, and there are those who resent the widening gap between the wealthy and the less wealthy in this society – it also begins to be associated with democracy, with, in their opinion, economic injustice.
No one has promised that democracy will make you rich; it was never intended for such a purpose. It has often gone hand in hand with wealth, as democracy means a more open society, freer trade and better education, as well as a certain dynamism. Reality has not lived up to expectations.
2023-05-22 02:20:00
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