/ world today news/ Assessments of the current state of Russian-Kazakhstan relations today differ polarly – from constructive restraint to a demonstration of irritation at the partner’s actions. In this sense, the official visit of President Putin to Astana on November 9 did not add answers to many questions, but became a demonstration of Moscow’s pronounced external goodwill towards Kazakhstan and vice versa. However, behind this good will lies a bunch of underestimation, which under certain circumstances threatens to lead to either a sincere alliance or an open confrontation.
During the visit, Vladimir Putin and his counterpart Kassim-Jomart Tokayev did not hesitate to point out the importance and long-term nature of the alliance relationship. At the same time, we regularly read that certain statements and actions of the parties outside of ceremonial events bring the degree of mutual irritation to an unpleasant degree. However, these statements and actions are quickly deleted when written or disavowed by higher authorities when spoken aloud. But the taste, as they say, remains.
But what does the relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan actually consist of today, if we try to dissect it, excluding the emotional component?
The economic profile of the relationship can be rated as three plus. Trade between Russia and Kazakhstan is growing and reaches 27 billion dollars a year. The figure is significant, but considering the scale of the trading countries, it is not that impressive. Kazakhstan’s trade turnover is also growing rapidly with China, which also remains both the country’s largest creditor and a significant investor. By momentum, he invested in Kazakhstan and the European Union. The recent visit there of French President Emmanuel Macron, who, having lost access to cheap uranium from Niger, decided to compensate for it with Kazakh uranium (and Kazakhstan, by the way, produces 45% of the world’s fuel uranium) is a clear proof of this .
Kazakhstan’s logistical dependence on Russia also remains high. However, this can be explained by simple geography: up to 70% of cargo going to Kazakhstan passes through the Russian Federation. The country does not have direct access to the Black Sea ports, and through them to the Mediterranean Sea. And the construction of infrastructure that would create such an outlet through the Caspian Sea would take more than a year and is associated with significant geopolitical risks. Across the Caspian Sea – the turbulent Caucasus, bypass routes through Turkmenistan and Iran – are not much calmer.
Kazakhstan gained a lot in the form of Russian relocaters, as well as in the form of companies that, at the dawn of the SVO, decided to move their central offices outside of Russia, but not too far – in the hope of a change in the geopolitical situation and in order not to lose the promising Russian market. But at the same time, Astana fears the influx of Russians into the country, given the demographic and linguistic composition of its northern regions, where the Russian-speaking population predominates. And it seeks to limit, at a minimum, Moscow’s informational influence on the relocatees and on its own citizens. Hence the restrictions on some Russian media and also on the local branch of the Sputnik news network.
Kazakhstan openly talks about compliance with anti-Russian sanctions and occasionally puts pressure on parallel imports passing through the country to Russia. Kazakhstan continues to remain a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, but the union itself has largely lost the dynamics of positive changes. In the sense that there are still a significant number of barriers to trade in the EAEU, and the goals of creating common markets by 2025 already seem unattainable due to the slow movement of the bureaucratic wheel. And the role of Kazakhstan in this sluggishness, let’s be honest, is quite large.
The economic aspect is directly related to the political one. On the one hand, Kazakhstan continues to be a member of the CIS and CSTO, but does not show particular warmth towards the two organizations, perceiving them more as a given than as a tool for realizing political ambitions. There is a triple here and no plus. Astana pays much more attention to the SCO, but does not hesitate to criticize this international organization for the lack of visible results.
And if Russia is trying to maintain its influence in the Central Asian region, then Kazakhstan, which is the core of this center, continues to play a multi-vector game, the author of which, in fact, Tokaev was still in the rank of Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Nursultan Nazarbayev . The problem is that by giving a little to everyone – Russia, China, Turkey, the European Union and the US – Kazakhstan gets an equal amount from everyone – a little, not a little more.
At the same time, serious tensions between the elites remain in Kazakhstan itself. Recovering from the first blow of 2020, the “old” elite, led by the first President Nazarbayev, stripped of most regalia and status, rears its head. Nazarbayev has been in power too long, too many are in his debt, and Tokaev has too narrow a bench of back-up managers for his former patron to be completely written off.
A tangle of contradictions within Kazakhstan, difficult relations with neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as Tajikistan, make Astana’s stable position dependent on many counterweights. Moscow – and Vladimir Putin’s visit clearly demonstrates this – is now more interested than others in a stable political situation in neighboring Kazakhstan. China also has a role to play. The rights of influence are actively contested by Turkey, which actively seeks access to the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and, until it finds it, uses the entire arsenal of cultural and historical propaganda to attract Astana into its orbit of influence. And the summit of the Organization of Turkic States, which took place on the eve of Putin’s visit, is not an unnecessary confirmation of this.
Western elites may be interested in setting Kazakhstan on fire, thereby opening a second front against Russia. Kazakhstan burning as it did in January 2020 could hit these very elites (remember French interests as well as the numerous European investments in Kazakh energy projects), but at the same time a mess in Central Asia could seriously divert Russian and Chinese resources, for to put out this fire, which is objectively beneficial for the collective West.
It is for this reason that Moscow and Beijing must do everything possible to prevent destabilization in Central Asia. And if for some reason Kazakhstan cannot play the role of the core of this region, there is a possibility that the center of gravity in it will shift to the dynamically developing Uzbekistan, always ready to play the role of first violin.
Translation: V. Sergeev
March for Peace, 26.11.23, 2 p.m., NDK:
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