The dynamics that led to the outcome of the Ligurian elections is very evident, trying to understand the lesson that can be drawn from it is much less simple. On the first aspect, the diagnosis is easy: the opposition camp, which had an advantage of over 22 thousand in June, now finds itself 8,500 votes behind. The defections are that of the voters of the centrist area (from 8% to 2%) towards Bucci, and above all that of the M5S which had 10.2% and almost 65 thousand votes, and which now obtains 4.6% and 26 thousand votes.
So far the numbers: then the interpretations begin, especially since it concerns the M5S. Contingent reasons certainly also played a role (the final showdown with Grillo could have been postponed), but we are faced with a structural fact, which however no longer constitutes a justification, but rather an aggravating circumstance. The dimensions of the collapse in Liguria are entirely similar to those recorded in the other three regional elections held this year: in Basilicata (from 25% of the 2022 elections to 7.7%); in Abruzzo (from 18.4% to 7%) and also in Sardinia, where the M5S candidate also won (from 21.8% to 7.8%). Yet, if polls are to be believed, on a national level the M5S seems to be holding around 10%. How to explain this gap? There is no need to recall here the characteristics of the M5S electorate, which we have focused on on other occasions. Everything still valid; but now another element must be added: the strategy pursued by Conte in recent months has proven ineffective, based on a cautious relocation of the M5S on the “progressive” side, but at the same time on the meticulous search for distinctions and on a continuous stop and go in relationships with possible allies.
The idea was perhaps that, in this way, the historical distrust of M5S voters towards other parties (and towards the Democratic Party, in particular) could be diluted. It didn’t work: the effects were those of a disorientation of the M5S electorate (now perhaps aggravated by Grillo’s aggression) and a perception of indeterminacy regarding the actual position of the party. When in doubt, many voters abstain, or disperse in various directions (this was also seen in Liguria), especially when the stakes are not perceived as relevant and the personal appeal of the leader cannot weigh them.
We must hope that the next “constituent” assembly of the M5S can clarify something, in the very interest of building an alternative. Yes, because by now it should be clear that, if the M5S does not keep its voters, they will not rush to take refuge in the welcoming arms of the Democratic Party or AVS: the fracture that has developed in the last decade is too deep to think that it could easily mended. It is a sign of political blindness, even on the left, to hope that the M5S will definitively implode: the left would not be the one to pick up the pieces.
But if the strategy of the M5S did not work, it cannot even be said that that of the Democratic Party worked completely: yes, of course, the party is recovering, the votes are arriving, the Democratic Party is a robust party, but in a context in which it does not have a stable coalition (if we exclude the relationship with AVS) and therefore the indication of the political-strategic horizon appears weak. The secretary’s attempt was to make a field of alliances credible thanks to the patient search for convergences on individual issues. But it was like Penelope’s canvas: as soon as a theme of agreement was found, immediately afterwards some incident broke out, which ruined every message of cohesion.
Even in post-election interviews, Schlein insists on this line, indicating five points (health, school, work, industrial policies, rights): everything is right, but what is not convincing about this approach? The feeling is that it is not enough to put the various issues one after the other, and that an overall vision is missing, capable of truly uniting and mobilizing the forces interested in a change. A government proposal, certainly, but based on a critical reading of Italian society and its structural nodes, and on an action that knows how to identify, and then try to recompose, the social subjects (today very fragmented) that in this proposal are can recognise. The sore point, however, here is twofold: in order to be able to propose to others a vision that holds together the individual programmatic aspects, the Democratic Party must first have its own coherent one (and it is certainly not just a problem today), and that he chooses what to say on many issues on which reticence or ambiguity still appears to be strong: first of all, international politics and disarmament, but then also institutional policies, or some major economic-social issues such as tax reforms aimed at a radical redistribution of income.
And then, the party-instrument: an organizational conference was announced last year. It seems to me that it has disappeared from the horizon a bit: it would be a mistake. And not only because, as it is, the party machine is inadequate (for example, in ensuring some presence in the many marginal areas of the country), but also because what is most needed is not working: offices, channels and procedures. of debate and political and intellectual elaboration. Otherwise, the vision, one’s own and the one to be discussed with others, vanishes into thin air.
