On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched an offensive on the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (RAHK or Artsakh), a territory of Armenian population under blockade since December 2022. Present since the end of the 2020 war, Russian soldiers have remained observers , unable to prevent the forced displacement of some 100,000 people, almost the entire population of the enclave. On September 28, the RAHK announced its dissolution, scheduled for January 1, 2024, after more than three decades of unrecognized existence.
Populated for three millennia by Armenians, Nagorno-Karabakh illustrates how a security vacuum gives way to the frozen conflicts of the past thanks to the war in Ukraine. After the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, the short-lived Federation of Transcaucasia (April-May 1918) gave birth to three states: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. None agree on the outline of their respective borders, while their populations are far from being ethnically homogeneous.
A 100 year war
Survivor of the 1915 genocide perpetrated by Ottoman Turkey, Armenia is trying to assert its sovereignty over the regions of Nakhitchevan, Zangezour and Nagorno-Karabakh, which are disputed by Turkish-speaking Azerbaijan. In 1920, the South Caucasus was Sovietized, but territorial disputes were far from being resolved. Then at the head of the Commissariat for Nationalities, Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) decided a year later by granting Nagorno-Karabakh, populated by 95% Armenians, to Soviet Azerbaijan. For the Kremlin, it is up to weakening Armenian and Azerbaijani nationalisms on the outskirts of the former Russian Empire by regulating manageable conflict while giving a pledge of friendship to anti-imperialist Turkey which had not yet chosen its side. .
Rich in oil, Azerbaijan receives Nakhichevan, gradually emptied of its Armenians under the Treaties of Moscow and Kars, concluded in 1921 between the USSR and Ankara. Two years later, the province was given the status of an autonomous region integrated into Azerbaijan. Cut off from the motherland, Nagorno-Karabakh suffers a double colonial yoke: Azerbaijani and Soviet and, on several occasions (in the 1960s and 1970s), it attempts to assert its rights to attachment to Armenia. The perestroika of the 1980s was a test of democracy: the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous region voted in February 1988 for reunification with Armenia.
Pogroms followed in Sumgaït and Baku, with the aim of encouraging the Armenians to abandon their project. The conflict escalates and takes on a high-intensity dimension which causes population clashes: 400,000 Armenians flee Azerbaijan and 100,000 Azerbaijanis leave Armenia for fear of suffering reprisals. On August 28, 1991, Azerbaijan proclaimed its independence and removed the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh. On September 2, the latter in turn declared its independence. A war ensued between the Azerbaijani army and the self-defense forces of Nagorno-Karabakh supported by Armenia which, officially, has not declared war on its neighbor nor recognized the independence of this republic in order to avoid not appear like an aggressor state. This means that Armenia will not be mentioned in any way by the UN resolutions demanding the withdrawal of the forces which have taken control of portions of Azerbaijani territories surrounding the enclave. This will fuel anti-Armenian resentment for decades to come. The ceasefire signed on May 16, 1994 ratifies the military advantage of the Armenian side, but does not resolve anything in substance.
Azerbaijan’s violent “revenge”
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict opposes two antagonistic concepts of international law: the territorial integrity defended by Azerbaijan and the self-determination of a people to live in security on their ancestral lands. The inertia and maximalist visions of successive leaders have weakened Armenia’s diplomatic positions, while the balance of power shifts in favor of Azerbaijan, which inaugurated the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan gas and oil pipeline in 2002 and prepares its revenge.
Unlike Armenia, which entrusted the keys to its security to Russia within the framework of two bilateral defense agreements signed in 1992 and 1997, Azerbaijan is diversifying its strategic partnerships, obtaining both Russian weapons and by strengthening its alliance with Turkey, Pakistan, Israel and the United Kingdom, which is the leading Western direct investor. THE rounds negotiations under the aegis of the Minsk group having been unsuccessful, Baku launched a blitzkrieg in April 2016 against the Armenian positions in Nagorno-Karabakh. This lasts four days and is stopped by Russia. Armenia, bloodless, realizes the extent of the imbalance in terms of the balance of power (demographic, economic, military). Most of the strategic sectors of its economy have come under Russian control, increasing almost total dependence.
In the spring of 2018, Armenia changed its face thanks to a “velvet revolution” led by Nikol Pashinian. With him, a large part of civil society overthrows the post-Soviet regime of Serge Sargsyan (2007-2018), originally from Nagorno-Karabakh and whose constitutional reform of 2015 had accentuated the authoritarian turn of his power. However, Yerevan’s rapprochement with the European Union (EU) and the United States displeases Moscow. In the summer of 2020, clashes took place on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, and Turkish-Azerbaijani maneuvers took place in Nakhichevan. At the end of September, Baku launched an offensive which, after 44 days, resulted in the capture of 75% of the territories formerly controlled by the Armenians. The RAHK gradually loses all political links with Yerevan and passes into the orbit of Moscow, which deploys an interposition force of 2,000 men.
Victorious on a military level at the cost of some 3,000 deaths, Azerbaijan does not consider itself satisfied. Its war objectives consisted of annihilating the independent republic, forcing Yerevan to cede an extraterritorial corridor in southern Armenia in order to achieve a junction with Turkey via Nakhichevan, and opening the file of the Azerbaijani enclaves of Armenia with a view to concluding a peace treaty on the basis of mutual recognition of the territorial integrity of the two States. If Yerevan entrusts the destiny of Nagorno-Karabakh to Russia, the issue of the corridor remains a red line. The Azerbaijanis launch a hybrid war against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh by dividing their territory and harassing their population; but also against Armenia. In spring 2021 and September 2022, its sovereign territory was attacked by the Baku army. France pushed the EU to intervene and obtained the sending of a mission of civilian observers deployed along the border on the Armenian side. Symbolic presence, but sufficient to irritate Russia which, in the context of the war in Ukraine, has increased its links with Azerbaijan for the export of hydrocarbons.
Armenia, victim of empires
A strategic partnership which does not say its name is sealed between Moscow and Baku, while in Yerevan, the absence of intervention by Russia and its allies from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to defend its territory fuels frustration and the conviction that we must turn to other partners. The EU, which imports gas from Azerbaijan, brings together the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders on several occasions, and pushes Yerevan to agree to let go of Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for hypothetical aid. On the strategic level, no Western country is offering military assistance to Armenia, while Azerbaijan is increasing its pressure on Nagorno-Karabakh by imposing, in December 2022, a blockade which is suffocating its economy and starving its population. Nine months later, it’s the final blow. Baku seizes the territory in coordination with Russia, which does not intervene, and imprisons most of its civilian and military leaders. The EU and the United States are content to condemn the offensive.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian does not react, aware that a response would lead to catastrophic consequences for his country and calls for ethnic cleansing. In the space of 48 hours, almost all of the 120,000 Armenians in the RAHK left their homeland, using the Lachin corridor in appalling psychological and physical conditions. With Nagorno-Karabakh abandoned, Armenia is not yet free of the Azerbaijani threat. Azerbaijan occupies 150 square kilometers of Armenian territories, strategic heights which increase the vulnerability of the south of the country, a mountainous strip where Turks and Azerbaijanis intend to create an extraterritorial corridor to facilitate the transit of hydrocarbons and freight.
This is a red line for Iran, which considers of vital interest the maintenance of its dyad with Armenia through which norias of trucks pass every day and has made it known that it will not tolerate a change of its border for the benefit of the Ankara-Baku axis. Weakened, Russia is not opposed provided that it maintains control of this corridor. In this situation, Armenia is moving closer to the West. On October 3, 2023, Yerevan ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the casualty of war for Russia, which encourages the pro-Russian Armenian opposition to overthrow Nikol Pashinian. The same day, the visit to Armenia of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Catherine Colonna, made it possible to renew France’s commitment to defending the territorial integrity of Armenia, but Paris does not want to adopt sanctions against ‘Azerbaijan. Point of friction of the Russian, Turkish and Iranian tectonic plates, Armenia, the weak link in the Caucasus, risks being the victim of the geopolitics of empires.
**Given the changing geopolitical landscape in the Caucasus, marked by Russia’s waning influence and the increasing involvement of non-regional actors, what new strategies could be employed by international organizations to prevent further escalation and promote a long-term peaceful resolution to the conflict?**
## Open-Ended Discussion Questions on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
This article provides a detailed account of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its impact on Armenia. Here are some open-ended questions designed to stimulate discussion and explore different perspectives:
**I. International Law and Self-Determination:**
1. The article presents the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a clash between “two antagonistic concepts of international law.” How can these differing perspectives on territorial integrity and self-determination be reconciled?
2. To what extent should international organizations like the UN play a role in mediating such conflicts, and what are the limitations of their intervention?
3. Can self-determination be exercised while respecting the territorial integrity of a sovereign state? How can a balance be struck between these competing principles?
**II. Shifting Geopolitical Dynamics:**
4. The article highlights Armenia’s reliance on Russia for security and Azerbaijan’s diversification of its strategic partnerships. How does this asymmetry in alliances influence the conflict dynamics?
5. What are the implications of Azerbaijan’s strengthening ties with Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, and the United Kingdom for regional stability?
6. How is the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war impacting the delicate geopolitical balance in the Caucuses and the Nagorno-Karabakh issue specifically?
**III. The Role of International Actors:**
7. Should the European Union and the United States take a more active role in mediating the conflict and providing aid to Armenia? What are the potential benefits and drawbacks of their intervention?
8. How can the international community better address the humanitarian crisis arising from the conflict, such as the displacement of Armenians from areas controlled by Azerbaijan?
9. Is there a path towards a lasting peace agreement that satisfies the concerns of both Armenia and Azerbaijan? What concessions would each side need to make?
**IV. The Future of Armenia:**
10. How has the conflict impacted Armenia’s socio-economic development? What challenges does the country face in rebuilding its economy and society after years of conflict?
11. How can Armenia balance its strategic partnerships with Russia and the West to secure its national interests?
12. What is the long-term outlook for Armenia in the Caucasus region, considering its complex geopolitical environment and the legacy of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
These open-ended questions encourage participants to delve
deeper into the complexities of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and explore alternative perspectives on its causes, consequences, and potential solutions.
