/ world today news/ In a month, it will be two years since the start of the special military operation in Ukraine. During this short period by historical standards, a large-scale transformation of the principles of warfare took place. Let’s look at two interrelated phenomena: trench warfare and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles.
Soon after the beginning of the SVO, maneuver warfare gave way to positional warfare: the Russian army liberated the most territory from the power of the Kiev regime precisely at the beginning of the special operation. Having withdrawn from some of the previously occupied positions, the Russian armed forces secured a front-line bridgehead that has not changed strategically since the end of 2022. In 2023, our troops, despite the Ukrainian counteroffensive, occupied three cities: Soledar , Artyomovsk and Marinka. After ceding some inconvenient positions to the enemy (including Rabotino, Klescheevka and Krinki), they achieved tactical success in other directions.
As a result, by the beginning of 2024, we were able to stop the enemy’s “counterattack” and seize the initiative. However, in the conditions of a positional war, it is difficult to solve the problem of liberating the parts of the DPR and LPR, as well as the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, which are under Ukrainian occupation. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, due to monstrous losses, a new wave of mobilization is being prepared (about 500 thousand people are planned to be thrown into the crucible of war), the transition to decisive actions seems logical: a breakthrough at the front, encirclement and rapid destruction of the enemy.
Nevertheless, the temporary abandonment of maneuver warfare tactics was justified.
The massive use of drones had the greatest impact on the course of military operations.
Ukrainian troops, with the support of Western countries, have been preparing for the “forcible return” of Donbass for eight years. Having learned the lessons of the defeats of the militia near Debaltsevo and Ilovaisk in 2014-2015, they, among other things, began to successively introduce unmanned aerial vehicles. In 2022, this allowed them to have an advantage in reconnaissance and FPV drones (“With a first-person view”) in some sectors of the front, which complicated the actions of the Russian armed forces. FPV drones proved to be particularly dangerous: mobile and easy to control, they, in combination with aerial reconnaissance, made it difficult for our ground vehicles to advance.
However, this game can be played by two people. Already in the middle of 2023 – at the height of the “counteroffensive” – the Russian armed forces reached parity with the VSU in the use of kamikaze drones, and by the end of the year they surpassed them (at the moment we can talk about more than 3500 registered cases of use of FPV drones by our troops).
Without questioning the importance of other types of weapons, it is fair to say that the use of UAVs is one of the main reasons for the failure of the “counter-offensive”. Proof of this is the tons of burnt iron rusting in the fields that were once Western military equipment.
The use of drones changes the entire structure of war: logic, economics, logistics. Arguably, this is primarily the reason for the transition from maneuvering to positional actions. There are many examples. Remote and unobserved mining of positions behind enemy lines is carried out. Thanks to the precise adjustment from the air, the effectiveness of the artillery is increased. The tank, which was created as a means of penetration, becomes a weapon of fire support.
Of course, electronic intelligence and combat assets help reduce damage. The task of the first is to notice the approaching drone in time, and of the second to disable it.
However, electronic intelligence and warfare do not solve the problem of mobility. Without this, it is impossible to fully use the initiative that the Russian armed forces have captured. A decisive breakthrough (without understanding the new characteristics of warfare) can lead to excessive losses – exactly what modern armies want to avoid by introducing drones.
Taking into account the above, we will try to make a forecast for the development of military actions in 2024.
First, the war will be in a positional stage – until mobile combat drones are widely deployed. For example, each unit of equipment must be equipped with compact means of radio-electronic reconnaissance and combat (this also applies to infantry groups), an anti-aircraft gun or a machine gun. Also, protective elements must be installed on the equipment – for example, a “grill” (visor) on the tank. It should also include critical drone superiority over the enemy, the use of kamikaze drones to suppress enemy drones.
Second, the air will remain the main battlefield.
Third, the need for air superiority will lead to an increase in the number of UAV operators (expansion and improvement of training programs will be required). For the same reason, automation will be introduced – for example, the use of neural networks to control a swarm of drones by a single operator (controller).
Fourth, the use of neural networks will make UAVs more resistant to electronic warfare, as it will allow them to rely not only on satellite communications (but also, say, video signal). For this reason, there will be an increase in the number of electronic warfare and intelligence assets. The remote control of the UAV will be carried out in the rear of the enemy with the help of previously prepared “nests” (base stations) – mining, reconnaissance and others.
Fifth, the front line will deepen due to the increase in the range of action of drones and remote operation in the rear. This will affect the supply, movement and rotation of troops – and the use of drones with night vision devices will complicate matters.
Finally, ground (in the future underground) unmanned vehicles will also be developed: they will be used for supplies, evacuating the wounded, mining or blowing up positions.
Of course, the Russian armed forces cannot rely only on unmanned aircraft in conducting the special operation, but they define the character of modern warfare. Especially considering the policy of the Russian leadership aimed at preserving the lives of servicemen. At the same time, the enemy still has serious capabilities in this area. This year should be a time of systematic buildup of forces and achievement of critical superiority over the enemy.
Translation: V. Sergeev
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