The Anchorage Summit may have been drama, but each side achieved its goals. The two great powers are trying to cooperate and compete with each other at the same time.
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The US-China summit in Alaska ended with much drama and speculation that bilateral relations could remain on a course of confrontation and deterioration. Sure, the atmosphere at the meeting was not as positive as some observers might have hoped – but the result was not as bad as many media project it.
In contrast to the meeting between China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Hawaii last summer, which ended with no tangible results, the next concrete steps for the two countries were determined at the summit in Alaska. Despite the political theatricality and media hype, the meeting met the low expectations of both delegations.
Three lists: cooperation, competition and confrontation
The Anchorage meeting was designed from the start as an in-depth political dialogue in which both sides should clarify their positions on specific issues, rather than a place for political agreement. The statements released after the two-day meeting ended were much less contentious than the opening statements by either side.
Indeed, the delegations from both countries arrived in Anchorage knowing that there would be no progress on sovereignty issues such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet. They also knew that climate change would be the best chance to work together.
Compared to the confrontations in the Trump era, the fact that both sides have expressed a willingness to support a case-by-case approach to handling their competitive relationship is already a significant improvement.
Foreign Minister Blinken’s statement at the meeting that the US “will be competitive when it should be, cooperative when it can be, and opposing when it has to be” is reminiscent of the “three lists” approach suggested by the Chinese side last year. This stipulates that both sides should subdivide issues into a “list of further cooperation”, a “list of dialogue and negotiations” and a “list of differences that need to be managed”.
No mere theatrics
During her March 19 press briefing, State Department spokeswoman Jalina Porter attributed the tense start to the meeting to “exaggerated diplomatic presentations” aimed at “a domestic audience.” By “domestic audiences,” Porter meant the Chinese public and, perhaps to an even greater extent, Xi Jinping himself.
This assessment is not entirely accurate. While the Chinese delegation certainly had to be tough in front of the media, there was no reason for Yang Jiechi to engage in diplomatic theatrics just to please his home audience. The career diplomat who has been working on relations between the United States and China since the early 1980s is too old and too experienced for that.
Indeed, there is broad consensus in China’s foreign policy that Beijing should systematically adjust its tone in dealing with the US and be more confident in setting boundaries and shaping the rules of engagement. In other words, Yang’s criticism of the US that it was “not qualified to speak from a position of strength” was not just a spontaneous reaction to a dispute over the protocol, but rather a signal of a new, more confident Chinese foreign policy.
Both sides achieved their goals
Despite the dramatic start to the summit, both China and the US have achieved what they came to Alaska to do: clarify their positions and intentions, and determine what can be achieved in the near future.
One of the most important achievements for China was the USA’s adherence to the “one-China policy”, the foundation of a peaceful bilateral relationship. The Beijing announcement after the summit stated that the American side had “reaffirmed its one-China policy on the Taiwan question”. That likely means that the two countries have come to a common understanding that China will not take Taiwan by force as long as the US continues to keep Taiwan under control.
Another point that China won was the agreement to start talks on the reopening of the Chinese Consulate General in Houston and the US Consulate General in Chengdu. The shutdown of the Chinese consulate in Houston was a political move by the Trump administration and one that President Biden could easily undo without much domestic opposition. It is a low hanging fruit for the normalization of relations, and Beijing hopes that a summit between Xi and Biden on this matter could bring symbolic success for both sides.
Beijing’s statement also indicates that both sides want to work on easing travel restrictions, possibly through a mutual vaccine recognition program. Specifically, it means that the countries will organize vaccinations for diplomatic personnel. China’s “Spring Vaccination Initiative,” unveiled by Foreign Minister Wang Yi in early March, stipulates that China’s consulates would help Chinese citizens abroad get either Chinese or local vaccines.
Taken together, these developments indicate that a vaccine cooperation between the US and China will come about in 2021.
Cooperation in the field of climate change
Cooperation on climate change is where both Washington and Beijing can claim victory. Beijing’s announcement states that both sides will work together on climate and form a bilateral working group – it is the only concrete exchange mechanism that was promised as a result of the meeting.
This means that John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua, China’s newly appointed Special Envoy on Climate Change, who reports directly to Xi, will be in frequent contact. In addition, the Earth Day Summit, scheduled for April 20-22, will be an opportunity for Xi and Biden to talk to each other.
Foreign Minister Blinken traveled from Alaska to Brussels to attend the NATO ministerial meeting, which will take place from March 22nd to 25th. His shuttle diplomacy, which began in Japan and Korea and ends in Europe – with the meeting with China in Anchorage in between – has made Biden’s foreign policy for Beijing quite clear. Indeed, China may perceive such a pronounced effort by Washington to revive regional alliances as a sign of weakness and a loss of confidence in the United States.
In parallel, Xi Jinping gave a televised video address to the Colombian public on March 21, highlighting the three shipments of Chinese vaccines to Bogotá. His speech was likely designed to contrast China’s strength with the US’s weakness.
“Reset” relations after the Trump era
While both delegations return to their capitals and work on preparing a meeting between Biden and Xi, there will be a gradual “reset” of bilateral relations in the second quarter of 2021. The Earth Day summit in April gives Xi and Biden the opportunity to focus on climate cooperation without being distracted by other topics.
The acceleration of the vaccination campaigns in both countries could meanwhile lead to a relaxation of travel restrictions as early as July. Both sides could also signal their willingness to reopen the consulates in Houston and Chengdu, although it could take much longer to actually reopen them.
Trade relations are likely to remain on a stable course as Beijing has not yet signaled that it would abandon its purchase commitments from the Trump-era “phase one” trade deal. The White House under Biden will also downplay the issue of bilateral trade – only a continued review of the supply chains of medical products in the USA can be expected.
Dividing the global tech ecosystem into two parts
The technology rivalry between the two states was not a major issue in Alaska. It is expected that the US will continue to implement the Trump-era export control regime, while showing more leniency to US companies that rely on the Chinese market.
Both countries are now aware that the global tech ecosystem will split into two spheres, with China and the US securing their respective, but overlapping spheres of influence. Rather than advocating for Chinese companies to enter global markets, Beijing will provide more political support for basic research and domestic innovation, and further strengthen competitiveness in sectors where Chinese companies already have the lead.
In the long term, the scope for improvement – or deterioration – in US-China relations under the Biden administration is limited. With the meeting in Alaska as the setting for the redrawing of boundaries, the bilateral relationship could enter a phase of stabilization.
Given the challenges of the upswing after the Covid pandemic, both sides will refrain from introducing drastic measures that could further endanger the economy. It is likely that the two great powers will take small steps to reassure their regional partners that they are capable of maintaining a peaceful relationship.
