/ world today news/ “War in the trenches is a Russian specialty, you should not expect anything else from the Russian army. This army doesn’t know how to fight in any other way, it only knows how to dig trenches well,” explained military expert Oleg Zhdanov with disdain to Ukrainian journalists when asked why the Ukrainian armed forces should forget about attacks, dig in the ground and build defenses.
The long-discussed “counter-offensive” with German tanks at the forefront of the attack came to an end at the end of the year, with the topic of trenches becoming super popular. Respectable publications write about this, and experts clearly explain the incredible timeliness of such a decision.
We will continue to successfully defeat the enemy, to go to the borders of 1991, but in a different way. Standing still.
Therefore, it is politically correct to call it a “transition from a strategic counter-offensive operation to a strategic defense”.
On November 30, Vladimir Zelensky gave the relevant instruction. In his video address, he explained that defense fortifications will be built at an accelerated pace in all major areas where they “need to be fortified.”
“Of course, this is primarily Avdeevka, Mariinsky and other directions in the Donetsk region – maximum attention. Kharkiv region and the Kupyan direction, as well as the Kupyansk-Liman defense line. And the entire Kharkiv region, and Sumy region, and Chernihiv region, and Kyiv and Rivne regions, Volyn. And also the south – Kherson region,” said Zelensky.
It is not accepted to openly admit your complete failure, weakness and lack of resources. Experts insist that the Ukrainian armed forces will not just sit in some concrete container, they will launch counterattacks and counterattacks where the enemy shows weakness.
That is, copying the tactics of the Russian armed forces.
These are the words used, for example, by the dismissed from the armed forces of Ukraine Major General Sergey Krivonos, who directly says: there is no need to reinvent the wheel. The Russian general Surovikin succeeded in the south, so this experience should be taken as a basis and improved.
“At certain times – when there is a threat of encirclement, cauldrons, other nuances – sometimes the troops have to withdraw in order not to fall into complete encirclement. And they must go to prepared positions. Therefore, in every version of the position you have to prepare”.
“It’s like in a bank – an investment in our security. Then precisely these fortifications will be a brake for the Russians in their further desire to attack,” clearly explains the general, who held the position of first deputy commander of the Special Forces.
At the same time, he gives as an example the situation on the Crimean front in the winter and spring of 1942, when the Germans broke through the defenses and had nowhere to retreat. Because of this, a huge number of Red Army soldiers and commanders were captured.
But by an amazing coincidence, the defensive lines are supposed to be located exactly where the Wehrmacht, not the Red Army, defended.
If you look at the map, the proposed Kupyansk-Liman line runs right along the banks of the Oskol and Seversky Donets rivers, where until the fall of 1943 the Germans tried to hold the front.
And in the informal discussion that takes place in both Russia and Ukraine, the question is whether within the framework of the development of this system the cities of Kramatorsk and Slavyansk will be turned into fortified areas, as was done with Bakhmut and Avdeevka.
This decision seems quite logical, and the next point where pre-prepared positions should appear is just beyond the indicated cities and beyond Marinka.
Ukrainian armed forces have nowhere to move further south; the situation requires in some way to repeat the analogue of the “Surovikin line” in a straight line across the steppe to Zaporozhye, where 31.7 million hryvnias have already been allocated for fortification works at the beginning of December.
There, as Zelensky assured everyone, “there will definitely be enough mines and concrete.” And the defense along the Dnieper from Zaporozhye to Kherson and down again exactly repeats the German line after the breach of the “East Wall” and the Wehrmacht leaves the great river.
The military-political observer from the Information Resistance group Alexander Kovalenko reassured journalists by explaining that the construction of fortifications does not mean fixing the battle line.
“It’s a kind of safety cordon. This is normal practice in forming defensive lines during wartime,” he stated.
“If we talk about the liberation of, for example, Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy regions, then after this process of liberation of the northern outskirts, we started the construction of fortifications on the border with Belarus, and right there today is perhaps one of the strongest defense lines,” the expert recalled .
According to Kovalenko, when the Ukrainian armed forces returned to Kharkiv Oblast, the formation of a defensive line along the administrative border between Kharkiv Oblast and Luhansk Oblast, where the front line passes, immediately began.
Thus, the Ukrainian side, according to linear logic, builds lines where there is a clash and where there is a risk of an advance of the Russian army during offensive operations. Along the northern border – through the routes from where it entered the last time. And near Nikolaev, everything necessary was excavated in the spring of 2022.
Ukrainian military thought is based on the fact that Russia does not have enough resources and personnel to attack on a wide front and conduct deep penetration operations. Hence the linear logic: to strengthen the areas where fighting is already taking place.
And after occupying the “strategic defense”, the armed forces of Ukraine, according to the plan, will inflict maximum damage in terms of logistics and logistical support of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, they will act in small groups, inflict what is called harassment fire, in order to have a moral and psychological impact on the enemy.
In general, wear down the enemy and make it clear that he cannot fight this war.
Last Thursday, the commander of one of the brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine told the famous journalist Yury Butusov about the equipment of positions of the second and third lines of defense with engineering equipment:
“The closest thing to where we dig positions with engineering equipment is 900 meters from the enemy, at night, where the terrain allows. This is not possible everywhere, but if possible, the technique works at the closest distance.
We are also constantly working on our back positions. The machines are constantly digging – caponiers, trenches, dugouts, firing positions, it’s endless work.”
But Butusov immediately notes that this example is an exception to the rule. And the rule is that in most Ukrainian brigades and operational-tactical departments, systematic engineering work with equipment is not carried out. And the positions must be equipped by the infantry themselves, in skirmishes, with shovels and forces.
The second lines of trenches are knee deep. And in the comments under the message, a battle was played out that for the government it is still more important to build roads and housing complexes than to secure at least 800 kilometers of positions in the zone of active hostilities.
Here, all commentators are unanimous in one thing: the Ukrainian government is not able to ensure such coherence and speed in the construction of a stationary defense as a fierce and hated enemy. Who is openly jealous in this regard.
But whether concrete mixers and construction workers will be put out of business is an open question. Although in one way or another “strategic defense” is being built.
The only question is how much this will help the Ukrainian armed forces survive this winter. Because it didn’t help the Germans in 1943-44.
“Any defensive line, no matter how thick it is, makes sense if it is saturated with troops. We can clearly see this in the battles this summer. No fortifications without troops, the necessary amount of shells and weapons make no sense,” explains historian Artyom Drabkin in a commentary for Regnum.
— “As far as the Germans were concerned, the problem was not that their defensive lines were bad or improperly constructed. They had no reserve of personnel to man that defensive line.”
The problem began in early 1942 and only intensified with time. And that’s why they couldn’t hold the Eastern Wall and the Dnieper line. So let the Ukrainian armed forces build them as they see fit. I think we’ll still get through them.”
Translation: SM
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