The West must rethink its relationship with Russia. Even if a ceasefire is reached, the confrontation with the country is by no means over.
How long will the war last? Ukrainian soldiers in the Sumi region near the Russian border.
Thomas Peter / Reuters
Even after more than two and a half years, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues to shape the debate about European security – how could it be otherwise.
In February 2022, Putin crossed a red line and openly challenged the European security order. Central principles of this order are the inviolability of borders between sovereign nation states and the prohibition of aggressive war.
Russia has even gone beyond a war of aggression and is waging a war of conquest, which involves the annexation of another country’s territory. The declared aim of the war is the end of the existence of an independent Ukrainian nation and a sovereign Ukrainian state.
In doing so, Russia is attacking the foundations on which Europe’s security, prosperity and freedom are based – an order that was built in Western Europe after the Second World War and adopted by the east of the continent after the end of the Cold War, with NATO and the EU as its central pillars.
The war radically changes Europe’s relationship with Russia. The idea of a close partnership, which has shaped the West’s Russia policy since the end of the Cold War, has clearly failed. There is still no coherent new Russia policy. For the time being, Europe, under Washington’s leadership, has agreed on a dual approach: support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia.
How will the relationship with Russia develop in the coming years under these conditions? Four scenarios are conceivable: a direct conflict with Russia, permanent tensions, modus vivendi and a regime change in Russia. The time horizon is the year 2030, i.e. a medium-term future.
1. Open conflict with Russia
This scenario is the least likely, but at the same time it is extremely important for the present – because it describes the possible future that current actions must absolutely prevent.
Russia is significantly rearming, investing heavily in its armed forces, and is supported in this by a number of partners: from China, in particular with dual-use goods, from Iran with drones and ballistic missiles, from North Korea with ammunition and other war-critical goods.
At the same time, Putin has repeatedly made it clear that he is not only concerned with Ukraine, but with a dominant position in Eastern and Central Europe.
A frontal attack by Russia is the least likely scenario. However, it is possible to provoke an incident, and the Baltic states are a good place for this. Russia could invade under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians. This would force the NATO states to either respond militarily or, by doing nothing, reveal the invalidity of the NATO protection promise – and thus weaken European security. In the long term, this would open up further opportunities for Russia.
Moscow could take this step if it is provoked by Western weakness – or the appearance of it. Disunity in the West and a new Russia policy, for example after a ceasefire in Ukraine, which relies on new offers to Moscow, could be seen as weakness.
How this scenario might develop would depend on the reaction of the West. Decisive, rapid resistance could contain the conflict, keeping it at the level of an “incident”. Longer hesitation, on the other hand, would allow Russia to drive a wedge into the alliance – between the countries in the east and north of Europe that are determined to stop Russian expansion, even at a high price, and those countries that are counting on a power-political compromise with Russia.
2. Permanent tensions
A second scenario for the next few years would be the continuation of tensions at the current level. Russia continues to attack Ukraine, there are periods of increased warfare and then periods of calm, possibly in the form of a ceasefire. But both sides still see a chance of winning the war. That is why they are not giving up.
At the same time, Russia is doubling down on its hybrid warfare against the West, using disinformation and propaganda as well as occasional covert attacks. It is exerting particularly high pressure on Georgia and Moldova and is continuing the creeping annexation of Belarus.
The West remains hesitant in its support of Ukraine: it gives enough to ensure that Ukraine does not give up and can continue to resist Russia, but too little to ensure that it can win the war.
3. A new modus vivendi
It is possible that the West will fully support Ukraine. Following a ceasefire, Ukraine would be secured militarily by the West to such an extent that it would be hopeless for Russia to continue the war.
The West is building up the Ukrainian armed forces and supplying what is needed. Because Ukraine now has reliable security guarantees, investors are coming to the country, refugees are returning, and Ukraine is recovering. At the same time, Georgia and Moldova are being protected against a Russian takeover.
This means that Russia loses the military option in its western neighborhood. It can continue to conduct hybrid operations, but it will be deterred because the West is strengthening its armed forces and offering itself as a reliable partner to the countries in the region.
Tensions continue to exist between Russia and the West. But the clear demarcation of boundaries also allows the West to make offers to Russia – without compromising its clear position in the area of security and defense.
4. Regime change in Russia
The fourth scenario is unlikely. A successor to Putin would probably continue on his course. However, it is unclear whether he would soon have a similar level of power and be able to control the country as effectively as Putin. It could be that a successor to Putin would not have the capacity to worry about conquering neighboring countries because he would first have to consolidate power in his own country.
It is possible that there will not only be a change in leadership, but also a change of regime – and that more liberal positions will prevail again. There could be a thaw in Moscow, as there was after Stalin’s death in 1953, and thus opportunities for an opening towards the West.
In such a case, the West would have to make efforts to make Russia new offers of cooperation and integration – without turning a blind eye to questions of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Russia’s neighbors, as was the case after the end of the Cold War. The prerequisite for cooperation must be a clear renunciation of imperial ambitions.
Influence of the West
The West must prepare for a range of possible scenarios. What happens in Russia cannot be controlled from the outside. But the West is in a position to shape the strategic environment in which Russia operates, which in turn has an impact on Russia itself.
The more clearly the West rejects Moscow’s attempt to regain a dominant position of power in Eastern and Central Europe through military force and hybrid warfare, the more likely Russia is to give up on this project. Because the country has fewer power resources than Europe.
Defense and deterrence are central to Europe’s self-assertion against the new Russian imperialism. Secure borders make good neighbors. If Europe wants to live in peace with an expansionist Russia, it must show toughness and determination and invest in its armed forces. This cannot be achieved with diplomacy, friendly words and concessions, as the past few years have shown time and again. Europe must shape the balance of power in its favor.
