Bundeswehr chief Carsten Breuer fears that Putin’s army could soon be stronger than ever before. Is he right?
Russian President Vladimir Putin during a visit to the arms manufacturer Uralvagonzavod in February this year.
Imago
The Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022 radically changed Western security policy. NATO is developing new operational and defense plans for Europe, modernizing its armed forces and training how to proceed in the event of an attack by the regime in Moscow. Almost all alliance states have increased their military budgets, and some are discussing reintroducing conscription.
However, the rearmament is directed against an enemy that has been suffering massive losses in Ukraine for a good two and a half years. Russia’s army is wearing itself out in the fight, especially in the Donbass. Nevertheless, in the summer the highest-ranking soldier in the German army, Carsten Breuer, warned that time was running out. Russia could be ready for war against NATO in five to eight years. Is that really realistic, given the bloodletting of Russian troops in Ukraine?
According to various estimates, Vladimir Putin’s armed forces have lost around 10,000 to 15,000 vehicles since February 2022, including more than 3,000 battle tanks. This number is higher than the number of tanks that Russia’s armored forces had before the war began. The publicly available figures on casualties and wounded also vary widely. The Ministry of Defense in London recently estimated the number at 610,000, while a study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington recently estimated 350,000 dead and injured soldiers.
The question is not just how quickly Russia can compensate for these losses. In view of the statement by Bundeswehr chief Breuer, it is more a question of what Putin will equip his army for in the future. Is it to attack a NATO country, such as Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia, with “little green men” like in Crimea in 2014 and test the alliance’s willingness to wage a major war? Is it to annex Georgia or Moldova? Is it to conquer Ukraine completely? Or is it a mixture of everything?
Russia’s lessons from the war
An answer to this question could possibly be found next year. Then the government in Moscow wants to adopt a long-term procurement program for the military. This is the conclusion of the Carnegie study “Russian Military Reconstitution 2030”. The authors expect that Russia will rely primarily on new technologies to modernize its armed forces. This primarily means drones, electronic and cyber warfare.
But Russia is already learning lessons from the war in Ukraine and putting them into action. On the one hand, the losses in Ukraine are to be replaced, and on the other hand, the armed forces are to be expanded beyond the pre-war level. In the coming years, Moscow has the following goals for the army:
- Modernization of equipment: The Russian leadership is seeking to modernize its military equipment, as many of the weapons systems currently in use, especially those from the Ukraine war, are outdated.
- Increase in troop strength: Russia plans to expand its army to up to 1.5 million soldiers. This expansion will require significant investments in recruitment and training.
- Logistics and production capacities: A key goal is to increase the capacity of the Russian defense industry. Despite increases in production that have already taken place, there are still bottlenecks, especially in the production of modern weapons.
- Modern Warfare: Russia has recognized that modern warfare and success on the battlefield also depend on technological capabilities. The focus here is on the further development of electronic warfare, drones and cyber warfare capabilities.
Despite the enormous losses, Russia is gaining valuable experience in the war against Ukraine, not least in high-intensity combat. This experience puts it ahead of all Western armies, and it will very likely be incorporated into future military strategies and the development of the armed forces. Where developments will lead in concrete terms will only become clear in the coming years. But it is already clear today how Russia wants to equip the individual branches of its army.
Nuclear forces
The country has been modernizing its nuclear forces for years. This includes the development of hypersonic missiles and new intercontinental missiles. In Russian military doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons is considered justified when the existence of the state is threatened. This continues to affect the debates about arms deliveries to Ukraine, particularly in the USA and Germany.
There, these doctrines are interpreted to mean that Putin and his regime could be prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Even if German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has not yet said so, his rejection of the delivery of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine is presumably based not least on the concern that Russia could see its existence threatened if Ukraine uses these weapons and resort to nuclear weapons.
On Wednesday, Putin tightened this doctrine. At a meeting of the National Security Council, he declared that in future an attack on Russia by a non-nuclear power, but with the participation or support of a nuclear power, would be considered a joint attack on the Russian Federation. Putin was obviously referring to the Ukraine and their western allies. Russia, the President continued, could also consider using nuclear weapons if it were to be massively attacked from the air.
Conventional Armed Forces
The war in Ukraine has shown the Russian leadership that the army is outdated in many respects. This applies to a large proportion of the conventional weapons systems themselves, but also to the organization of the armed forces and their logistics. In the coming years, the army in particular is to be modernized. In the current war, the majority of battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles now come from depots with equipment from the Soviet era. In the future, the army plans to acquire thousands of new vehicles, missile and artillery systems, not only for heavy armored units, but also for lighter, more mobile units.
In addition to further modernizing the air force and air defense, Russia also plans to expand its navy. The intention to invest in the submarine fleet in particular has been known for some time. The underwater units are not only an important part of nuclear deterrence, but can also be used for conventional attacks with cruise missiles and medium-range missiles. One of the navy’s main goals is to secure a permanent presence in the Baltic and North Seas, as well as in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. These seas, and increasingly also the Arctic, are important for militarily underpinning Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions in the fight against the West.
Considerable difficulties
But despite all of Moscow’s grand plans to upgrade and modernize the army, the authors of the Carnegie study also indicate that there are significant difficulties. The war costs a lot of money, not only for equipment, weapons and ammunition, but also for personnel. Like the West, Russia is increasingly lacking men fit for military service for demographic reasons. The armed forces’ recruitment target also competes with the high demand for labor in industry, which is suffering from the fact that many well-educated young men have left the country in recent years.
In order to counteract the shortage of new recruits, the army has massively increased the salaries and other financial benefits for soldiers since the invasion of Ukraine. The Carnegie study says that it will be difficult to maintain this level in the long term, especially if the size of the army is to grow by 200,000 to 1.5 million.
At the same time, the authors continue, the sanctions are making it increasingly difficult for Russia to access global markets and technologies. This is affecting the production of modern weapons and modern equipment. In addition, there are economic bottlenecks, corruption and structural problems in the Russian arms industry that could hinder the ambitious goals. For example, arms manufacturers are working at capacity limits. In order to increase production beyond the current level, Russia plans to build new arms factories and convert civilian production facilities into those for military purposes.
Moscow appears determined
Despite the major challenges, Russia appears determined not only to compensate for its losses in Ukraine, but also to massively expand and modernize its army in the coming years. The war shows that the country and Vladimir Putin’s regime are prepared to make great sacrifices for their geopolitical ambitions.
Moscow has more plans for its army than “just” waging war in Ukraine. This is also shown by the latest budget plans. They envisage a further increase in military spending. The more the regime bets on the military, the more difficult it will be to get out of the arms spiral. The economy and the labor market are increasingly dependent on the high salaries of soldiers and in the arms industry.
It is not yet clear whether the head of the German armed forces is right and whether Russia is really ready for war against NATO in five to eight years. The Carnegie authors conclude that it will be crucial for the West to anticipate Russia’s progress in reconstructing its military and its future direction in good time. There is a simple reason for this: the principle of military deterrence pursued by NATO only works if it does not fall behind technologically in any crucial field.
